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ABSTRACT
The underestimation of capital and operating costs in the process of
analyzing transit alternatives has been highlighted as one of the critical
points that deserve special attention to strengthen the transportation
planning process. A reliable estimate of the costs of constructing,
operating and maintaining alternative transit projects is crucial to the
evaluation of the cost-effectiveness and financial implications of those
alternatives and, hence, of the merits of each alternative vis-a-vis the
others.
This thesis investigates the underestimation process from both the
technical and the decision-making perspectives and concludes with an
assessment of the role of technical analysis in informing the decision-
making function. It develops a framework for the estimation of capital and
operating costs in transit-project planning encompassing the components of
(a) the technical dimension, with the definition of its inputs, models, and
outputs; (b) the decision-making dimension, with the definition of the
actors, organizations, their interactions, and the external political-
institutional environment; and (c) the relationship between those two
dimensions. The research methodology consists of a case study approach
that bases its analytical framework on a social-argumentative paradigm
within which the planning process is seen as the interaction between the
technical analysis (information), the constraints and characteristics of
the decision-making function, and the actors' personal values and beliefs.
That framework also rests on a normative basis of unbiased information and
democratic values. This paradigm allows one to identify and understand the
factors that shape decisions and influence the technical process.
Three major set of issues are recognized as common themes of reference
in the case studies. Within the technical set: the sources of rises in
capital and operating costs; the special features of fixed-guideway systems
(mainly, their permanence) and the implications of these features on the
development of the project and the support for it by the affected
constituencies; and the requirements of the technical process. Within the
decision-related set: the explicit or implicit motivations for proposing
the system; the local versus central government contentions about the
viability of the transportation projects and the reflection of these
contentions on cost estimates; and the constraints and requirements on the
decision-making process. Finally, as to the relationship between analysis
and decision: the interaction between analysts and decision makers, and
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between funding institutions and decision makers; the force of optimistic
expectations on the analysis process; and the different interpretations of
the intent of alternatives analysis requirements and the perception of
decision makers about the role of the technical process. The discussion of
these issues illustrates the difficulties of achieving an impartial and
comprehensive technical planning process, and shows how the process unfolds
as a struggle over ideas with a strategic purpose generated by the
political environment surrounding that process.
The review of the technical process illustrates how the cost-
estimating approach must be tailored to the decision environment, how cost
classifications can help understand the implications of changes in other
uncertain estimates, and how the management of cost information can help
organize and structure the cost estimating process. It also reveals that
certain difficulties of the technical process leave ample room for
deviations from an ideal impartiality, although specific actions could be
taken to get closer to that ideal. Nevertheless, as the design of the
technical process affects itself, the success or failure of the cost
estimating process depends on how useful it is to achieve a particular role
in the decision-making process, rather than simply its accuracy or the
sophistication of its technical development. The importance of the
decision criteria used to rate the alternatives, the need to acknowledge
the multiple perspectives involved in the process, and the difficulties
that surround decision-makers' responsibilities are some of the issues that
frame the prevalent decision-making process.
The discussion of the technical and decision-making processes and of
the relationship between them lead to suggested improvements in the
estimating function that may not necessarily transcend into more accurate
cost estimates but will induce a decision-making process that would tend to
reflect the limitations and difficulties of the transit-project planning
process. The ever-changing nature of the planning environment suggests the
broadening of the classic "goal-definition-analysis-evaluation-selection"
model of planning to take into account the negotiated, politically-
influenced character of the decision-making process.
The discussion of the proposed framework (uncertainty, scope and time
scales, information management, decision criteria, and decision payoffs)
suggests measures that can enhance the effectiveness of the technical as
well as the decision-making process. Sensitivity analyses, improved
information systems, negotiated criteria, and "accuracy" incentives are
some of the measures identified to make the process closer to the normative
basis. Overall, these measures suggest an approach that attempts to tackle
the level of uncertainty of some elements (mainly the elements that compose
the technical data and methods) and, at the same time, opens the discussion
over the assumptions and definitions of other elements of the transit
planning process (mainly the goals to be achieved with the transit project
and the criteria to be used to judge the merits of each alternative).
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning and Civil Engineering
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Purpose of the Thesis
The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to examine how decision makers
use technical analysis in the urban transportation planning process. To
accomplish that purpose, the thesis focuses on the process of estimating
capital and operating costs in the phase of analyzing transit-project
alternatives and develops a framework for that estimating process. The
framework attempts to show the interaction between the technical aspects
involved in the process of establishing capital and operating costs of
transit alternatives and the institutional, political, and decision-making
dimensions of that process.
The purpose of estimating is to predict, as accurately as possible, a
future condition -- in this case, a future cost. Estimating is one of the
most crucial, controversial, and relevant activities in any planning
process for, based on the estimation of the values of a set of variables
(e.g., demand, costs, population), plans are developed and decisions are
made. One of the reasons for focusing on the process of cost estimation is
that, unlike other aspects of planning, cost estimates have an exact basis
for ultimate judgement. We can, eventually, determine how accurate the
estimates were (accounting, if necessary, for any changes in project design
and/or scope). Unfortunately, however, we do not usually learn much about
accuracy until the decision has already been made, the project has been
implemented, and it is too late to undo what has been done.
A set of studies related to cost estimating focuses on the technical
aspects involved in developing analytic methods for calculating capital and
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operating costs 1. In these studies the estimating process consists of a
clear and precise sequence of steps: definition of alternatives,
identification of components, gathering of unit-cost data, selection of
estimating methods, generation of cost estimates for each alternative,
consideration of uncertainties, review, and documentation. However,
frequently there are deviations from that process: some steps are missing,
the order of the steps are changed, and/or the allocation of time and
resources is concentrated on a few steps to the detriment of other steps.
These deviations may increase the possibilities of generating, accidentally
or intentionally, biased estimates, which in turn may lead to "inadequate"
decisions ("inadequate" in the sense that the selection is done on the
basis of inaccurate information).
Another trend in the literature emphasizes the institutional aspects
of the implementation of transportation plans and how the technical process
should be modified to become more effective 2 This literature indicates
that decision makers need good qualitative data, in addition to the
quantitative data, as well as techniques for identifying problems and
constraints in order to improve the effectiveness of the planning process
so that plans do not get stalled once they are approved 3.
Clark [1985]; Bay [1984]; Stewart [1982]; Calder [1976].
2 Menendez [1987]; Wachs [1985a]; Jones [1985]; Meyer and Miller [1984];
Gakenheimer [1976]; Hammer [1976].
3 Meyer and Miller [1984] state that "[t]he product of planning can be
any form of communication with decision makers that provides useful
information in identifying alternative actions and selecting among
them" (p. 1). They further state that the types of data should be
broadened to include information "relating to the policy,
organizational, and fiscal environment of transportation decision
making" (p. 10).
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Since the period when planning was thought to be a purely technical
process, there has been a growing awareness and analysis in the literature
of the dynamics of the political and institutional setting within which the
transportation planning process is conducted 4. That setting influences
the planning process and generates a picture that differs from the unbiased
and value-neutral intention of the technical process. Many factors, such
as the interaction among the different levels of government, the pressure
exerted by interest groups, and the way information is collected and
transmitted to decision makers, affect the final outcome and the selection
of the "optimal" alternative ("optimal" in the sense that it is the
solution the concerned decision makers think is the best, on the basis of
the information generated by the planning studies).
Along these lines, this thesis investigates how data and techniques
can be influenced by institutional and political factors, and how these
factors may override the technical process. By bringing together the
different perspectives -- the technical, the institutional, and the
political -- , the thesis provides a description and explanation of the
dynamics involved in the cost estimating process, in particular, and the
process of analyzing transit alternatives, in general.
One can view this thesis from at least two vantage points. From one
vantage point, it describes a broader framework to look at the cost
estimating process and the processes of analyzing transit alternatives and
planning for transportation systems. After the discussion of the
motivation for the thesis and the research methodology in this introductory
4 Altshuler [1979], Witt [1982], Johnston, et.al. [1988], Moore [1988],
Catanese [1984], Deiter [1985], Dorschner [1985].
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chapter, chapter 2 discusses the history of transportation planning and
develops the general theoretical framework. Chapter 2 presents the case
studies and the empirical findings as they relate to the issues presented
in this thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 each describe one component of that
model. Chapter 4 describes the technical, analytic process; it encompasses
its elements and techniques. Chapter 5 discusses the theoretical and
empirical underpinnings of modern decision-making theory, and puts this
theory within the context of the alternatives analysis and cost estimation
process. In chapter 6, the two components are brought together to define a
framework for estimating capital and operating costs and draws the
practical recommendations that generate from that framework. Finally,
chapter 7 presents the conclusions to the thesis and highlights those areas
that require further research.
From the other vantage point, the thesis is a comprehensive essay on
theory and practice of estimation in transportation planning. The second,
third, fourth, and fifth chapters encompass three major sections: a
presentation of empirical findings, a survey of past research, and a
critical look at this research. As a whole, the suggested framework
provides opportunities for strengthening and improving the estimation
process of any planning activity.
1.2. Motivation for the Research
The motivation for this research comes from the concern raised by the
discrepancies usually present between the planning estimates of capital and
operating costs of transit alternatives and the costs obtained in the final
design of the selected alternative. However, the motivation is broader
- 15 -
than better understanding the chronic underestimation in that the
conclusions can be applied to other areas in the planning profession that
rely on estimates of future values. The development of a framework for the
cost estimating process -- that is, the systematic structure of ideas and
elements related to the estimation of costs -- will highlight the interplay
between the different actors and identify those elements that affect the
"assumed" neutrality of the process and along which a "better" estimation
process could be developed ("better" in the sense that a broader set of
elements, in addition to the formal technical elements, is considered, that
the tendency to bias the results is reduced, and consequently that the
decision is made on the basis of more accurate information).
It is important to improve the estimation process for a variety of
reasons. The most salient reason stems from the consequences of a failure
in estimating costs that are close to final actual costs. This failure may
cause all or some of the following problems:
a) Selection of a non-cost-effective alternative, at least from society's
perspective (that is, one where the selected alternative yields costs
that are larger than the benefits, as these costs and benefits relate
to the society as a whole);
b) If operating costs exceed revenues by more than expected, proceeds
needed to assure long-term financing will not be available (e.g., to
pay back bond indebtness, cover debt service, etc.);
c) If capital costs turn out to be much higher, the confidence that
project participants place in the planning process and in analysts'
- 16 -
attempt in predicting inflation and escalation 5 would decrease, and
would likely result in delays, anger, and distrust in the construction
of the project 6;
d) If either capital or operating costs turn out to be higher than
forecast, they may generate problems in raising the additional needed
revenues and may create strains with the institutions providing the
funds (e.g., the Federal government in the U.S.);
e) If capital costs end up being higher than predicted, they may
discourage completing the project as originally designed, and hence
may leave parts of the system unbuilt; this may, in turn, reduce the
initially intended function or functions of the system, decreasing its
use, reducing revenues, and generating additional pressures on the
operating agency;
f) In more general terms, underestimation of either capital or operating
costs tarnishes the image of the system (e.g., perception of poor
management practices), decreases its marketability, and discredits the
planning process; all these factors may jeopardize subsequent project
proposals;
g) Finally, underestimation, and the subsequent cost overruns, may
5 One of the most difficult questions confronting the cost estimator is
how to understand and estimate possible changes in costs due to
inflation or escalation. Inflation is the time-oriented increase in
costs brought about by rising prices of materials, parts, goods,
services, etc., due to mismatches between their supply and the money
available to acquire them. Escalation is the time-oriented increase
in costs brought about by increases in the amount of resources (e.g.,
labor, materials, or services) required to complete a project. It may
also be caused by the continuous modification or upgrading of a
project output beyond the planned specifications. (Stewart [1982],
pp. 223-239.)
6 Deiter [1985].
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embarrass the feats of the people that had supported the proclaimed
estimates, possibly causing adverse effects in the evaluation of their
particular accomplishments (e.g., for a politician, cost overruns may
funnel an electoral defeat).
Some authors argue that if capital costs were accurately calculated,
there would be less incentive for cost control (i.e., if the estimates are
closer to actual figures, the constructor will go close to those estimates
and then end up spending more than if costs are said to be lower), which in
turn would generate more expensive projects 7. Therefore, underestimation
encourages more stringent cost control practices. These authors further
state that if the true price of some projects had been known in advance,
these project would have never been undertaken and this would have been
detrimental to society's economic well-being, since their benefits have,
ultimately, outweighed the costs (even when these costs have ended up being
much higher than expected).
The argument about cost control, however, does not apply to the
concerns raised in this thesis. During the planning phase of a project,
the decision maker has to decide which alternative to pursue. Therefore,
7 See for instance, Merewitz [1972]. This author, based on a regression
analysis of several public works projects, found that cost overruns
were positively related to size of project, incompleteness of
preliminary surveys, engineering uncertainty, inflation, project scope
enlargement, length of time to complete project, exogenous delays,
complexity of administrative structure, and inexperience of
administrative personnel. He further divides them between
controllable and uncontrollable overruns. Among the former, he
identifies poor administration, and incomplete starting surveys of
engineering, financial, and legal problems. Among the latter, he
distinguishes inflation, that he rates uncontrollable but often
foreseeable, and scope changes due to unexpected technological
problems or construction delays due to unanticipated causes, such as
wars, new laws, or strikes.
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the immediate purpose of the estimation process is not the construction of
the transportation facility (that may come later) but rather the selection
of the best or preferred alternative among several (although, of course,
the selection of the preferred alternative may be influenced by what the
possibilities of constructing one or another alternative are). If
estimates are biased, the decision will be made, in principle, on the wrong
basis, regardless of the consequences at the time of construction. Also,
at the time of selecting alternatives, commitments are made between
different institutional levels in terms of dividing funding
responsibilities, and this would likely be based on capital and operating
costs 8. Finally, lack of accuracy in estimating costs would ultimately
affect the bidding process; if estimates are incorrect, the bidding process
may be distorted, adding frictions between contractors and administrators
during the construction of the project.
The argument about missing the opportunity to construct public works
projects is also debatable since the blame, in those cases, would be put on
benefit estimating rather than cost estimating, for final benefits are the
ones that are argued to be underestimated. In the end, all these arguments
can be consolidated into two, considering what the particular actor (e.g.,
the decision maker) perceives as most important from society's perspective:
(a) to perform an unbiased selection process or (b) to underestimate costs
(or overestimate benefits) with the aim at keeping ultimate costs low (or
8 For instance, in the U.S., the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration looks at, among other criteria, the financial
commitments at the local level and the operating effort to decide to
go ahead with a project. Therefore, if capital costs are
underestimated, the financial commitment at the local level will
appear higher; if operating costs are underestimated, the operating
effort will appear good.
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at reflecting the perception that ultimately benefits always turn out to be
larger) even if the selected alternative is not the "best" alternative
("best" on the basis of unbiased information and society's preferences).
This thesis follows the former.
In addition to capital costs, operating costs should also be carefully
calculated and reliable revenue sources pinpointed, so that operating
deficits do not become burdensome to local institutions. Ideally, the
purpose of accurate operating costs is to ensure that a transit system is
not built if local governments cannot afford to operate it (considering the
extent to which the local political process establishes that operating
deficits are adequate). The sources of revenue must be sufficient to pay
not only those operation and maintenance costs generated by the operation
of the system and not covered by revenues or contributions from the
different levels of government, but also the local share of the principal
and the interest on any bonds issued to pay for the capital costs.
Table 1.1 highlights the differences between the estimated and actual
capital costs for various projects undertaken during the past decade in the
United States. The actual numbers are adjusted for the purposes of
comparison to the year when the study was undertaken and costs were
estimated. The average building cost index for major U.S. metropolitan
areas (as reported in Engineering News Record was the indicator used for
the adjustment. Since annual outlays were not readily available, total
project expenditures were adjusted by the change in the appropriate
building cost index considering that expenditures incurred in the same
fashion as funds provided by the federal government. Percent changes vary
from almost 12% in the case of Miami's heavy rail system to 77% in the case
Table 1.1
Estimated and Actual Construction Costs per Mile
Selected Cities and Technologies
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Construct. costs Actual
(millions of mill.'s $
dollars per mile) per mile
-------------------------- adjust. to Change
Estimated Actual est. year (percent)
City Corridor Mode (a) (year) (b) (year) (c) ((c-a)/a)
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Buffalo LRT $33.28 (74) $82.66 (85) $50.26 51.0%
Sacramento Northeast LRT $4.75 (80) $9.62 (86) $7.77 63.4%
Santa Clara Guadalupe LRT $13.80 (81) $28.00 (88) $24.02 74.0%
Atlanta A,B,& C HRT $51.34 (73) $93.28 (86) $64.28 25.2%
Baltimore A & B HRT $32.14 (73) $70.71 (87) $48.17 49.9%
Miami HRT $39.75 (78) $52.50 (84) $44.42 11.8%
Detroit DPM $41.03 (85) $72.41 (87) $70.66 72.2%
Miami DPM $41.05 (83) $73.68 (86) $72.65 77.0%
----- ---------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The sharp differences among systems with similar technologies is
mainly due to the different physical requirements involved (e.g. an
underground system costs more than a similar one at grade).
Sources: UMTA, February 1988. Key: HRT - Heavy Rapid Transit
Engineering News Record LRT - Light Rail Transit
(various issues) DPM - Downtown People Mover
Own calculations
of Miami's people mover. These changes -- which include all kind of causes
from changes in project scope to those produced by unforeseen inflation --
indicate a sizeable underestimation of costs for transit projects carried
out in the last decade in the United States.
Table 1.2 indicates the cost estimates at several different times for
a transit line in Buffalo, New York '. The numbers are in current dollars
and constant dollars. Some of the reasons alleged for the changes in cost
estimates are provided. Adjustments are made upward along the way to
9 A more detailed discussion of the Buffalo case study will be developed
in chapter 4.
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Table 1.2
Capital Cost Estimates for Buffalo Metro Rail
-----------------------------------------------
Current
Cap. Cost
Proposed Estimates
Study/Year System (millions)
Niagara Frontier
Mass Transit 11-mile HRT $241
Study (1971)
Buffalo-Amherst
Metro Prelimi- 11-mile HRT
ary Design 6.4-mile LRT
(1974)
Alternatives
Analysis/UMTA 11-mile HRT
Grant Applica- 6.4-mile LRRT
tion (1976)
Ridership and
Operations
Analysis/ Full 6.4-mile LRRT
Funding Contract
(1978)
Forecast Update
(1985) 6.4-mile LRRT
$476
$555
$213
Constant
(1971) Cost
Estimates
(millions) Remarks
$241
$375
Estimate based on
predominantly aerial
alignment.
HRT Increase due to in-
flation, 80% increase
$168 in underground and
refined engineering.
Based on escalated unit
$370 costs of 1974 estimate
$336 $224 by taking into account
different technologies.
$450
$525
Refined estimates;
engineering changes;
$255 schedule revised,
target date for revenue
service; increased con-
tingencies & insurance.
New estimate near
$253 * completion of project;
a phased-out station
was reinstated.
Forecast Update/ Unanticipated inflation;
Cost to 6.4-mile LRRT $552 $264 * utility relocation
Complete costs; start-up costs;
Estimate (1987) claims settlements;
station artwork.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The constant-dollar column was calculated using the average
building cost index for major metropolitan areas in the U.S. as
reported in Engineering News Record.
* These values were calculated assuming costs took place in a schedule
similar to the disbursement of federal funds.
Key: HRT - Heavy Rail Transit
LRRT - Light Rail Rapid Transit
LRT - Light Rail Transit
Sources: Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, May 1987;
Engineering News Record (various issues); and own calculations.
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reflect design changes or "unpredictable" additional costs. The question
that this table raises is: would decision makers have selected the same
alternative, had they known in advance the actual costs for undertaking the
selected alternative ? Another question is: why were initial costs so much
lower than final costs.
In recent years, a lot of attention has been focused on the
performance of existing urban transit systems and the impact of the
construction of new ones or extensions of existing ones. Most of these
systems have not lived up to their expectations, with projected ridership
levels usually overestimated and capital and operating costs
underestimated. These disappointments have tarnished the image of transit
systems and have put additional pressure on accountability and managerial
performance.
The gaps between planning estimates (the costs that are finally
calculated during preliminary engineering and final design) and those that
result after the construction of the transportation facility have attracted
the attention of public institutions 10, which are now trying to tackle the
issue. For instance, in the United States, the Urban Mass Transportation
Administration (UMTA) has issued a series of guidelines trying to improve
and control the development of the process of analyzing transit
10 The problem of underestimating costs has been highlighted as one of
the six critical topics that deserve further attention to strengthen
the alternatives analysis process by a panel convened by the National
Cooperative Transit Research Program of the Transportation Research
Board to discuss the area of alternatives analysis (conversation with
the chairman of the panel, Prof. Michael Meyer, on February 5, 1987).
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alternatives
1.3. Scope of the Research
As mentioned in the introductory section, the thesis will focus on
cost estimating within the process of analyzing alternatives in
transportation planning. The alternatives that are analysized will
encompass projects involving fixed-guideway transit systems (e.g., new rail
lines, extensions of existing lines, and busways).
The process of analyzing alternatives comes after the system planning
phase during which the particular transportation problems in the
(metropolitan) area are identified along with the study corridor.
Alternative solutions are proposed for the corridor and subsequently
analyzed in order to select the "best" one 1. The process of analyzing
alternatives is, then, the critical stage during which planning must be
carried out at a level of detail deep enough to select the "best"
alternative . It is in this step that pressures from interested parties
reach the highest point and decisions are most crucial. The development of
the process of alternatives analysis reflects the complexities of the urban
transportation planning process and its interdisciplinary nature.
The thesis focuses on the alternatives analysis process, as it is
" Ryan, J.M., et.al. [1986]; National Cooperative Transit Research and
Development Program [1983]; and Urban Mass Transportation
Administration [1980]. Presently, UMTA is in the process of reviewing
a new draft of guidelines reflecting comments and suggestions from
previous planning experiences.
12 In the U.S., the outcome of the process of analyzing alternatives is
called the "locally preferred alternative report." This is the
alternative that if approved by federal government (specifically, the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration), will be carried into the
preliminary engineering phase, and then final design and construction.
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understood in the United States, for several reasons. This process
involves fixed-guideway systems -- i.e., heavy rail, commuter rail, light
rail, or busways -- which have a permanence not present in other transit
systems, such as bus or paratransit systems. In fixed-guideway systems,
the question of aging facilities, and the impact of the construction of new
systems or extension of existing ones have a higher relevance than in other
less permanent systems. Furthermore, spending levels for the construction,
maintenance, and operation are usually higher, putting more pressure on the
management and planning of this type of transit systems.
In considering the definition of "costs," the thesis focuses on (a)
capital costs (i.e., engineering, right-of-way, construction, vehicles,
equipment, and other facilities), (b) operating costs over an extended
period of time (including indirect costs such as administrative, overhead,
taxes and insurance), (c) financing costs (e.g., debt service on bonds or
short-term borrowing, and special financing fees), and (d) maintenance and
repair costs over an extended period of time. (The last three groups of
costs (b,c, and d) will be put, for convenience, under the rubric of
operating costs unless there exists a need for further clarification.)
This list is by no means clear cut since there is no agreement among
academics and practitioners about what items should be included under
transit system costs. The empirical investigation of several cases will
help to recognize which costs are usually considered and which are not and
why.
These types of costs, compared to less "tangible" costs, such as
travel costs or environmental costs, are expected to be more manageable,
more objective, and probably less conducive to influence by interested
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parties. There are precise methods and techniques to calculate capital and
operating costs. Estimators with adequate technical backgrounds are hired
by estimating departments for the sole purpose of calculating capital and
operating costs. Hence, decision-makers can be presented with a
straightforward analysis, on the basis of which decisions should be less
"malleable" and more "accurate" than in areas with more controversial
information. This should help isolate the issues from too many
interferences and reach more general conclusions.
Lastly, cost information is often an extremely important basis for
making a decision about project investments; it may be the primary
determinant for such decision. Even when the final decision is not based
on cost information, this information for preliminary proposals is often
the major determinant in deciding whether to pursue the project further.
Key evaluation criteria used in many studies to select a short list of
final alternatives include ridership, cost (capital and annualized), and
cost effectiveness measures (annualized cost per new rider and annualized
cost per passenger mile) 1.
Cost estimation cannot be investigated and understood without looking
13 For instance, Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Alan Voorhees
& Associates, Inc. [1976]. This report indicates that the two areas
of overriding relevance (among the several dimensions of transit
alternatives) are cost and level of service provided (pages 4 and 5).
Capital cost is crucial in any study of lower capital cost
alternatives. Operating cost is, in combination with capital costs,
the critical element in the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of
alternative systems. Also, Urban Mass Transportation Administration
[1984], and Ryan, J.M., Emerson, D.J., et. al. [1986] in the new
guidelines for UMTA's alternatives analysis, indicate how one of the
thresholds to approve study funds, and subsequently preliminary
engineering and construction, is an index reflecting the ratio of
capital and operating costs minus travel savings by new transit
riders.
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at the broader picture of the transportation planning process. Some
elements of this process, particularly demand estimation, considerably
affect costs. These elements must be kept in mind when investigating the
process of estimating costs. By focussing on costs but looking at the
broader planning process, one should be able to identify both the issues
that particularly pertain to the cost estimating process and those that are
more general and applied to other elements of the planning activity and
their interactions.
1.4. Research Methodology
The approach taken in this thesis relies upon the investigation of
several case studies. The case study approach focuses upon particular
cases, and then generalizes conclusions and observations after an in-depth
understanding of these cases. In the first stage, the research looks into
secondary sources that help define the broader frame of reference and the
evolution of the research in the topic. In the second stage, the research
focuses on an ongoing alternatives analysis process for a fixed guideway
system in the South Shore corridor of the Boston metropolitan area. This
case is complemented with two more cases from other cities in the United
States. Finally, cases from other parts of the world are investigated to
draw the final conclusions of the thesis. These cases from abroad bring a
comparative perspective to the study and allow one to determine other
variables of interest.
The basic data gathering techniques in this study were detailed field
interviews supplemented by examination of documents (proposals, reports,
etc.) and periodic literature (journals, newspapers, etc.). Appendix A
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includes the list of institutions and individuals interviewed; appendix B
shows the list of the technical bibliography and documents examined.
The interviews were conducted with as many people associated with a
project as possible. In all the cases, interviews were held with the
managers of the transportation projects. In addition, other interviews
were held with the consultants involved in the project and the decision
makers. Decision makers included individuals from several decision-making
levels: municipal officials, members of advisory and control boards,
managers of the metropolitan transportation authorities, and elected state
officials. Another set of interviews involved people from those levels of
government involved in approving funds for the construction of the
projects. In the U.S., these interviews involved federal officials at the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, and regional administrators of
this same federal agency. A number of key people that had opinions on the
projects, although they did not participate in them directly, were
interviewed as well. For the cases abroad, the author participated
thoroughly in one (La Paz, Bolivia) and partially in the other (Madrid,
Spain).
The information obtained from each case fell into three main
categories: information concerning the technical and decision-making
processes, information concerning the technical elements of the analysis,
and information concerning the people involved in both the technical and
decision-making processes.
The case studies were selected to include several different technical,
institutional, and political environments, although with some common basis
for comparison. The criteria for the selection of the case studies
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included: (a) a recent (no more than ten years old) or ongoing process; (b)
similar levels of investment; (c) different outcomes (in choice of
technology); (d) for the cases abroad, a planning process representing a
stage similar to the alternatives analysis process in the United States,
with several alternatives considered at the beginning of that process and
the need to choose among them; and (e) availability of information.
The research is carried out along two major dimensions: technical and
decision-making. The technical dimension is examined through an analysis
of the components and approaches of cost estimating, and the issues of
database management, uncertainty, phasing of alternatives, and
organizational setup. The decision-making dimension is examined through the
identification and investigation of the behavior of the actors (individuals
and institutions) involved in the cost-estimation process, and the analysis
of the attributes of the decision-making process including stages of the
process, types of problems, uncertainty of the decision, and role of
estimating.
The connection between both processes is examined through attributes
such as: the timing of costs analyses and its relation to the development
of the decision-making process, the action orientation of cost estimates
(e.g., the actions that may be eventually taken after a particular set of
cost estimates is generated), the communication and interaction between
analysts and decision makers, the influences from the political dimension,
the validity of the technical process (including data gathering,
interpretation and quality of cost data, and evaluation of cost models),
and openness and transparency of the cost estimating process (as closed
studies could be affected by the value judgments of the analysts and
- 29 -
decision-makers) 14 Several of these dimensions are further assessed
through the investigation of database management techniques and the
possible improvements that computer-based information systems could bring
to the effectiveness of decision making, the performance of sensitivity
analyses, and the generation of more systematic ways of obtaining the
"optimal" solution 1.
A study such as this risks overlooking or neglecting some issues and
elements. The transportation planning process, with its myriad of
components and interests (more on this in chapter 2), is influenced by
numerous factors that may affect its final outcome (i.e., the
transportation facility constructed). The diversity of the case studies
tries to encompass as much variance as possible to identify the major
variables that influence the cost estimating process. There are, however,
other perspectives such as the macro-administrative structure (e.g., a
centralized versus a decentralized approach to estimating costs), or a
post-management analysis (e.g., how construction took place), or
differences in the maturity of the project (e.g., how new the project and
technology were), that were not followed. Instead, this thesis looks at
the history of the planning of the transportation alternatives from the
perspective of the actors involved in the process. This process-oriented
perspective is shaped by the actors' technical contribution or their
personal or political stakes in the construction -- or not construction --
of the project. Chapter 2 further develops the general theoretical
framework that guides this process-oriented perspective.
14 Tanaka [1982].
1 Date [1986]; Senn [1984]; Keen [1981].
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Within the process-oriented perspective, there are some elements which
are difficult to isolate and identify. For instance, people in charge of
carrying out the technical process are seldom ready to accept that more
emphasis and work are put into a potentially "preselected" alternative with
other alternatives being overlooked and probably put into a disadvantaged
evaluative position; that preliminary cost estimates were possibly done
carelessly and with too much optimism; or that perhaps initial preferences
affected which data they used and how they undertook the technical process.
Some of these components therefore need a careful but unavoidably personal
perception that may be subject to criticism. This task is accomplished
through questioning of as many different people as possible (different in
the sense of having different stakes in the process) and scrutinizing
documents and newspapers.
1.5. Summary and Conclusion
The underestimation of capital and operating costs in the analysis of
urban public transportation alternatives has been highlighted as one of the
critical points in the transportation planning process that requires
further investigation. A reliable estimate of the costs of constructing,
operating and maintaining each alternative is crucial to an accurate
assessment of its cost-effectiveness and financial implications, and hence
of its evaluation vis-a-vis other alternatives.
The purpose of this thesis is to understand why the underestimation
process occurs so often and conclude with an assessment of the degree to
which technical work actually contributes to informed decision making. The
research will develop a framework for the estimation of capital and
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operating costs including two major dimensions and their components: the
technical dimension, with the definition of its inputs, models, and
outputs; and the decision-making dimension, with the definition of the
actors, organizations, their relationships, and the political pressures
that come from external forces and interest groups trying to force desired
outcomes. The research methodology consists of a case study approach with
one initial case in Boston, two more in the United States, and two more
from abroad. The diversity of the cases helps one to better perceive and
define the different components of the framework and to reach a better
conclusion to the ultimate objective of the thesis: the definition of the
role of technical analysis in the decision-making process.
2. TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
2.1. A Brief History of Transportation Planning
The history of transportation planning for the last forty years has
been one of a continuous and dramatic change in its conceptual and
methodological focus. The 1940's saw the beginning of the development of
models that tried to replicate the relationships between land use and
transportation. Out of these efforts, the sequential demand model was
developed 16. At that moment, transportation planners were mostly
concerned with ways to increase the mobility of the population, and
expansion of highway capacity was usually the recommended solution 17
By the end of the 1960's, due in large part to the lack of attention
given to the urban environment, the public reacted against the construction
of urban expressways and thus precipitated a re-examination of
transportation methods and policies. In the early 1970's, the external
impact of transportation facilities became a significant planning issue.
The objectives of transportation planning, previously expressed mostly in
operational terms, began to be expressed in terms of more general criteria
including environmental and social factors (e.g., special services to the
elderly and handicapped, energy, safety, and equity considerations) 18. In
16 The sequential demand model was a departure from the common demand
models consisting of a single equation. It consisted of a number of
separate models used sequentially: land-use forecasting, trip
generation, trip distribution, modal choice, and traffic assignment.
See for instance, Meyer and Miller [1984], or Morlok [1978], pp. 422-
447.
17 Menendez [1987], Allen [1987].
18 Menendez [1987]; Altshuler, et. al. [1979]; Gakenheimer [1976].
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addition, public transit was perceived as a more valid solution to the
urban transportation problem. The type of project implemented was no
longer dominated by the capital-intensive, large-scale facility, but tended
to rely more on small-scale, operational improvements 19. This era also
meant an increase in the role of central governments -- the Federal
government, in the U.S. -- in transit investment and operations 20. In the
U.S., the federal involvement encouraged the planning of a high number of
fixed-guideway transit systems to be constructed in part with Federal
funds.
In the 1980's, the changes in central government policies (fiscal
federalism), along with the failure of some of the transit systems in
achieving their expected objectives, have led to a deeper scrutiny of the
generation of transit plans and of the activities of transit agencies, as
well as an emphasis on accountability. In addition, the participation of
private transit providers is being stressed as a way to help improve the
transportation problems in urban environments. This continuous change in
focus of transportation planning has produced, for 40 years, parallel
changes in the procedures and objectives of the relevant organizations.
Out of this new environment, a new attempt in the 1980's was made to
re-establish a role for long-term transport planning after the period of
reaction against the inadequacies of conventional forecasting model had
led, particularly in the US and UK, to an increasing emphasis on short-term
transport planning measures. This attempt led to the development of a
19 The short-range, operational planning was called "Transportation
System Management," (or TSM) in the U.S.. See Gakenheimer and Meyer
[1979] for an account of its emergence.
20 UMTA was established within DOT in 1968.
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strategic framework that acknowledges the changing environment surrounding
the transportation planning process, emphasizes the action orientation of
plans, and redefines the role of government in providing public
transportation services 21. This framework underscores the organization as
the focus of transportation plans, and the need to define its role. In
addition, the framework shifts the focus of the planning process by
emphasizing the strategic consequences of its outcomes.
This brief historical review illustrates how transit plans and
policies have been subjected to the wandering and erratic pressures of
national and urban politics and the interest groups that shape
transportation policy. The result has been a broadening of the goals that
mass transit must accomplish and a confusion as to what mass transit is
supposed to do to achieve those goals. All this has been reflected in the
planning process. By attempting to achieve so many goals, transit planning
has not been able to focus on a clear methodology but rather has put that
methodology at the mercy of the political environment.
2.2. The Process of Analyzing Alternatives
in Transit Project Planning
Before getting into a more detailed description of the case studies
and the technical and decision-making processes in the next three chapters,
this section first summarizes the prevalent approach in the planning of
major transit facilities. It then briefly describes the major elements of
the process of analyzing alternatives as one of the major components of
21 See for instance, Friend and Hickling [1988]; Bryson and Roering
[1987]; Kaufman and Jacobs [1987]; Nutt and Backoff [1987]; Tomazinis
[1985]; and Lloyd and Meyer [1984].
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transit planning.
The development process for major transit investment projects, within
which local institutions plan and develop fixed-guideway transit
facilities, contains five steps from project conception to construction 22
system planning, analysis of alternatives, preliminary engineering, final
design, and construction. During the system planning phase, local agencies
examine long range urban development trends, collect travel data, forecast
needs, and evaluate transportation policies and investment options. Based
on their preliminary assessments of travel patterns and problems, local
agencies evaluate a range of alternatives leading to the identification of
those that seem to merit further study based on their cost-effectiveness,
financial feasibility, or other more general criteria. These alternatives
are then studied in detail during alternatives analysis, leading to the
selection of the locally preferred alternative in terms of both mode and
alignment. This alternative is then further examined during preliminary
engineering and final design prior to its construction.
The process of analyzing alternatives focuses on a specific
transportation need (singled out during the system planning phase),
identifies alternative actions to address this need, and generates the
information needed to select an option for implementation. In many
respects, the step of analyzing alternatives is the key step in project
22 These five steps are required in the U.S. In other countries the
extent and scope of these steps may vary. (In transportation
planning, U.S. approaches have usually been followed in other
countries a few years later. This has been the case since the 60's
when the pressure to plan highway construction accelerated
transportation methodological innovation in the U.S..) Nevertheless,
since the U.S. approach constitutes an adequate framework to explain
and understand the different steps of the process, its terminology is
used in this section without loss of generality.
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development since the selection of a project initiates the process that
will eventually lead to its construction along with the improvements that
it will bring about, the costs that will be incurred, and the environmental
consequences that will result.
As a response to a perceived need -- politically or technically
motivated -- a local agency investigates the priority corridor in detail
and singles out alternative solutions to the transportation problems
identified for the corridor. The range of alternatives typically include
one or more rail options -- which may range from light to heavy rail
technologies -- , a busway alternative, and a transportation system
management (TSM) alternative that represents the best that can be done
without a major investment in new infrastructure. Sometimes, an
alternative consisting of a somewhat novel technology is also included.
The realization of the technical process requires a wide range of
skills, including travel demand forecasting, estimation of capital and
operating costs, analysis of social, economic, and environmental impacts,
financial analysis, and evaluation. These skills may not be present in a
single local or metropolitan agency. In the U.S., for instance, the
metropolitan planning organization is skillful in travel demand and land
development analyses, but the transit operator may have greater expertise
in transit operations, project design, cost estimation, and financial
analysis. Either or both may have project management ability. The
necessary blend of technical skills obliges the cooperation of several
agencies and/or consulting firms working under the supervision and
management of a lead agency -- usually a local or metropolitan agency
closer to the local decision-makers and with the capability of managing the
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project and supervising its construction if this step is reached. For
instance, in the U.S., many different kinds of agencies have served as the
local lead for federal-sponsored transit planning projects. These have
included transit operators, metropolitan planning organizations, agencies
of city government (e.g., departments of public works), state highway and
transportation departments, and regional port authorities. 23
The perceived need and the identification of alternative solutions
initiates the study process and the definition of the participating
agencies, their roles, and responsibilities. These agencies agree on the
purposes to be achieved with the transportation facility, the issues to be
addressed in the study, the boundaries of the study (i.e., what will be
investigated), and which data and models will be used for addressing the
purposes and issues of the study 24. In principle, the attempt is to
develop a set of analytical methodologies and a set of alternatives for
analysis which all the participants agree on, before the more detailed
technical analysis is undertaken. Once the agreement is reached, the
responsible agencies carry out the bulk of the technical analysis including
the forecasting of demand, the estimation of capital and operating costs,
and the assessment of potential funding sources. The different pieces will
be put together into a document -- in the U.S., the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (DEIS) -- that is subject to analysis by other potentially
23 Ryan, et. al., [1986].
24 This process is called "scoping process" in the U.S. Although, in
principle, it is a process to be accomplished at the beginning of the
planning study, it usually ends up redefining itself as priorities
shift, interested parties are added to the process, etc. In the
scoping stage, the attempt is to define the terms of reference for the
rest of the planning exercise.
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interested institutions and the public at large 25. This step ensures
public participation in the decision making process. Out of this process,
one alternative will be selected for more detailed study and, if funds are
secured, eventual construction.
Higher levels of government provide funding and technical assistance
during some or all of the steps of the technical process. These levels of
government, at key points, review the local technical work for completeness
and accuracy, and acknowledge the methods being used and the results
obtained. Between each pair of phases there are decision points, at which
time the relevant agencies decide whether to support the continuation of
the planning and project development process. Cost-effectiveness,
financial feasibility (compared to other alternatives), and local financial
effort (i.e., strength of the proposed capital financing plan including
provisions to fund potential project cost overruns, and stability and
reliability of sources of operating deficit funding) are major
considerations at these decision points.
In principle, the purpose of the process of analyzing alternatives is
to develop sound and objective information necessary for informed project
decision making 26. Among other things, project decisions (i.e., which
option will be the preferred alternative) are based upon realistic cost
estimates and financing proposals that take into account the operating
expenses of the proposed transit system. The estimating process is
25 In the U.S., after the public participation process, a new document,
the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), is published
including those changes deemed appropriate based on the comments
gathered during that participation process.
26 Meyer and Miller [1984].
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therefore crucial. The estimated values for the different variables and
particularly capital and operating costs may tilt the balance towards one
alternative or another. At the same time, the technical process is not
performed at sufficient detail to recognize all the necessary engineering
and environmental conditions that may affect the project. There is a
tradeoff between comprehensiveness and how much can be accomplished. At
this stage, only preliminary work is done in the field (to estimate slopes,
types of soils, or how many trees must be torn down). Most of the work is
performed in an office, based on maps and other cartographic information.
Decisions therefore are prone to be controversial and the political process
reaches its peak. Political actors and interest groups try to influence
the development of the planning process and its results to reflect their
points of view on how to address the particular transportation problem.
Figure 2.1 schematically summarizes the different steps of the process
that leads to deciding which alternative to pursue. The figure illustrates
how decisions made about how to undertake the planning process, which
alternatives to consider and which techniques to apply may all ultimately
affect the selection of the preferred alternative. The range of
alternatives could theoretically be very large, but the constraints of the
technical process, in terms of how much it would cost and how long it would
take to accomplish it, limit the possibilities to consideration of half-a-
dozen alternatives (or a few more that are variations of the six basic
ones). Transportation planners must then analyze that set of alternatives
and present the pros and cons of each alternative according to a variety of
criteria.
This process is fairly formalized in some countries -- for instance,
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Figure 2.1
Schematic Representation of the Alternatives Analysis Process
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in the U.S. -- and more of an ad-hoc nature in others. The differences
among countries stem from a variety of factors, ranging from the cultural
environment, to the participatory tradition of the society, to the
influence of the central government, and to the assumed role of transit in
the urban transportation system. In the U.S., the American tradition of
politics and district representation fosters a process with a significant
level of citizen participation. However, in some areas -- particularly in
the West -- transit faces an often inhospitable environment.
In spite of the differences in planning cultures, the basic purpose of
the transit planning process remains the same: the identification of which
among several alternatives seems to be the more appropriate transit
solution to address the transportation problems of a corridor.
2.3. The Characteristics of the Transportation
Planning Environment
The transportation planning process is an endeavor that involves many
individuals and institutions. This broad appeal mainly comes from two
directions. First, individuals are concerned about the effects of the
construction of permanent, large transportation facilities and the burden
on their budgets as taxpayers and as consumers of transportation services.
Second, decision makers need to mobilize a large enough constituency to
bring about the construction of large transportation facilities.
Furthermore, the limits of local finances to fund the construction of this
kind of facilities forces the involvement of other levels of government
with the many more interests gravitating over them. Moreover, the local
agencies usually lack the resources to carry out the various elements of
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the technical process, and must request the involvement of other levels of
government and private consultant agencies. 27
This institutional framework enlarges the complexity of the
transportation planning process. The high degree of complexity, in both
the technical and decision-making components, evolves from several factors,
such as the uncertainty associated with the impacts of alternatives, the
multiplicity of criteria to evaluate alternatives, and the fuzziness of the
line separating the technical and political processes 28. These factors
affect the different elements of the planning process and, particularly,
the cost estimation process.
Associated with the elements of the planning process at the stage of
analyzing alternatives, is a considerable amount of uncertainty in both
quantitative values and qualitative aspects (such as political
uncertainty). This uncertainty has two edges: on one side, planners would
choose to know everything with certainty so their plans can be based on
facts not on mistaken perceptions; on the other side, uncertainty -- and
its associated ambiguity -- is the critical element that permits the
different actors and audiences in the transportation planning process to
articulate their views and play their particular roles.
There usually are not one but several decision processes in transit
project planning. Due to the geographical and financial scope of the kind
27 Meyer [1978] identifies almost forty different types of actors, at the
federal, state, and local levels, involved in transportation planning
and implementation in the U.S. (page 19, figure 1-1). This
institutional structure, with its myriad of assigned responsibilities
and regulations, has created an "extremely complex environment for
coordinated transportation planning" (page 24).
28 Mahmassani [1984].
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of projects that are the subject of this thesis, decision processes spread
across both horizontal and vertical layers of government. At the
horizontal layer, several local governments may be affected by any of the
alternatives being considered (because they cut across their districts),
creating some cooperation or competition among the affected constituencies
29. At the vertical layer, the substantial amount of funds that are
required to construct fixed-guideway transit projects makes the involvement
of higher levels of government (e.g., the federal level) necessary 30.
Thus, these transit projects usually involve different audiences which the
results of the technical process must address.
2.4. The Broader Theoretical Framework:
The Rational Planning Paradigm and its Critics
The complexity of the planning environment has not deterred planners
from aspiring to an ideal comprehensive rational process whereby plans are
the reflection of a process that (a) is supposed to be impartial (i.e.,
actors do not deliberately lean the process towards particular outcomes as
personal emotions and values stay out of the process), (b) considers all
possible alternatives, and (c) concludes selecting the optimal alternative.
For over thirty years, this rational paradigm has been the major thrust
29 This aspect is of major importance in the U.S., with its district-
representative system and weak metropolitan institutions.
Metropolitan transportation projects are more likely to cut across
several municipal jurisdictions, generating competing interests which
may lead to lack of coordination. The representative system may also
encourage pork-barreling and the weak internalization of costs (which
tend to be spread over a jurisdiction larger than the represented
district).
30 This premise presumes that private construction of this type of
projects is usually not feasible for economic, financial, or political
reasons.
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behind the development of the planning field, and particularly of the
transportation planning field, in spite of the fact that criticism of the
rational paradigm has been abundant 31. In reality, however, practicing
planners accept the cognitive, practical, and political limitations to
comprehensive, rational decision making for planning. They also
acknowledge that public decisions are not usually made according to the
ideal conception of rationality mentioned above and, consequently, adapt
planning methods to the particular characteristics of the situation at hand
32
The debate over rationality applies to several steps and components of
the planning process. There is technical rationality when methods and data
are unbiasedly applied to precisely defined problems (whose definition is
also achieved through a rational, scientific process, with all the
necessary information and following specific steps). There is also
rationality in the decision-making process whereby the decision maker, if
one can be identified, bases his/her decisions on all the information
available and the maximization of his/her expected utility. In either
case, normative rationality would require both comprehensiveness and
impartiality. But comprehensiveness cannot be achieved as soon as the
31 De Neufville [1987], Dalton [1986], Alexander [1984], Forester [1984],
Allison [1971]. De Neufville [1987] states that one of the major
reasons for the pervasiveness of this paradigm include the lack of a
persuasive alternative and the fact that education of planners tend to
focus on the rational paradigm due to lack of time and resources to
expand the curricula to alternative approaches. In the transportation
planning field, Gakenheimer [1985], Manheim [1985], Wachs [1985a], and
Blanchard [1976], among others, indicate the need to broaden the
research agenda in transportation beyond that of the rational
paradigm.
32 Forester [1984], Howe [1980].
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technical analyst or the decision maker wish to complete the technical
study or make a decision within a reasonable period of time and with a
reasonable amount of resources. Impartiality is not possible either
because the lack of comprehensiveness gives way to uncertainty and
ambiguity which allow pressures and, ultimately, compromises between the
forces and interests that have a stake in the process and its outcomes.
Besides rationality in both the technical and the decision-making
processes, we can also identify rationality in how information flows
between those two processes. In principle, the decision maker is the
recipient of the information rationally gathered and manipulated
(calculated) by the technical analyst. The analyst is an impartial
technician, while the decision-maker is engaged in politics, entrusted with
expressing public values. Rationality in the link between the technical
and decision-making processes implies that information generation and
decisions are completely separate and distinct activities. This
rationality cannot be achieved because it would not "engage the emotions or
imagination of the potential user," 33 probably giving way to plans that
are not effective (i.e., plans that do not meet the intended goals).
The attack on the planning paradigm began as early as the 1950's with
Simon's discussion of the connection between planning and decision making.
He stated that no real decision-making process could meet the requirements
of normative rationality: complete information and the simultaneous
consideration of all possible alternatives. Almost at the same time,
Lindblom developed his concept of disjointed incrementalism. According to
this theory, alternatives developed in a planning process differ only
33 De Neufville [1987].
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slightly from the status quo 34. From another perspective, observers of
how planning and administrative decisions were made in the real world
placed increasing emphasis on their political context. That resulted in an
increased sensitivity to the "politics of planning," a resulting critique
of and retreat from comprehensive planning, and the realization that there
is a "culture of planning" that is not necessarily rational ".
At the same time, organization theorists have suggested that the
institutions and organizations where planning takes place and where
decisions are made do not conform to the premises of the rational model
either. Organizational decision making and behavior may be the result of
bureaucratic politics, organizational "satisficing," or even the simple
limits of individual and institutional attention and information processing
36
capabilities
These criticisms of the rational paradigm have led several academics
to think that the field of planning theory must confront the question of
how to resolve the contradictions, in practice, between that paradigm and
the realities and constraints of real-life decision-making. Forester
[1984], focusing on the decision-making side, suggests that "[t]he role of
theory may well not be to predict 'what will happen if . . . ' ; instead, (.. .)
[it] may be to direct the attention of the decision maker, to suggest what
important and significant variables and actors and events and signals to be
alert to, to look for, to take as tips or warnings." Others, focusing more
on the interaction between the analysis and decision-making processes,
34 Lindblom [1959].
3 Alexander [1984].
36 Scott [1981], Allison [1971].
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advocate the development of alternative paradigms 37, paradigms that can be
labeled under the rubric of social-argumentative paradigm. In this
paradigm, one must look at planning primarily as a communicative action
rather than mainly as two distinct and separate components: analysis and
decision-making 38. This notion provides a useful perspective on the
complex interweaving of information, power, and values that characterize
planning practice.
The social-argumentative paradigm underscores the impossibility of
achieving comprehensiveness (generality) and advocates the understanding of
particular events in their own terms and contexts. In this paradigm, the
focus shifts to the identification and confrontation of the needs of
particular situations rather than to the generation and application of a
comprehensive, universal method. The technical process is not guided by an
attempt to achieve objectivity -- that is assumed to be an impossible task
-- but rather is formulated as part of a broader process wherein concepts,
data, and methods evolved as the planning objectives change and the myriad
of interests interfere with each other and try to reach agreements on how
to proceed. According to this paradigm, the outcome of the planning
process becomes "objective" as a result of the interplay of and
argumentation among the affected interests and the reliance on a variety of
sources, not as a result of a, supposedly, correct method and the analyst's
37 Ines, Judith [1988], page 277; Dutton and Kraemer [1980].
38 Meyer and Miller [1986] follow a parallel paradigm and state that
effective planning requires communication with decision makers,
providing them with the information they desire and need. The social-
argumentative paradigm defines planning in a broader manner as its
communicative purpose involves an audience broader than that of
decision-makers.
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work as a detached observer. Thus, information becomes "more important in
problem defining than in problem solving; more in describing process than
predicting outcome; more in saying what happened than in saying what works;
more in generating alternatives then in comparing them; and more in
,, 39
negotiating than in providing simple decision criteria
2.5. The Analytical Framework:
A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing the Transit Planning Process
Much has been written about transportation planning methods, their
application, and how their results can better reflect actual figures. The
literature primarily focuses on analytical elements and possible ways to
improve them ' . The drawback is that, although analytical tools are
generally available and their improvement and application can be helpful,
it is very difficult to explicitly treat the complexities immersed in the
urban transportation decision-making process. How effective or how
accurate transportation models are cannot be analyzed in isolated technical
terms. One must look at the broader transportation planning process
including its institutional and political environment.
The disenchantment with transportation planning techniques since the
beginning of the 1970s surfaced not so much because of technical errors 41,
but rather because of the expectations society put on their role for
solving the transportation problems of metropolitan cities and addressing a
39 De Neufville [1987], page 89.
40 Some examples are: Atkins [1987]; Obeng [1985]; Chomitz, et. al.
[1984]; Polzin [1984]; Walker [1984]; Caudill, et. al. [1983]; and
Merewitz [1972].
41 This is, for instance, the approach taken by Atkins [1987].
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myriad of other goals, and the subsequent perception of its failure in
solving those problems and achieving those goals. At the end, the success
or failure of technical analyses will not depend on the accuracy or the
sophistication of their technical components but rather on the ultimate
role assigned to these analyses, and how useful they are to make
transportation decisions. This is why it becomes crucial to look at the
role of transportation planning in decision making and to take a behavioral
approach to analyzing the transportation planning process, an approach that
focuses on how the technical process is undertaken, how the decision making
process unfolds, and how both processes interact with each other 42. In
this approach, the transportation analytic process is viewed as a dynamic
iterative one, where the analyst, the decision maker, the transportation
system manager, the system user, and those affected by the system are all
part of the same process or system.
In this direction, the approach followed in this thesis tries to
confront the criticisms of the rational paradigm and put them in the right
context. Within the rational paradigm, better techniques and more
information would unambiguously lead to more accurate estimates and better
decisions. If that paradigm, however, does not fit a particular situation
(as it seems to be the case in the case of transportation planning), better
estimates (or methods to generate more accurate estimates) do not
necessarily lead to "better" decisions. This is because underestimation
(or even overestimation) may be an acceptable way of hedging against
uncertainty, politics, or social preferences. In this vein, the thesis
investigates the limits of the rational paradigm through the analysis of
42 Faludi [1987] talks about "procedural" planning.
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several transit project planning exercises and, after identifying what
leads to underestimation, takes into account those limits to suggest some
ways to improve the transit planning process (recognizing that those ways
may not necessarily conform to the rational paradigm).
Within the argument-oriented paradigm the technical rational analysis
would be understood within a broader framework (than the decision-oriented
one), and would attempt to address and explain the complexities of existing
planning processes. The argument-oriented approach expands the framework
of the planning process by putting more emphasis on the scoping process
(i.e., definition of actors, definition of terms of reference, definition
of "fair" relative comparisons between alternatives, and definition of set
of criteria and/or objectives to evaluate alternatives) considering the
possibility of mismatches between decision processes at the local and
higher-level institutional settings. This approach does not abandon
rational concepts and methods; rather it views these concepts and methods
as dealing with other subsystems (institutions, politics, personalities),
43
and hence integrates them into a paradigm that is more encompassing
By following the argument-oriented approach, this thesis also attempts
to illustrate how far the prevalent approach can be from a pure rational
process, and then proposes ways to redirect the process in terms of the
definition of a "correct" decision-making process. Two complementary
approaches can be identified in the literature as normative bases upon
which to establish the definition of a "correct" planning process. The
first one is to evaluate a "correct" planning process on the basis of
overall moral values of fairness, honesty, public spirit, and impartiality
43 Etzioni [1988] calls such an approach "codetermination" (page 3).
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44. The second one is to look at how distortions in the process have led
to a "planning disaster" in the sense that few or none of its intended
goals were achieved 45. To define a "correct" planning process is no small
task, and it will surface several times in other sections of this thesis.
For now, we can think that a "good" planning process is such that ensures
decisions are made on a good footing -- i.e., on the basis of the best
information we can have--, and, to the extent possible, in a democratic way
(in the sense that participants have knowledge of the facts and can voice
their comments on the technical process). With these conditions, the
ultimate purpose of the planning process is to use society's resources in
the proper way, anticipating that the eventual implementation of the
selected course of action reflects the predicted effects -- i.e., estimated
costs and benefits -- and puts no unsurmountable burdens on any affected
group or the society as a whole.
Figure 2.2 schematically illustrates the general methodological
approach of this thesis. The case studies (empirical framework) allow a
view of the transportation planning process from the rational perspective,
sustained by the theoretical rational paradigm, and single out those limits
that prevent the achievement of rationality. The identified limits allow
for a discussion of the elements that comprise a social-argumentative
paradigm that expands upon the elements of rational analysis and decision-
making theories.
44 Wachs [1985b], Kelman [1987].
45 See Hall [1980] for the history of some planning failures, in the
sense of implementing courses of action that ended up generating the
wrong effects and adding heavy burdens to the affected societies.
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Figure 2.2
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2.6. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has led to the presentation of the general methodological
approach taken in this thesis after a brief description of the history of
transportation planning, a discussion of the characteristics of the
planning process, and an exposition of both the paradigm upon which the
prevalent process is based on and an alternative to it.
The history of transportation planning and the discussion of the
characteristics of the planning process support the claim that decision
makers typically choose means largely on the basis of a broader set of
factors, rather than on the basis of logical-empirical considerations.
Drawing on that broader set of factors is then an effective, not a
distorted way of making choices and rendering effective decisions.
The claim leads to state the planning process within the realm of a
social-argumentative paradigm whereby the researcher can characterize the
Transportation planning
process (rational process)
VIl1
I Rational paradigm
(analysis and decisions)
||
V
11
- 53 
-
planning process with the interrelationships between the technical analysis
(information), the constraints and characteristics of the decision-making
function (power and politics), and the actors' personal values and beliefs.
The social-argumentative paradigm provides crucial insights into the
institutional and political factors that shape decisions and influence the
technical process.
By designing a framework that makes planners realize the limitations
of the rational paradigm, one should be able to generate more "correct"
outcomes ("correct" in the sense described in the previous section), or at
least a more responsible and reliable planning process. The purpose of
this thesis, however, is not to abandon or substitute the prevailing
rational paradigm; indeed, much of what it has contributed can well be
integrated into a more encompassing paradigm. Rather, it proposes a
framework that attempts to better serve the realities of the decision
process with a planning process that is strengthened with methods that
should encourage improved cost estimation procedures.
In the next three chapters, following the social-argumentative
approach, the thesis seeks to explain what has happened in several transit
project planning exercises. The discussion is complemented with an
analysis of the roles of data (information) in the decision-making process
(e.g., communication, justification of previously-made decisions, framing
discussions, etc.).
3. CASE STUDIES
3.1. Introduction
This chapter summarizes both the information gathered from interviews
held with the parties involved in the different projects and the
documentation related to those projects. Each section highlights the main
issues related to the estimation of capital and operating costs identified
in each case. Chapters 3 and 4 develop these issues with greater detail
and put them in the context of cost-estimating and decision-making theory.
All the case studies involve situations where the implementing
agencies (the ones in charge of constructing and, eventually, operating the
system) did not have the financial capabilities to construct the system.
These agencies had to request additional funding from higher level
institutions. They involve cases where the proposed system was new or
encompassed the extension of an existing facility. In principle, no
distinctions are necessary for these two types of projects because the
issues discussed in this thesis apply to both types with enough generality.
The pressures to select one particular type of technology versus another,
however, would probably differ between a new system and the extension of an
existing one. In the latter case, continuing with the technology already
in place may involve some advantages that are not present in the case of
planning a new system.
For each case study, the presentation includes the following sections:
(a) a brief description of the geographical context; (b) an introduction to
the case study (i.e., what the case is about); (c) a description of the
transportation context; (d) a brief description of the institutional
- 55 -
context; (e) a description of the project, projects, or other documentation
relevant to the planning and decision making processes for the particular
transportation facility, with reference to the cost estimation element of
those processes; (f) a discussion of the main issues related to the case
study; and (g) comments on the case study.
3.2. U.S. Experiences
Three case studies take place in U.S. cities. The history of some of
these case studies spans a long period of time (almost 15 years, or even
longer depending on when we consider the first serious proposals began).
As a common ground for these three case studies, it is convenient to
briefly describe the U.S. context as it relates to transit development.
In the U.S., the study of the history of transit policy and planning
(as well as of transportation, in more general terms) is closely linked to
changes in broader federal policy 46. Until the beginning of the 1960's,
transit was perceived as a local responsibility with both capital and
operating costs to be financed by its users. The social conflicts of the
mid-1960's modified federal policy towards transit which then was presented
as an integral part of the new federal commitment to urban renewal and a
more 'balanced' transportation system. In 1964, direct capital grants to
transit agencies were approved for the first time. During these times
privately owned transit firms started to be transferred to public
ownership. Operating costs were mostly covered out of the farebox and
46 Smerk [1974], Altshuler, et. al. [1979], Weiner [1983], Jones [1985],
Smerk [1987], Weiner [1987].
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expansion of services was modest "v.
By the early 1970's, the attention shifted to new problems including
energy shortages, air pollution, traffic congestion, urban sprawl, and the
needs of minority, elderly, and handicapped sectors of the population. The
belief that transit was an effective way of serving all these objectives,
broadened the political appeal of transit assistance, although transit's
direct constituency was relatively small. Transit was perceived as an
investment that could address and satisfy many perspectives on the urban
problem. This situation led to the authorization in 1974 of Section 5 of
the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which provided for direct payments to
offset transit operating expenses.
By 1978, the federal government was funding a greater percentage of
the total operating and capital subsidy than all other government levels
combined 48. In order to gain a broad base of political support for the
transit assistance program, new services were expanded and new systems were
created in not-so-densely populated areas, where transit could not easily
compete with car travel. The transit assistance program became essentially
redistributive in nature, with funds flowing from, and back to, local areas
on the basis of politically determined criteria (focused on demographics
rather than transit service supplied and consumed). These criteria
47 This was in part due to the insulation of the public authority from
the day to day politics, so transit services were better tailored to
revenues (Fielding [1983a]).
48 Fielding [1983a]. It is ironic, Pucher [1980] indicates, "that in the
U.S., with its long tradition of decentralized government, the federal
role in transit financing is significantly greater than the
corresponding role of national governments in most Western European
countries, even with their long traditions of very centralized
government structures."
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encouraged expansion and the construction of not-so-efficient new transit
systems (from a cost-effectiveness standpoint). Social, environmental, and
political concerns seemed to govern, rather than costs. None-theless,
subsidies reversed the trend of ridership declines of the previous decades,
although they promoted less efficiency 4. Transit was given a whole set
of social and political objectives, most of them incompatible with
operating and financial efficiency.
By the end of the 1970's, there was a general frustration that transit
had not been the panacea for urban problems, and had cost too much for what
it had accomplished in terms of reducing pollution and congestion,
conserving energy, and addressing the needs of particular sectors of the
population . Attention then shifted from transit's social objectives to
the more pressing issue of its escalating costs. President Reagan's policy
of "new federalism" emphasized fiscal prudence and accountability, local
control and responsibility for expenditures, and increased involvement of
the private sector. These policies were to be implemented by phasing out
the federal operating assistance program and the provision of funds for new
rail construction. At the end of Reagan's presidential mandate, however,
the administration had not been successful in implementing these policies.
As a common institutional setting for the three U.S. cases, the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) of the federal Department of
Transportation plays a major role in all the matters related to urban
transit projects that seek federal funds. UMTA has the responsibility for
federal funding of planning, capital acquisition, and operating costs for
49 Pickrell [1985]; Fielding [1983b].
50 Hamer [1976]; Altshuler, et. al. [1979].
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mass transportation in urban areas. In the projects that it funds, UTMA
establishes standards for the planning process and oversees its
development. UMTA has regional offices to facilitate the communication
between the local participants and the federal office. 51
Two major funding sources are provided at the federal level: Section 3
and Section 9 funds 5. Section 3 are discretionary funds, which the UMTA
administrator can allocate as deemed appropriate, while Section 9 are
specified by formula. The formula include factors such as the number of
bus miles, the population of the area, and the population weighted by
population per square mile, for bus systems and revenue vehicle miles,
route miles, and passenger miles for rail systems . Section 3 funds and
around 60% section 9 funds are used for capital investments, and the rest
of section 9 funds are used for operating assistance. Most of the funds
for new fixed-guideway systems come from section 3 (discretionary) funds;
rail modernization takes about half of both section 3 and section 9 funds
combined; the rest is appropriated for bus systems (and a small amount for
51 At the federal level also, but not directly related to mass transit
projects, the Federal Highway Administration is responsible for
developing federal policy and procedure guidelines pertaining highway
planning and construction. It also funds the design and construction
of qualified transportation projects. In addition, the Federal
Aviation Administration is responsible for developing federal policy
and programs pertaining to air transportation, and for providing funds
for airport planning and construction.
52 In 1987, section 3 and section 9 funds comprised 86% of UMTA
appropriations for transit systems (equivalent to more than $2.8
billion out of a total of $3.4 billion). Section 3 appropriations
amounted to $0.9 billion (27% of the total UMTA grants), while section
9 amounted to $1.9 billion (56%). Information provided by UMTA (April
1988].
53 GAO [1987], pages 246-248.
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technical planning purposes) 54. Some matching requirements applied to all
the funds in such a way that federal match for planning and/or capital
assistance cannot exceed 80% of net project costs, or 50% in the case of
operating assistance.
For the last fifteen years, there has been a growing shift away from
allocating funds in a discretionary manner and towards formula-based
allocation. Recently, along the lines of the 'fiscal federalism'
philosophy, UMTA officials at the federal and regional level advocated the
phasing down of the discretionary portion of UMTA assistance, leaving most
of the funding based on formula. This approach, it is argued, would reduce
the uncertainty about federal funding and eliminate most of the political
component of the transit funding process. The conclusions of this thesis
will provide some indications about the appropriateness of this approach in
improving the transit planning and allocation process.
3.2.1. The Boston Case Study
Introduction
The Boston case study singularly illustrates the struggle of different
parties and institutions over the analysis process as its outcome is taken
as the basis for decisions. The struggle forced frequent changes in some
of the elements of the planning process such as the alternatives to be
considered and the costs to include in each of them. The Boston case also
illustrates the difficulties generated by the attempt of the analysis
process to satisfy the needs of different audiences as well as those
generated by the uncertainty associated with some of the technical
54 Information provided by UMTA [April 1988].
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elements, particularly the amount of funding available. These difficulties
forced technical analysts to "dress" the project so that compromises could
be reached among the different interests involved in the planning process.
Finally, because of all these factors, the case illustrates the challenges
for decision makers in their efforts to put the project forward.
Boston's transit system is one of the oldest in the United States (its
tunnel section is the oldest) and is fairly well developed with a transit
network of buses, trolley buses, light rail, rapid rail, and commuter rail
transit covering most of the metropolitan area. In the past ten years, the
rail network has been in an extensive planning and construction stage as
old lines have been extended (Red Line), relocated (Orange Line), or new
lines have been proposed (Old Colony Project).
The particular project of investigation in this case study is the Old
Colony Project. This project involved the analysis of the rehabilitation
of commuter rail service south of Boston's central business district (CBD).
Service on the commuter rail line had been abandoned in 1959, due to
disagreements over the assessment of operating subsidies and the opening of
a major expressway: the Southeast Expressway. (Furthermore, in 1960, a fire
destroyed a bridge, over the Neponset River, that connected the rail lines
to Boston's CBD, physically eliminating the possibility of using the rail
lines for daily commuting.)
At the beginning of the 1980s, the major transportation planning
organizations singled out the corridor, the Southeastern portion of
Massachusetts, as an area that needed urgent transportation improvements
since it was the most rapidly growing area in the state, with a predominant
transportation demand toward the CBD of Boston (see figure 3.1). At the
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time of the project proposal, several major thoroughfares (the Southeast
Expressway and Route 3) and a single transit subway line (Red Line from
Braintree to Boston) provided the transportation links to the CBD 55. The
area was also served by express buses, a commuter boat service, and feeder
buses connecting to the transit line stations and the commuter boat
service.
Institutional Environment
The agency in charge of managing Boston's transit system is a state
agency: the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). This agency
reports to the State's Department of Transportation, and the director of
this department to the governor of the State of Massachusetts. The MBTA,
in addition to operating the existing public transportation system, has the
statutory responsibility for preparing the engineering and architectural
designs for transit development projects and for constructing and operating
them within the area constituting the Authority (79 cities and towns) 56.
A variety of other state institutions are also involved in the
planning, construction, and management of public transportation in the
Boston area. Among them, the Executive Office of Transportation and
Construction (EOTC) coordinates the activities and programs of the state
transportation agencies, and prepares the capital investment program of the
55 The subway line, however, extended for a length of 11 miles from South
Station and, therefore, did not reach very far along the corridor,
with travel lengths of up to 37 miles.
56 The 79 towns contribute to the MBTA budget according to specific
assessment procedures. These procedures try to appreciate that the 79
cities and towns of the MBTA District that benefit by the system must
share some of the deficit and that a greater portion of the cost of
operating the MBTA must come from those cities and towns that get a
greater degree of service.
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MBTA in conjunction with other transportation programs. The Secretary for
Environmental Affairs reviews and approves the programs for the
construction of state transportation facilities. Another important state
institution is the Massachusetts Department of Public Works (MDPW) which
has the responsibility for planning, designing, constructing, and
maintaining state highways and their related facilities. At the MBTA, the
Advisory Board acts as the regional body in charge of reviewing and
approving the MBTA's annual operating budget and mass transportation
programs. The Advisory Board consists of the chief administrative
officials (or their designees) from each of the 79 member municipalities
57
At the local level, the municipal governments have a wide range of
statutory powers critical to the implementation of transportation programs
such as transit facilities and transportation systems management (TSM)
proposals. Any state agency in charge of executing these programs must
deal individually with the municipal governments. Local governments have
statutory powers regarding land use and zoning, and traffic management and
parking within its boundaries on roadways which are not federal, state, or
county roadways. In addition, local officials must initiate request for
federal urban systems projects in their municipality.
Project History
In 1984, as a response to complaints about the unbearable travel
congestion in the Southeast corridor voiced by several legislators from
districts in the area, the state legislature instructed the MBTA to study
the feasibility of restoring commuter rail service in that corridor. The
57 Each municipality has a weighted vote on the Advisory Board.
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study was going to analyze the possible transportation improvements in the
area including the rehabilitation for commuter use of the Old Colony lines.
In this report, it was stated that "[o]ther possibilities such as light
rail or other transit technologies (...) exist but have not been analyzed
as part of [the] feasibility assessment." 58 This initial interest in
restoring service on the railroad lines gave the posterior studies a
suspicious name, 'Old Colony Railroad Rehabilitation Project,' although, as
it is explained below, the alternatives also included, initially, a TSM
alternative and a busway and, later, a TSM alternative alone.
In response to the state request, a feasibility study was prepared,
and it was found that the restoration of the Old Colony service would be
feasible (with the adequate physical improve-ments) at a cost of almost
$200 million (in 1984 dollars) for the full-restoration alternative.
Following the feasibility study, the governor instructed the MBTA to
proceed with the necessary environmental studies, officially launching the
initiation of the Old Colony Railroad Rehabilitation Project.
Initially, the environmental studies had to comply only with the state
regulations (Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act of 1972) since the
project was going to be funded with state funds. The steps included the
filing of an Environmental Notification Form, accomplished in January 1986,
the preparation of a project scope, issued in October 1986, and the
publication of the Environmental Impact Report (EIR). But as local
officials approached the federal government and UMTA agreed to provide
technical assistance and to consider possible future federal financial
participation, the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
58 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority [1984], p. 2-1.
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was required, in order to also comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1972.
The feasibility study estimated commuter rail capital costs at $187.7
million , and annual operating costs between $15.7 and $16.8 million for
the full service alternative 60. Ridership could reach 9,200 passengers
per day by 1990. Local newspapers publicized these figures, which became
widespread in spite of the fact that the feasibility study explicitly
indicated the shortcomings of the cost figure and the elements that were
missing (such as land acquisition costs, and provisions for design,
administration, and contingency). The figure however was low enough to
give the project a head start and a push into the next stage, the process
of analyzing alternatives.
By 1985, there were high hopes of returning passenger rail service on
the Old Colony lines. For instance, in May 1985, a referendum held in the
town of Weymouth indicated that 77% of the 10,000 people who voted favored
the restoration of the commuter rail service, although 53% disapproved of
using local tax dollars to cover operating costs. With this overwhelming
support, by the end of the year, the state was hoping to get 80% of the
estimated costs from the federal government and start track work for the
59 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority [1984], table 3.1, page 3-
20.
60 The feasibility study also included the possibility of providing
commuter rail service only up to Braintree or Quincy Adams where
passengers could transfer to subway lines. These options were quickly
dropped from further consideration due to strong local opposition in
the areas were these stations were located, to the point that later
alternatives for the commuter rail system did not even have stops at
these stations.
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project by 1987 61. UMTA however was not very receptive because they
considered the project a major new capital investment (not a simple
rehabilitation undertaking).
Before the formal technical process of analysis of alternatives was
initiated, a scoping report was published in September 1986 indicating the
range of site-specific and regional-level impacts that would need to be
considered in the analysis process. The Secretary of Environmental Affairs
had designated the project a "Major and Complicated Project" and appointed
an independent body including a wide variety of perspectives and personal
and professional interests, the Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC), to
review and comment on the technical studies. The CAC basically agreed with
the scoping report and emphasized that 'safety and security', 'traffic and
parking', 'noise and vibration', 'air quality', 'land use and zoning',
'community disruption', and 'consistency with local plans' were the impact
categories that would require particularly detailed analysis in the
technical process 62
At this initial stage of the process, most of the effort of the
project managers was geared towards keeping the alternatives to be
considered within the technical limits dictated by federal funding criteria
(and, of course, those of the operating agency, the MBTA). For instance,
61 Most of the track was currently in place (85 percent of the 80 miles),
although much of it needed to be upgraded, a new signal system
installed, and a new bridge over the Neponset River be constructed.
In the Middleborough line, freight service operated in part of that
trackage, while passenger service was limited to seasonal service to
the Cape Cod area. On the other hand, near the center of the city,
with a single track, the provision of passing tracks (to improve
reliability of service) was already thought to be costly and time-
consuming.
62 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority [1986], Appendix.
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the relocation of the Greenbush line (with monorail technology, as another
alternative) on the median strip of a major route in the area -- Route 3 --
was rejected because that would make the project a 'new start', a
qualification that, in federal terms, meant less funds available, stronger
competition from other cities in the country, and a lengthier process for
approval from the federal government. Federal funds, it was said, would
cover only reactivation of existing rail lines 63. In addition, MDPW
opposed that alternative on the basis of technical feasibility.
The Route 3 alignment was not the only concern that surfaced from
various community meetings. Other dissenting voices were raised in those
communities, particularly near the center of the city, through which the
trains would pass without making stops. In addition, the proximity of the
tracks to some residential areas and particular types of buildings (e.g.,
schools) started generating fears of neighborhood disruption and
destruction.
By the end of April 1987, the price tag for the project had been
raised to $387 million. As costs increased 64, the federal government
showed less support for the project, and opposition became more vociferous
in some sections of the proposed lines. The secretary of EOTC and the MBTA
indicated that the project would be phased, starting with the less
controversial lines with service only to Braintree station (the terminal
63 At that moment, in 1985, UMTA account for 'new starts' had $368
million, and $411 for 'rail modernization.'
64 One major item in the list of increased costs was the need to
reconstruct a bridge over the Neponset river. This bridge had been
burnt down shortly after the abandonment of the lines in 1959.
Another item was land acquisition costs for station sites and rail
rights-of-way.
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station on the Red line of the subway system) not to South Station (the
initially planned terminal in the Boston CBD).
In spite of the fact that the phasing plan also tried to reflect a $50
million annual spending cap -- the amount the federal government usually
allows states to withdraw from all federal transportation funds per year --
the changes angered local legislators and supporters of the restoration
for they thought that the state was retreating from its promise of
rehabilitating the whole rail system. They demanded a strong commitment
from the state to prove that the full system would be eventually put in
operation. That came in the form of a request for funds from the governor
of Massachusetts. On May 19, 1987, the governor reiterated his firm
commitment to the full restoration and requested $195 million from the
state legislature over the next two years for commuter rail service serving
34 cities and towns South of Boston (with a total population of around
600,000 persons in 1980) 65.
At that moment, the estimates indicated that the system would carry up
to 15,000 passengers a day when open in 1993. The $195 million, if
approved by the legislature, would cover 50% of the capital costs for the
restoration of the full service. The estimates were based on the
calculations made in the Environmental Impact Report (to comply with State
65 The state request came about as the governor filed a bond issue
providing $827 million in direct state support to the MBTA, (twice as
much as the $442 million two-year bond issue of 1985). Out of the
$827 million, $195 million was allocated to the restoration of the
commuter rail service on the South Shore. This bond issue took place
in the middle of several large highway proposals for the Boston area.
The total bond issue was close to $3.1 billion, to be supplemented by
an additional $1.5 billion in federal funds. The highway projects
included $3.2 billion (that later escalated to $4.3 billion) for the
reconstruction of a major thoroughfare underground and the
construction of a tunnel under the harbor.
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regulations). The more detailed calculation of capital and operating costs
required by the federal process would not be completed until December of
1987 (later revised in July 1988).
The reason for a 50% share was based on UMTA suggestion that with this
share (instead of the statutory 20%) the project will have a better chance
of getting federal support (and would probably involve less hurdles). A
change in the head of UMTA in November 1987, challenged the federal support
for the project, and eliminated the guarantee of the $195 million federal
share. The impasse lasted four months, until March 1988, when new talks
between UMTA and the MBTA officials put the possibilities of a 50% federal
share back in place. The explanation given by MBTA officials was that
there existed a misunderstanding between UMTA and the MBTA as to which type
of project they were dealing with: 'new start' or 'rail modernization.'
Almost two years after the MBTA had taken all the precautions to persuade
interested parties to stay within the limits imposed by the existing rail
network, UMTA raised the issue again, slowing the progression of the
project.
The technical analysis included, in addition to the commuter rail
alternatives, three other alternatives: a no-build, a TSM, and, by
recommendation of MDPW, a busway alternative. The state process required
the study of the largest and most complicated alternative for its
Environmental Impact Report. UMTA, however, also required the analysis of
sub-options of the possible total system with enough differences to be able
to compare the worthiness of the full system. In the case of the Old
Colony project, the sub-options consisted of reconstructing: (a) the
innermost line alone (the Middleborough line), (b) this line with the
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middle line alone (the Middlegorough and the Plymouth line), and (c) the
innermost line and the shore line (the Middleborough and the Greenbush
line). For the correct operation of each of the seven alternatives, two or
more modes of transportation were included, such as improvements in the
existing bus system and rapid transit Red line, or additional feeder bus
lines and commuter boat service.
The different components of the study, from demand estimation, to the
calculation of capital and operating costs, and to the assessment of
environmental impacts, were assigned to different consultant firms in the
Boston area. The costing model for both capital and operating costs was
based on the principles of buildup costing, in accordance with UTMA
guidelines (see chapter 4 for a more detailed description of costing
approaches). Table 3.1 shows the cost figures generated in December 1987.
Capital costs included a lower and an upper bound, and a best estimate (the
middle value shown in the tables) which tried to reflect the uncertainty of
some cost figures. However, the values were calculated based on
differences in assumptions about particular items. For instance, the
busway variations responded to assumptions about lighting on the busway
(the lower bound assumed no lighting; the best estimate, lighting every 200
feet; and the upper bound, lighting every 100 feet) or about the trackwork
in the commuter rail alternatives (the lower bound assumed only replacement
of existing defective ties; the best estimate, all new wood ties with
resilient fastenings; and the upper bound, concrete ties with resilient
fastenings). These limited assumptions yielded lower values less than 6%
lower than the best estimate and upper values less than 0.6% higher than
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the best estimate 66.
Table 3.1
1987 Capital and Operating Costs for the Boston Alternatives
(November 1987, 1986 dollars)
Annual operat. Capital costs
Alternative & maint. costs (middle values)
No build $12,926,801 0
TSM $18,308,663 $31,949,640
Busway $18,408,629 $102,580,669
Commuter rail
Middleborough $22,633,791 $189,979,064
Midd./Plymouth $26,492,298 $282,415,561
Midd./Greenbush $25,108,638 $262,353,966
Midd./Ply./Green. $28,957,473 $360,975,566
Source: MBTA 1987a and 1987b (reports 8 and 9).
Eight months later, after the confidence of UMTA had been regained,
new figures were generated. These figures are shown on table 3.2.
Table 3.2
1988 Capital and Operating Costs for the Boston Alternatives
(July 1988, 1986 dollars)
Annual operat. Capital costs
Alternative & maint. costs (middle values)
No build $10,955,680 0
TSM $14,675,718 $ 30,333,670
Commuter rail
Middleborough $19,001,648 $188,363,092
Midd./Plymouth $22,860,187 $280,799,589
Midd./Greenbush $23,137,797 $261,107,782
Midd./Ply./Green. $26,986,654 $359,729,382
Source: UMTA, 1988.
66 For one of the rail alternatives, the upper value was less than 0.1%
higher than the best estimate. When I indicated this apparent
discrepancy to the analysts, they stated that it was probably due to a
technical error. Were it an error, it had been carried forward
through the whole length of the project since the same figures
appeared in all the reports from the beginning of the study up to the
one that came out in July 1988.
-----------
72 -
The busway alternative was rejected on the basis of two major
considerations. First, operational considerations, since the lower
capacity of buses would require an almost constant stream of buses to run
during peak hours, interfering with local traffic at grade intersections.
In addition, the width of the busway would be too narrow to permit
overpassing in the case of breakdowns, and would eliminate the present
freight operations. Second, institutional considerations, since a busway
would be incompatible with the objective of modernizing the regional rail
network, isolating the Old Colony area from the remainder of the MBTA's
extensive rail network. Other changes in the cost figures were due to the
elimination of improvements in commuter boat service as part of the
alternatives since those improvements affected all the alternatives in a
similar way.
The Boston case is still on-going. State and local officials kept
working at all fronts to secure the approval of federal funds for the full
project. Conversations with these officials indicate that they are mostly
interested in getting the project ahead. These officials stress the need
for the project and praise its advantages but are not aware of the
technical results (at most they are familiar with overall figures). They
further state that, nevertheless, the study is necessary to validate their
pre-defined preferences and comply with federal regulations.
Comments on the Boston Case
The Boston case, as the rehabilitation or extension of an existing
system, highlights some particular characteristics of the process. When
dealing with extension of existing (well-established) transit systems, the
constraints on the technologies to be considered are stronger than in other
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cases. In Boston, alternatives different from the commuter-rail ones never
attracted major interest from decision-makers. This indifference was
reflected in the alternatives under study and can be attributed mainly to
the fact that facilities such as maintenance shops and terminals were
already in place to accommodate any additions to the commuter rail network.
Furthermore, labor groups in the transit agency would probably have
complained if a novel technology had been introduced.
Notwithstanding, the study process could be assessed as more
straightforward than in instances of new systems since information could be
gathered from other parts of the existing system. On the other hand, due
to new federal requirements, the scope of the analytical study had to be
carried out to a more detailed level than in other instances, making the
whole technical process a difficult endeavor. Since demand was to a great
extent already known from existing commuter rail lines, cost estimation
became one of the most important and time-consuming elements of the
planning process.
Shifts in the federal stance towards the project further affected the
development of the technical process. First, the definition of the project
-- as a 'rail modernization' project -- limited the range of alternatives to
be analyzed. Second, increases in capital costs made UMTA suggest that the
statutory 80% federal share would not be easily attainable for the Old
Colony project. Both factors added to the uncertainty of which level of
funds could be obtained from the federal government and put the MBTA in the
position of trying to keep costs as low as possible (and perhaps be as
optimistic as possible in estimating ridership).
The decision-makers' need to attend to two different audiences further
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affected the technical process. The major difference between the two
audiences was in emphasis: the state process was concerned primarily with
assessing (and addressing) the full range of environmental impacts and
insisted that alternatives (or components of alternatives) be examined
whenever they meet objectives with less serious environmental consequences;
the federal process focused on cost and financing issues and insisted on
examination of alternatives which may meet the basic objectives at less
(financial) cost. Therefore, the former process allowed cost increases to
meet environmental concerns, while the latter tried to encourage limits on
capital and operating costs. The clash over the criteria upon which to
evaluate the projects is also reflected in the differences between what the
CAC as representation of community interests deemed the appropriate
evaluating categories and, again, UMTA's emphasis on cost measures.
The Old Colony study stressed the lack of transportation capacity to
serve downtown Boston from the Old Colony area (in terms not only of
highway capacity but also of downtown parking spaces) in the light of urban
developments taking place in the corridor (including the reconstruction of
a major highway -- the Central Artery -- underground). These concerns,
even if not explicitly indicated in the technical report, broaden the
constituency affected by the project. On the other hand, the perception of
the goals was not always the same across different groups such as some
communities at the local level (e.g., Quincy, Braintree, Weymouth), and may
not perfectly fit the interests of the federal government (which at the
moment was trying to phase out the provision of funds for transit
projects).
The extent of the project, a rail network of 80 miles of double and
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single track, increased the number of concerns to be addressed. Station
locations and parking lots, for instance, were a constant source of
complaints from the affected communities. As a matter of fact, in November
1988 when the DEIS was almost completed, the location of some stations
(e.g., South Weymouth on the Plymouth line) was still undecided 67. This
added to the uncertainty of cost elements and of operating strategies
because of constraints generated by the predominantly single-track sections
of the system (particularly in the segment closer to the CBD terminal).
Nonetheless, supporters of the restoration, probably aware of the effects
that community concerns might have on the technical process, indicated that
although transportation decision makers (including the governor) could have
a difficult task persuading local residents about the advantages of the
project, they should also make certain that they do not scale down the
plans to meet local concerns.
As to the technical process itself, the slight variations between the
lower or upper values and the best estimates indicate that no attempt was
made to try to reflect the uncertainty of cost estimates. The many other
documents that had to be generated in order to comply with state and
federal requirements (ten volumes, two of which referred specifically to
67 In November 1988, a nonbinding referendum held in Quincy and Braintree
(the two communities closest to Boston's CBD where the commuter
service was going to pass by but did not have any stations) asked
people how they think their state representatives should vote in the
Legislature in relation to the restoration of the Old Colony lines.
Analysts and decision makers were glad to know that the referendum
gave some support to the restoration of the line (around 60% in favor
and 40% against). However, they did not like the results of another
vote, this time in Braintree only, about the possibility of making the
Braintree station a transfer station. This vote resulted in an almost
50/50 decision, what did not help clarify the community support on
this issue.
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capital and operating costs) and how cost information was organized (mainly
in computer-based spreadsheet) did not encourage a full sensitivity
analysis.
Rather than costs, two other major (and time-consuming) concerns
absorbed analysts and decision makers. The first one was the relation with
the communities in the corridor so that they could know exactly how the
project would affect them and voice their concerns s. These meetings were
also a good opportunity for the MBTA to gain support for their proposals.
The second major concern involved the cost-effectiveness criterion required
by UMTA's regulations (this process is explained at greater length in
chapter 4). This criterion had not been publicized by the time capital and
operating costs were calculated (and by the time this thesis was written)
but the quietness of the analysts when asked about the criterion 69 leads
to the presumption that the project did not fare very well on that
criterion . This apparent shortcoming of the project probably forced
decision makers to increase negotiations with the federal government to
reduce the possibility of rejecting the project on the basis of that
criterion, trying to relegate the cost-effectiveness evaluation to a second
stage.
The Boston project has not been constructed yet. Its history,
68 Between 1985 and 1988, the project manager (MBTA official) held around
200 meetings with the communities affected by the project. In some
times, meetings were held three or four times in the three year
period. (Conversation with MBTA officials, July 1988.)
69 In several conversations with key people involved in the project, no
answer was given when asked about the value of the cost-effectiveness
measure, or the question was avoided altogether.
70 Section 5.3 discusses this issue at greater length.
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however, indicates many of the issues involved in the cost estimation
process and mainly the pressures exerted by different parties and
institutions over the technical process in an attempt to reflect their
ideas about the purpose and worthiness of the transit project. The next
two cases, Santa Clara County's LRT and Buffalo's LRRT, illustrate some
similar issues and some other issues from the perspective of two fixed-
guideway systems that were constructed in cities with no previous rail
systems in place. In addition, both systems have recently been opened
(only the first section for the Santa Clara's LRT, though) and, therefore,
give a perspective from a completed system. In these cases, however, it
was harder to gather information on the preliminary stages of the planning
process and the individuals interviewed tried to emphasize more the
performance of the operation of the existing system at the present moment
rather than the difficulties in the planning stage.
3.2.2. Santa Clara County's LRT
Introduction
The case of Santa Clara County illustrates the situation in a fast
growing area with conditions unfavorable to fixed-guideway transit systems
(e.g., low density developments or high income population) but plagued with
traffic congestion which ultimately could thwart the pace of growth and
development in the area. This fear created the belief that it was
necessary to avoid the experiences of other cities in the same part of the
country (mainly, Los Angeles) and try to redirect the land use patterns in
the area. The presence of strong advocates for a fixed-guideway system
(basically, an light rail option) at the decision-making level very much
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determined the survival of the project until its implementation in spite of
the many set-backs that took place throughout the process.
Unlike the Boston case, Santa Clara County is predominantly a suburban
area, with low density, and a transit system -- 470-bus fleet operating on
79 routes and limited commuter rail service on the peninsula to San
Francisco -- that has only lately received some consideration. The county
houses the forefront of the world's high-tech industry (known as the
Silicon Valley), and includes the cities of San Jose and Santa Clara. The
growth of the electronics industry for the past fifteen years has been
accompanied by a similar growth in the population and residential
development in the county. This growth has led to high levels of
congestion, aggravated by the suburban character of the area.
In 1975, the county's employment base of 502,000 jobs was growing at a
higher percentage rate than its population of 1.1 million persons and its
resident labor force of 490,000 workers. Countywide, more than four
million person trips were being generated daily, only one percent of which
were on public transit. The region known as the Guadalupe Corridor -- for
it goes parallel to the Guadalupe River -- encompasses a portion of the
county with an area approximately 16 miles long and 5 miles wide. In the
15 years from 1975 to 1990, the corridor area was expected to grow from
360,000 to 420,000 in population and from 187,000 (.519 jobs per person) to
383,000 (.912 jobs per person) in the number of jobs. This growth was to
generate 50% more trips than the 1.2 million trips generated in the
corridor in 1975. 71
71 United States Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation
Administration [1981], page 2-1.
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The locational imbalance of jobs and housing and, consequently, the
predominant southeast-to-northwest travel pattern (from South San Jose to
North San Jose and Palo Alto) created delays on the major roads during peak
hours. Congestion was exacerbated by the continual development of the
semiconductor industry in the mid-1970s. In addition, state freeway
projects slated for construction by 1970 had not been completed -- though
the right-of-way had been purchased -- , aggravating congestion on major
highways and arterials, with traffic spilling over onto local streets,
causing increasing intrusion into and disruption of residential
neighborhoods. By the end of the 1970s, with growing congestion and
climbing gasoline prices, ridership in the bus system almost doubled
between 1978 and 1981 72.
Concerns, however, were broader than the mere traffic congestion. A
1976 report, the "Santa Clara County Transit District Light Rail
Feasibility and Alternatives Analysis," quoted the then UMTA Administrator,
Robert Patricelli, stating that "[r]apid transit is part of becoming and
being a great city." The study concluded that
"Santa Clara County is essentially facing the choice of a future
similar to that which exists today in Los Angeles ... or one which
provides the option for some of its urban area -- by no means all --
to accommodate itself to transportation and urban development
characteristics associated with one or more rail lines. (...)
In the final analysis, however, the choice is dependent not on
technical information alone, but on the unique and special way the
County perceives itself and the future toward which it wishes to
move." 73
Other concerns included the perception that residential growth could
only occur if the additional transportation capacity were provided. The
72 Ibid., page 2-3.
73 De Leuw, Cather and Company [1976], p. 326.
- 80 -
City of San Jose's plans for some additional 50,000 new dwelling units by
1990 in the south of the city could only be carried out if new
transportation facilities were constructed 74. Furthermore, a rail-based
transit system would help encourage growth in the downtown area where
revitalization was very much needed. Overall, these concerns amounted to
an attempt not to constrain further growth in the area. If transportation
improvements were not made, the region would not be able to support the
inevitable growth.
Other concerned parties stressed the role of transit projects in
developing a diversified transportation system that would prevent any
problems in case of oil shortages, and at the same time would meet the
travel needs of different segments of the population and of different urban
communities. But at the forefront of the desires for a major
transportation improvement, public officials underscored the attempt to
guide land use development and encourage denser development patterns in the
process of directing the inevitably expected growth 7. At some point the
proponents of the system said that the preferred transportation system
(mainly a light rail line and improvements in highways) could make Silicon
Valley the "Paris of the West Coast." "It will determine more than any
other action whether we will be a great community in the 21st century in
that it establishes the mode of interurban transportation for the next 100
74 Santa Clara County Transit District [1981], page 20.
75 This goal was supported on the grounds of a strong belief that land
use and transportation decisions influence one another.
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years" 76 Later, they also indicated that the "[federal] administration
realizes that the Guadalupe Corridor project not only is a relatively low
cost project, but that it offers a unique opportunity to directly benefit
the growing defense, aerospace and electronics industries which are some of
,, 77the few bright spots in the U.S. economy
All these concerns fed the perception of the need to develop
transportation facilities in the Guadalupe Corridor. Development of the
transportation system have lagged sharply behind private residential and
employment development, and some studies had to be undertaken to provide
the evaluation necessary to give local decision makers the required
information for choosing the adequate transportation mode to address the
travel needs of the corridor.
In the mid-1970s the studies began to define the problem and identify
solutions. The studies have now been translated into a 20-mile LRT system
linking residential communities in the south of Santa Clara County with
employment concentrations in the north, including the famed Silicon Valley
78. The system also sought to return the centrality of downtown San Jose
with the provision of a 10-block-long mall located approximately at the
midpoint of the line. At the same time, a four-lane freeway will also be
built paralleling the line south of downtown. (Figure 3.2)
Institutional Environment
The Santa Clara County Transportation District (SCCTD), the agency
76 Statement by County Supervisor Rod Diridon, San Jose Mercury "Major
transit decision is near," October 14, 1981, pages 1B and 2B.
77 Santa Clara County Transit District [1981], page 26.
78 Actually, only the north portion, with a length of about 10 miles, was
opened by the end of 1988.
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that led the project throughout the planning process, acts as the
transportation authority in Santa Clara County with the responsibility for
the planning and operation of transit services in the county. The cities
of San Jose and Santa Clara, which the corridor of analysis traverses, are
responsible for supervising transportation infrastructure investments
within their boundaries. The scope of the project, affecting two
municipalities, required the involvement of several other coordinating
agencies. Among these, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) has
the responsibility for coordinating planning development efforts in the San
Francisco Bay area and makes predictions about population and employment
changes in such area. The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC)
oversees performance audits ", and helps allocate state monies and
coordinate transit services, fares, and operations among the different
transit agencies operating in the area. At the state level, the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans) also had a stake in the process as
soon as the SCCTD sought funds from the state government. The support of
Caltrans was also necessary for requesting funds from the federal
government.
All those institutions coalesced into a decision-making body labelled
'Board of Control.' The Board of Control for the Guadalupe Corridor
transportation project included elected and appointed officials from Santa
Clara County Transit District, City of San Jose, City of Santa Clara,
Association of Bay Area Governments, Metropolitan Transportation
Commission, and Caltrans. The Board of Control provided policy direction
79 State legislation requires operators and transportation planning
agencies performance evaluations every three years.
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Figure 3.2
Santa Clara County LRT
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in the process of analyzing alternatives, coordinating with local
government bodies affected by the project, and helping administer the
overall planning analysis.
In addition, to effectively coordinate the views of all government
agencies involved in the Guadalupe Corridor study and to assist the Board
of Control, a technical advisory committee was established at an early
stage in the process, in 1979. This committee, composed of representatives
from UMTA, Federal Highway Administration, Caltrans, the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission, Cities of San Jose and Santa Clara, and the
SCCTD 80, met on a monthly basis and reviewed the technical data submitted
by the consultants and participating agencies.
Probably one of the most significant differences in California's
transit environment compared to the other case studies is the financial and
institutional support provided by the state legislature. The institutional
climate is often not very receptive to transit investments. Although
several measures had been put in place to ensure a relatively stable base
of support for all local transit systems, the number of projects
implemented have been few and far between and supported by a very small
number of legislators. The achievements are mainly a reflection of the
vigorous advocacy played by key legislators. Transit must compete for
funds with other state programs, and most of transit funds, unlike state's
highway funds, are not constitutionally dedicated 81. This situation
80 Almost half of the members of this technical advisory committee
belonged to SCCTD.
81 There exists, however, a 1/4 percent general sales tax dedicated to
local mass transit, and a formula-based share of gasoline tax
revenues. In fiscal year 1983-84, the state provided approximately
$715 million in transit funds.
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has created a piecemeal process whereby legislative involvement has come in
increments rather than through a prolonged, comprehensive action.
Interestingly enough, the legislature has established some performance and
productivity measures to assure that transit funds are spent in an
efficient manner. For instance, local support in the form of local
matching funds, minimum farebox revenues, or contributions from property
taxes and bridge tolls, is required. These local efforts are necessary as
a proof of local interest and commitment, and to limit the state's costs.
Project History
The history of the Santa Clara County (Guadalupe Corridor) Light Rail
System spans over a period of more that 15 years. The initial proposals
for specific transportation solutions date back to 1974 when consultants to
Santa Clara County began a study of the county's transportation needs with
the year 2000 as the horizon year 82. This preliminary study recommended a
medium-capacity transit guideway network -- consisting of 140-miles of
track -- fed by an extensive bus collection system.
The County Transit District contracted another study in December 1975
to investigate the feasibility of light rail or bus transit alternative in
five of the highest demand corridors identified in the first study. In
this study, the Guadalupe Corridor was singled out as the most feasible
route with the greatest potential for high ridership 83. This study,
published in August 1976, indicated that "[n]one of the alternatives
studied except for the baseline bus satisfied the given constraints on
capital and operating costs." (Incidentally, the study assumed an 80
82 This was the "Rapid Transit Development Project".
83 DeLew, Cather and Company [1976].
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percent Federal matching grant.) Nonetheless, a light rail system would be
the only mode that would be capable of attracting 15 percent of the 1990
peak-hour travel -- the goal of the City of San Jose's General Plan'80. A
starter line would cost $113 million in 1976 dollars for a total length of
12.5 miles.
The study concluded with some actions to seek early UMTA approval and
what actions to pursue to achieve this approval. Taking into account the
then recent rejection of the Denver Region's request for an LRT starter
line after completing studies worth millions of dollars, and the approval
of the Buffalo's LRT line based on "population density, size of the
downtown CBD employment, ease of automobile access, expected number of
daily riders in the short-range, and the total annualized costs per
passenger carried (cost-effectiveness)" 84, the study recommended that the
UMTA waters be tested to avoid "the wasting of scarce funds on pointless
additional studies and/or could help focus the County's efforts most
productively." 85
In 1975, the "Santa Clara Valley Corridor Evaluation" (SCVCE) was
started, including an assessment of future transportation needs. This
study constituted the first phase of the federal-required 'Alternatives
Analysis' process and, by its completion, had included over two hundred
public meetings and workshops to solicit comments 86. The study concluded
that transit could carry up to 12% of the work trips during peak travel
Ibid., page 352.
Ibid., page 353.
Joint Policy Committee of the Association of Bay Area Governments and
Metropolitan Transportation Commission [1979], page 2.
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periods, and that none of the transit options would recover more than 31%
from the farebox. The study also indicated that current transit funding
would allow for an approximately 700-bus system plus about 10 miles of rail
transit on the Southern section of the city of San Jose and an upgrade of
the commuter rail system (the Southern Pacific line).
Even before the completion of the draft report, the consultants'
preliminary recommendations advocated the construction of light rail
transit (LRT) as the mode to link downtown San Jose with the southern
residential areas. The predilections for an LRT system were attuned with
the preferences (for a rail system) strongly voiced, from the beginning of
the proposals, by some local elected officials. In 1976, the Board of
Supervisors of the Santa Clara County Transit District (SCCTD) was vested
with decision-making powers regarding transit proposals. In addition,
voters approved a half-cent sales tax to finance the SCCTD.
The SCVCE considered nine transportation alternatives and several land
use scenarios for Santa Clara county in 1990. The report stated that the
Guadalupe Corridor had long been master-planned for major freeways (state
Routes 87 and 85) which had never been built and that the right-of-way was
then over 70% in public ownership. For these reasons, in the SCVCE Draft
Report that came to light in 1978, the consultants concluded that
alternatives along the Guadalupe Corridor deserved the largest
consideration. The reserved right-of-way was a good advantage for a fixed
guideway system, and particularly for their recommended 10-mile light rail
starter line between San Jose and the southern areas. They further
recommended the acquisition of the remaining of the right-of-way property
and the construction of a four-lane freeway -- between 1-280 and Curtner
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Avenue -- within that right-of-way.
Regional and local governments approved the conclusions but indicated
that areas north of San Jose should also be included in the rail-line
plans. Subsequent to the completion of the SCVCE, in 1979, UMTA approved
plans totaling $650,000 to conduct the Alternatives Analysis process to
evaluate transportation alternatives in the entire corridor and the
production of an environmental impact statement 87. In August 1981 the
Alternatives Analysis/Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was
published and circulated for comments. UMTA indicated that at the moment
federal policy (Reagan had started his first presidential term 8 months
earlier) was to defer any new rail start, so Santa Clara County should not
expect Federal involvement in the project 88.
The Alternatives Analysis report stressed the importance of the area
(the Silicon Valley) to the rest of the nation. The report stated that the
fact that the county was the center for the U.S. electronics industry could
not be overlooked. It also indicated that competition from other countries
in the world could be counteracted by providing the necessary
transportation capacity to the county, which would allow an increase in the
number of housing units at affordable prices.
The draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) documented the
environmental impacts of 14 alternatives for transportation improvements in
the Guadalupe corridor. It also documented the anticipated costs, impacts
87 Jack Ibarra and Associates [19811, page 1.
88 As indicated in the Boston case, UMTA policy at that moment was to
defer federal involvement in new rail starts and extensions until
economic conditions improved, except where Interstate Transfer Funds
are available to fund these projects.
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and benefits of those alternatives in order to facilitate informed
decision-making regarding implementation of a transportation facility
within the Guadalupe Corridor. The statement had been prepared in
accordance with both the provisions of the Council on Environmental Quality
in California and U.S. Department of Transportation/UMTA regulations.
The alternatives included: (a) no-build, (b) baseline TSM (including
some highway construction), (c) busway/high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes,
(d) only-LRT (including TSM improvements), (e) busway/freeway, (f)
busway/expressway, (g) LRT/expressway, and (h) four alternatives related to
the expansion of the commuter rail service 89. Alternatives (b), (c), and
(d) had parallel alternatives with no highway construction. Alternatives
(b) to (g) also included a bicycle facility throughout the full length of
the corridor 90. The fourteen alternatives were quickly reduced to three
as discussions focused on alternatives (c), (d), and the locally-preferred
(g).
The light rail options consisted of 20 miles of new double-track line
(figure 3.2). LRT operation would require 50 vehicles, and daily mileage
would amount to 9,091 miles. Table 3.3 shows the estimated capital and
operating costs for the three most controversial alternatives as well as
the daily patronage forecasted for all transit modes -- express buses,
light rail, and commuter rail -- in the corridor.
89 The inclusion of highway alternatives led to the appearance of the
Federal Highway Administration in the process as the overseer of the
highway options. The busway/HOV alternative was included at a later
stage at UMTA's request.
90 Although the bikeway was a merely $1 million investment, it was given
as much space in the brochures advertising the project as the LRT and
expressway investments which amounted to more than $275 million in
1980 dollars (1981 estimates).
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Table 3.3
Capital and Operating Costs and Daily Patronage
for Selected Santa Clara County Alternatives
(Cost figures in 1980 dollars)
1990 operat.
Daily & maintenance
patronage costs Capital costs
Alternative (all transit) ($ thousands) ($ thousands)
Busway/HOV lanes 41,800 $96,400 $121,800
LRT only 44,800 $93,500 $208,000
LRT/Expressway 43,600 $93,400 $268,100
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1981.
In order to achieve a consensus, the board of control adopted a public
participation strategy in an attempt to: (a) encourage expression of a wide
variety of opinions; (b) allow maximum dialogue between technical staff,
consultants and the general public; and (c) permit maximum opportunity for
public review of technical materials 91. The strategy proved successful in
supporting the board's preferences and in November 1981, SCCTD and the
cities of San Jose and Santa Clara selected Alternative 6, the light-
rail/expressway/bikeway alternative, as the locally preferred alternative
91 Over 300 meetings and workshops were held with community leaders and
community organizations. Some of the concerns voiced in these
meetings, reflecting a wide diversity of opinions, included: (a) how
much each alternative would cost the taxpayers; (b) that ridership
figures were too low (vocalized by the light rail advocates) or too
high; (c) the disclosure of public opinion polls; (d) that the
decision about the light rail line had already been made and that the
study was a way to justify it; (e) that the board of control was
biased in favor of the LRT; (f) that highway projects should be
completed; and (g) that contingency plans should be developed in case
funding from state and federal sources did not materialized.
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92. SCCTD promptly applied for Section 3 federal funds to proceed with the
preliminary engineering of the light rail line. The Santa Clara County
Transportation Commission endorsed by a majority vote (15-6) the technical
recommendation and urged the approval by the Guadalupe Corridor
Transportation Board of Control. On October 28, 1981, the Board approved
the Technical Advisory Committee's recommendation by majority vote (six in
favor, one against, and one absent).
Upon sending the report of the locally-preferred alternative, the
chairman of the SCCTD board of Supervisors stated that the decision was a
land use decision and a "quality of life" decision. Other reasons for the
support included: (a) if by 1990, there was a justification for expansion
of the transit system, LRT would be less expensive to expand; (b) if there
is a sudden crisis -- such as oil shortages or strikes -- which required
additional transit capacity, LRT would be less vulnerable and would offer
the best opportunity for tackling the problem . A local newspaper stated
that "[s]ome form of a light-transit system would be safer, less polluting,
faster and cheaper than any other solution including another highway or a
92 Measure A, a non-binding, advisory vote of confidence on the County
Transit District's nearly $1 billion transportation-improvement plan
for the 1981-86 period (that included the design and construction of a
fixed-guideway system, either light rail or a busway), was approved
with 85% of the vote. This vote suggested that the public was
enthused about mass transit.
9 Some parties, particularly from LRT-interest groups such as the Modern
Transit Society, even claimed that the LRT system could carry 50,000
passengers per hour. Vuchic [1981], based on an analysis of several
systems all over the world, estimates that capacities of LRT systems
fall between 15,000 and 20,000 persons per hour (page 577).
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special roadway for exclusive use by buses and carpools" 94. Farebox
revenues were expected to cover 85% of operating and maintenance costs,
compared to 57% for buses. The 1981 report on the preferred-alternative
report further stated that although expressway alternatives would have a
reasonable chance of being funded, there would not be sufficient local,
state, and federal funds available to fund the large capital costs of the
95
highway portion of a freeway/busway alternative
At that moment, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
supported the LRT-only alternative, and threatened not to provide the
almost $1 million of state money needed for the corridor study for the
LRT/Expressway alternative 96 Caltrans staff was not convinced that light
rail patronage would be about the same with or without the competing
highway link. These events were denounced by the San Jose City council as
an usurpation of the authority of local decision-makers. Eventually, other
state agencies -- the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, and the
California Transportation Commission -- persuaded Caltrans to reverse their
earlier position and deliver the study money. Still, among the general
public, the proponents had their share of critics. Some people wanted a
94 San Jose Mercury, "Board hears praised of light-rail transit,"
October 1, 1981, page 12B.
9s Santa Clara County Transit District [1981), page 20.
96 The State Transportation Director was then depicted by her anti-
highway convictions (San Jose Mercury, "More studies, no transit,"
June 25, 1980 page 14B). In February 18, 1980, The Mercury News
indicated that "[w]e are sick and tired as anyone of paper exercises,
but this study ... is a necessary step if the area is going to be
eligible for federal mass transit money." In December 7, 1980, The
Sunday Mercury News, "{p)ublic planning agencies have an extraordinary
ability to deal in esoteric terms which mean nothing to most of us,
and nowhere is this more true than in our planning for public
transit."
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busway facility that could be upgraded to LRT when patronage warranted it;
others expressed concern that funding for the LRT could be cut off by the
federal government at any time; others indicated that a busway/HOV would
maximize independence from bureaucracy and annual labor disputes because it
would easily permit privaiization 9.
In March 1982, UMTA responded to the preferred-alternative report and
the SCCTD request with a technical assessment of the alternative
transportation investments. In this report, UMTA indicated that land use
patterns in Santa Clara County do not support a rail alternative mainly
because ridership, a major consideration for a successful implementation of
a light rail system, would probably be limited by "difficulties in access
to the system and the lower than average potential for direct service"
(i.e., passengers would need to take a bus to a station, then ride the LRT,
and then again take another bus from the LRT station closest to the end-
trip destination). UMTA further indicated that the four basic arguments in
support of light rail did not have a strong footing. For instance, the
busway/HOV facility was put at a disadvantage by not considering the
flexibility of this facility as a means of accommodating increased demand
97 An individual, member of a homeowners association, explained why she
advocated the denial of federal funding for the LRT project in the
following terms: a) net costs of light rail and busway/HOV appear to
be virtually the same because although a busway/HOV transit system
would cost approximately $9,300,000 more per year to maintain and
operate than a light rail system, this latter system would cost
approximately $93,000,000 (or approximately 70%) more than a
busway/HOV lane transit system; b) therefore, investing the extra
$93,000,000 capital at 10% per year would pay for this difference
(alternatively, one could also state, if the money were borrowed,
$9,300,000 per year debt service would have to be added to the LRT
operating and maintenance costs); and c) since overall a busway/HOV
transit system would get people to work faster, the LRT alternative
was not the optimal one on a cost-effective basis. (Letter to the UMTA
regional administrator, February 17, 1981.)
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for transit. In addition, UMTA indicated that although light rail would
reduce subsidy requirements by about 5%, capital costs make light rail the
least feasible alternative. Furthermore, the interpretation of the
economic efficiency data 98 could lead to the inference that either the
busway option was 43% more cost-effective in shifting auto users into
transit and HOVs, or that the investment required for the light rail
proposal beyond that required for the busway actually decreased the
economic benefits.
The report concluded that the busway/HOV would be more consistent with
local land use patterns because it would remove the need for many transfer
trips. In terms of cost per added transit/HOV user, the busway alternative
would be more cost-effective than the light-rail alternative. By January
1983, an impasse had been created, and the UMTA Federal Administrator
indicated the resistance of the county in looking at buses and carpools as
an alternative 99. Later that year, in March, SCCTD agreed to expand the
analysis of the busway option. This more detailed analysis was finished in
April. In June, a Santa Clara delegation presented the final EIS to high-
level DOT/UMTA staff and requested additional grants to carry out the final
design of the selected alternative. Nonetheless, in July 1983, the
regional UMTA administrator recommended to SCCTD that the busway/HOV
alternative be withdrawn from the FEIS because of concerns about how its
98 These data indicated that increased transit/HOV use would be gained at
costs of $1.66 per new passenger for the busway alternative, and $2.37
for the light rail alternative.
99 He further indicated that "the County's approach will not provide the
technical analysis and evaluation that we think should be performed
before either the light rail proposal or bus and carpool facilities
are advanced into final design and construction."
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cost-effectiveness had been calculated in comparison to the rail
alternative.
On August 19, 1983, the final EIS was published including public
comments on the AA/DEIS and responses to significant environmental issues.
Previous to this, the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress,
through its appropriation committee, recommended to UMTA the approval of
the construction of the entire 20 mile Guadalupe Corridor light rail
project and the issuance of the necessary paperwork for Section 3
discretionary funds.
In September, SCCTD responded to the questions raised about the cost
effectiveness of the busway alternative but did not delete this alternative
from the FEIS that had already been approved by UMTA and the FHWA. The
regional administrator however indicated that no funding contract would be
signed until the cost effectiveness issues were resolved. Congressional
pressures over UMTA, however, made the federal office encourage the
regional office not to delay the approval of the project, mainly because,
in spite of everything, the LRT alternative was still a cost-effective and
an environmentally preferable alternative. The regional office then
proceeded to approve funding for right-of-way acquisition only.
Complaints by opponents of the alternative selected (that is, the
LRT/Expressway alternative) -- such as the bias against the busway
alternative and the lack of overall consideration of the effects of the LRT
proposal -- were abundant at this time. Nevertheless, UMTA and FHWA
announced the decision to provide financial assistance for the construction
of the Guadalupe Corridor Project as a response to a congressional mandate.
UMTA justified the decision by indicating that LRT had the opportunity for
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private sector participation, minority business enterprise contracting
opportunities, and the higher than required local matching commitment.
The full funding contract between the SCCTD and UMTA was signed on
June 22, 1984. The total cost at that moment was estimated at
$411,075,000, of which $39,150,000 were for the budget related to the
transit mall. Out of the $411 million, 36.67% would be covered by local
funds, and 63.33% would be covered by the federal government (subject to
availability of funds from the Congress) 100. Those amounts were in
current values assuming construction would be ended in 1987 and with an
inflation (escalation, they call it) rate of 7.5% beginning in March 1984
(for those items already underway no inflationary escalation was
anticipated). Any additions, changes, etc. to the system that would
increase costs would need to be covered with local funds, except in cases
of extraordinary costs -- namely, inflation beyond the expected rate, acts
of God, eminent domain cases, costs directly caused by Federal legislation,
and those caused by unavailability of funds from Congress.
The SCCTD agreed to secure and provide (without further Federal
assistance) whatever additional resources were necessary to pay for extra
amounts not covered as extraordinary and complete the project. The full
funding contract also included the condition that the SCCTD would not
request Federal operating assistance in excess of the smaller amount
between the one specified by Section 9 or the one set forth by the SCCTD in
100 The cost for the LRT included 31 stations and 9 park and ride lots.
The $39 million for the transit mall were going to be covered 70% by
UMTA and 30% with local/county funds. The highway component of the
transportation project was a four-lane freeway with an estimated cost
of $106 million to be funded 41% by the Federal Highway
Administration, 37% by the city of San Jose, and 22% by the County
Transit District.
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its five year plan of March 22, 1983. Anything in excess of this will be
funded from State and local sources. In its appendices, the contract
specified which items of the project would be covered by local or federal
sources (e.g., 45 articulated light rail vehicles, without including spare
parts, tools, training or technical support, was stated as local activity).
In another appendix, the contract with the State indicated that no more
funds could be requested from State sources than those specified in 1983
($60 million).
A few weeks after UMTA decided to provide the funds, a group labelled
as "People for Efficient Transportation" filed a suit in U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. This group alleged that
there was a lack of adequate consideration of modal alternatives, among
them the busway alternative, that they believed were environmentally
preferable and more cost effective than the LRT alternative. They
requested an injunction against any construction or expenditures for the
Guadalupe Corridor transportation facility. The effect of this lawsuit was
a delay in the development of the project for almost 24 months. The first
10 miles of the LRT system were opened for revenue operation in May 1988
101
Table 3.4 indicates the changes in the estimates of capital and
operating costs from the 1976 study to the initial construction of the
system. It is interesting to note that the 1976 estimates indicated a cost
of $168 m. for a 20-mile LRT, assuming constant returns to scale (i.e.,
assuming proportionality). Decreasing returns would probably yield values
101 In fact some of the vehicles started running on December 31, 1987 to
make use of harbor leasing proceedings that helped the SCCTD save $7
million dollars.
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very close to the ones estimated before the 1984 full funding contract. In
other words, the 1976 estimates seem to have been more accurate than
subsequent estimates.
Several reasons can be pinpointed for cost increases since the signing
of the full funding contract (table 3.5 provides a summary of them):
(a) locally funded project enhancements: After the full funding contract
was signed in 1984, a number of local initiatives were studied to
Table 3.4
Comparison of Capital Cost Estimates for Santa Clara Light Rail
Constant
Current 1976 $
Cap. Cost Cap. Cost
Proposed Estimate Estimate
Study/Year System (millions) (millions)
Santa Clara County
Transit District Light 34.08-mile LRT
Rail Feasibility and 12.25-mile LRT
Alternatives Analysis (1976)
Alternatives Analysis/UMTA
Grant Application (1981) 20-mile LRT
Preferred Alternative
Report (1981) 20-mile LRT
Guadalupe Corridor
Briefing Booklet (1983) 20-mile LRT
Full Funding Contract 20-mile LRT
(1984) w/ transit mall
Forecast Update/Cost to 20-mile LRT
Complete Estimate (1988) w/ transit mall
$268
$113
$180
$187
$320
$372
$411
$559
$268
$113
$132
$137
$179
$219
$242
$305 *
Sources: Santa Clara County Transit District
Engineering News Record (building cost index)
Own calculations
* These values are an approximation whereby costs have been
discounted from the year 1987, as the approximate year of
construction (construction started in 1984 and is scheduled to be
completed in 1991).
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improve the basic LRT system (e.g., transit mall extension, automatic
train protection in the South Line, Community Sound Walls, etc.), and
other locally-funded projects were mandated by the California Public
Utilities Commission (such a grade separation, underpass, at a
railroad crossing on North First Street 102);
(b) preliminary estimates: At the time of the full funding contract,
estimates were based on preliminary design concepts and, as such,
swings of 30% were anticipated; some estimates such as the vehicle
costs proved very accurate, while other such as professional services
were too low;
(c) environmental delays: The law suit concerning grade separation in some
3.8 mile in the South Line, delayed the award of contract to the
lowest bidder; a Supplemental Environmental Impact Report (SEIR) which
evaluated 10 design alternatives required a lengthy process; also the
Transit District decided to delay the Final SEIR until other risks
related to asbestos were studied in more detail; these events delayed
the beginning of the construction 24 months;
(d) Measure A impacts: this measure involved an increase by 1/2 cent in
the sales tax to fund improvements in local routes, and particularly
on the expressway in whose median the LRT was going to be located;
after this measure was passed, LRT stations and park and ride access
had to be upgraded and therefore made more complex and expensive;
(e) utility escrow for private utility relocations: At the time of the
full funding contract, it was assumed that private utilities would pay
102 Public officials complained about this requirement since only a few
trains per day use this railroad line.
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for any relocation of their facilities in the public right-of-way; a
utility escrow was set aside, pending the final ruling of the Court;
(f) transit mall: Design services and construction change orders increase
the cost of the transit mall by $5 million.
Table 3.5
Reasons for Cost Growth
in Santa Clara County's LRT (1984 - 1988)
(growth of $147.5 million = $558.6 m. - $411.1 m.)
------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Percent of
increase total cost
($ millions) increase
-------------------------------------------------------
Locally funded $32.1 21.8%
Prelim. estimates $62.5 42.4%
Environm. delays $24.6 16.7%
Measure A impacts $8.3 5.6%
Utility escrow $15.0 10.2%
Transit mall $5.0 3.4%
Total cost increase $147.5 100.0%
-------------------------------------------------------
Note: Unexpected inflation effects are embedded in those
items that caused delays in the construction of the
project (mainly environmental delays) or in those that
presented unanticipated cost increases.
Initially the LRT line was going to be located in the median strip of
a highway designed for expressway standards (that is, with signalized
intersections and not fully separated). Later, as response to voters'
demands, when County Measure A was passed in 1984, the highway was upgraded
to freeway standards, requiring full separation. The new stations on the
line then were redesigned according to these standards. In addition, the
LRT track had to follow the same profile as the freeway.
Paradoxically enough, the redesign of the expressway to freeway
standards, along with the required LRT changes, was perceived by some as a
major drawback for the LRT line. In an area were most people drive cars, a
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freeway along an LRT would not be likely to take people out of the cars.
Furthermore, the redesign forced the construction of overpasses that LRT
patrons would have to climb up and down to get to the stations. The effect
of this inconvenience would be that, once near the highway, people would
rather stay on it and finish the whole trip on their cars. At the other
side of the line, the northern portion, another deterrent to transit use
consists of the distance -- almost a quarter of a mile -- an individual
must walk, across some landscaping strip and a parking lot, to get to a
building from a LRT stop. The way buildings are normally designed, because
of city requirements, is such that generous landscaping strips are provided
in between the street and parking lots. There is also almost a guaranteed,
free parking space for every employee. All these conditions amount to
strong disincentives to abandon the private automobiles and take the LRT
line. Ridership figures for the year 2000 have been put down to around
6,000 from initial estimates of 20,000 to 40,000 103. The main reasons
consultants revised the demand estimates were voter's demands for the
freeway standards parallelling the rail line, and because trains will
traverse downtown San Jose at 10 to 15 miles per hour. 104
Administrative costs, for the final figures, were around 30% of the
total costs, well above the usual 10%. SCCTD officials were not sure why
that was the case, but a possible explanation was related to the many times
103 For the first half of the system, daily ridership was 3,000 for the
first three months of operation, although this is not a definite
figure since transit systems require some time for people to get used
to them.
104 An express bypass was considered at some point at the end of 1986 but
did not prosper, mainly because downtown merchants and businessmen did
not like the idea.
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the system had to be redesigned because of citizen opposition or law suits,
and hence consultant fees and other administrative tasks increased
substantially. Any enhancements to the system had to be paid out of local
funds since under UMTA's mandate and the full funding contract, the
original scope and budget had to be kept intact . The full funding
contract was signed by UMTA after the corresponding appropriation was made
by the U.S. Congress. Therefore, at the end, funds were earmarked and
mandated by the U.S. Congress, not actually approved by UMTA as a result of
the process of analysis of alternatives.
Local public officials underscored the inappropriateness of the
federal planning process and the annoyance that it causes in the local
decision-making process as it cannot address the needs and particularities
of different local constituencies. The technical studies are necessary,
they stated, but there are other issues that can easily override any
conclusions from those studies. This apparent disdain at the local level
for the technical components of the project produced tensions with the
federal regional office and delayed the initiation of the project and
prevented its approval through the formal federal procedures.
Comments on the Santa Clara Case
Public opinion indicated that highways were largely supported as the
way to improve the transportation conditions in a wealthy and predominantly
service-oriented area. Some political compromise was reached between
105 A consultant firm was contracted to undertake the project management
oversight (PMO) to avoid mismanagement of project funds and complete
the project with the specified cap on Federal funding participation.
The PMO firm had also the role of providing UMTA with a reliable and
independent source of objective information relative to all aspects of
the engineering, design, procurement, and construction of the LRT
system. The services of the PMO firm were engaged by UMTA.
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freeway and transit advocates, to include alternatives that comprised LRT,
expressways, and improvements in the bus system. At some point, the
chairman of the Board of Control explicitly indicated that freeways had to
be built to placate those who consider highways the most efficient
transportation system conceivable. The pooling of several modes reduced
the chances of opposition from some parties and increased the likelihood of
constructing the LRT system.
However, the consideration of expressways and LRT on the same corridor
created some contradictions, since the former would detract riders from the
latter, reducing its effectiveness 106. The hope was that any potential
decrease in transit ridership will only last until highway gridlock sets in
again. A 1981 technical report stated that highway construction was deemed
necessary to attend the travel needs of those who would not or could not
use transit. The same report also indicated that an expressway would
detract close to 3% of the passengers from the adjacent transit facility,
but that a freeway would divert much more and its capital costs would be
much higher. 107
The main objectives to be achieved with the LRT investment included
the revitalization of the downtown area, the fact that such a wealthy area
did not have a "visible" transportation system, and changes in land use
patterns (towards higher densities) 108. To a large extent, this latter
106 Many of the reasons for the dwindling state support came about from
disagreements with the freeway potion.
107 Santa Clara County Transit District [1981], pp. 79 and 81.
108 Many of the proponents of the LRT kept arguing about the positive
effects of fixed-guideway systems on density patterns in spite of
repeated indications that density inducements from that type of
transit facilities do not very often come about (Meyer and Gomez-
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objective was the one that motivated the decision to select LRT, with the
hope that the change the land use pattern would create a high-density
commercial corridor 20 or 30 years from now.
This vision was not in harmony with that of the higher level
institutions, particularly UMTA. Although the local-UMTA working
relationship was termed good by the local people, they also indicated that
UMTA had a prejudice, because of an 'East-coast' high-density mentality.
UMTA expressed skepticism about the outcome of rail investments in low-
density corridors. Therefore, they felt that a system based on buses would
be more than enough, and would be more cost-effective (i.e., buses would
achieve the same goal at lower cost). Local people, on the other hand,
thought that cost-effectiveness criteria were important, but that other
elements also counted such as supporting a growing and dynamic economy
(with transportation enhancements and potential changes in land use that in
turn would, sooner or later, reinforce the LRT project). The busway/HOV
alternative was added at UMTA's request, and its technical elements were
developed with considerable less in-depth analysis than the LRT
alternatives.
The technical reports therefore reflected the enthusiasm for LRT that
consultants and transit supporters had at the time of deciding which
alternative to pursue. An example of this optimism relates to the
estimation of operating costs. Although only raised by a few people, there
were some concerns that after coming up with ways to finance the capital
Ibanez [1981]; Altshuler, et. al. [1979]; Hammer [1976] . Others
(e.g., Allen [1988]) indicate that rail transit has the potential for
changing land uses, but there is no definite study about both the
necessary and sufficient conditions for those effects to occur.
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improvements, the county will still have to bear the large burden of paying
for the operation of the whole transit system once it had been constructed.
The 1981 preferred alternative report concluded that for the LRT system
farebox revenues would cover 85% of the operating costs. At the end of
1986, when bus ridership had fallen around 3 percent from the previous
year, Santa Clara County Transit recovered about 11% of its operating costs
from fares 109. (The less optimistic SCVCE 1975 study indicated that no
transit option would be able to recover more than 31% of its operating
costs from the farebox.)
Some of the advantages of the LRT -- mainly, accidents, safety, and
operating and maintenance costs -- were based on achieving the expected
ridership. In fact, the preferred-alternative report indicated that "[t]he
greater the demand there is for transit (...), the less expensive it
becomes to operate light rail transit versus a busway." 110 But if certain
minimum levels are not achieved, many of the conclusions of the technical
study would not apply any longer, and particularly the adequacy of the
selected alternative since other alternatives would largely surpass the LRT
option in most of the economic, financial, and cost-effectiveness factors.
These arguments underscore the importance of complete sensitivity analysis,
where ridership, capital costs, and operating costs are interlinked so that
different assumptions suggest different alternatives and levels of
investment as well as how much capacity can be provided for a given funding
level or, conversely, how levels of ridership would change the economic and
109 Jansen [1987], page 11.
110 Santa Clara County Transit District [1981], p. 23.
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financial impacts of each alternative
Finally, in the case of the Guadalupe Corridor project, about 200
public meetings were held in the first stage (up to the SCVCE) and about
300 during the process of analyzing alternatives. After such an exhaustive
effort, one wonders why so many design changes had to be incorporated
later. This paradox arises from the need to compromise many competing
interests that never reach a stable position, and the political nature of
the project. On October 27, 1981, the Chamber of Commerce indicated that
they supported the LRT option, but expressed concern for applying sound
business practices, and for loading up the project with "frills" that may
be favored politically but do not have a strong impact on the
transportation needs in the county. Also, some institutions do not raise
their concerns until the moment they have to face them or when their
complaints would prove more successful. In addition, the static nature of
the technical document does not allow for changes to be made as quickly as
they need to be incorporated (or a deliberate passive action is assumed to
avoid raising costs too much before the time of selecting the preferred
alternative).
All the individuals interviewed agreed that the Santa Clara County LRT
project survived the many battles involved in the planning process because
"11 Furthermore, technical uncertainty was high in this case because LRT
technology was relatively new at the moment of the Santa Clara
County's transit studies since LRT technology had not been tried to a
full scale in other parts of the world (and particularly in North
America).
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of persistence by major actors to push the LRT technology ahead u2
Consultants played key roles in the planning and design effort but worked
all the times under the technical guidance of SCCTD staff and policy
direction of the Board as transmitted by that staff. Community support was
always sought, and successfully achieved, by the broad participation
program and by the careful selection of components of alternatives to
encompass most of the community interests.
3.2.3. Buffalo's Light Rail Rapid Transit
Introduction
The Buffalo case illustrates issues such as changes in design
elements, attempts to redirect land use patterns, and optimistic estimates
similar to the Santa Clara County case but from the perspective created by
a completely different socio-economic environment. Buffalo's LRT system
was one of the first one to be completed as a new fixed-guideway start in a
U.S. city. This newness, coupled with cost overruns and an awkward design,
has given Buffalo's system a somewhat undeserved reputation for bad transit
planning and poor management.
Buffalo is a typical example of a mid-size Northeast U.S. city. It is
a mature, stable community characterized by relatively high (for U.S.
standards) population densities, with a metropolitan population of
1,500,000 in 1980 that had been declining for a decade. Ridership rates
(measured by passengers per mile of service) have been above the U.S.
112 The absence of a major supporting actor has been highlighted as the
major drawback for the failure to construct a similar LRT system in
Denver, Colorado. In fact, the former director of the SCCTD was hired
by Denver's Transit Construction Authority in 1986 to lead another
attempt to put ahead a fixed-guideway project in this city.
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average.
Since the end of the 1960s there had been a growing interest in a
fixed-guideway transit system stimulated by the fact that winter weather in
Buffalo includes sporadic periods during which automobile and bus travel is
impractical (or even impossible) due to poor visibility and accumulated
snow. This interest increased at the beginning of the 1970s as the area's
manufacturing base decreased. The fixed-guideway system was seen as a way
to revitalize downtown Buffalo and arrest the decline in transit use. The
enhancement of the economic and social conditions in the region required
commercial and institutional development, but this development was thought
to be possible only with significant improvements in the mass transit
network.
By the end of the 1970s, Buffalo, New York State's second-largest
city, had lost more than 40 percent of its 1950 population. A few miles
north, the city of Toronto, which had been involved in the construction of
an extensive transit system since the 1950s, was booming economically.
With some envy for its Canadian neighbors, local officials perceived the
need to revitalize Buffalo's image as a government, financial, and business
center. A fixed-guideway transit system would be the shot in the arm to
turn around the area's sagging economy 1. The transit project would
provide jobs during the construction period and for years to come through a
multiplying effect and extensions of the system. Coincidentally, the
federal government was looking for a place to prove the advantages of light
rail systems as an alternative form of public transit. Buffalo was one of
113 The project was many times justified as a question of survival for the
Buffalo area.
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the preferred choices. The political climate could not have been more
conducive to the development of a fixed-guideway system in the Buffalo
area. By the end of 1986, a 6.4 mile LRT line was finalized but not before
a rather long and tortuous process.
Institutional Environment
Several organizations were part of the transit development process in
the metropolitan area. The Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority
(NFTA), created in 1967 by the legislature of New York State, has been
responsible for the operation of the Port of Buffalo and the Greater
Buffalo and the Niagara Falls International Airports, as well as the
development and implementation of a unified mass transit program and policy
for the transportation district known as the Niagara Frontier region. The
Authority acquired and consolidated six of the seven municipal and private
bus firms in 1975 and provides for the operation of these bus services
through a subsidiary organization, NFT Metro Systems, Inc. NFTA is, in
addition, a regular participant in any transportation planning proposals
for the area.
At the state level, the Division of Community Affairs in the New York
Department of State has the responsibility for coordinating and effecting
budget controls for the planning functions of various state departments
(including the Department of Transportation), coordinating state planning
with planning from regional agencies. The Department of Transportation is
responsible for the planning and development of mass transportation and
aviation facilities and administers financial assistance programs from the
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state and federal levels 114 The State University of New York at Buffalo
is responsible for planning educational and supporting facilities,
including utilities and transportation, on its campuses and is concerned
with matters outside the University, such as access and egress for
students, faculty, and staff.
At the regional level, the Niagara Frontier Transportation Committee
(NFTC) is the Metropolitan Planning Organization designated by the Governor
as being responsible, in cooperation with the State and NFTA, for the
federal (FHWA and UMTA) transportation planning process. NFTC staff
reviews and approves final plans for transportation systems in the study
area. Assisting the NFTC technical staff is a Planning and Coordinating
Committee which includes representatives of the principal technical staffs
dealing with transportation in Eire and Niagara counties. The technical
work is financed jointly by the New York State DOT, UMTA, FHWA, and the
other participating agencies.
At the local level, the counties as well as the cities of Buffalo and
Niagara Falls have planning departments involved in transportation matters.
From the citizen side, support for major transit improvements became strong
at the beginning of the 1970s. During this period, individual citizens and
citizen groups, many of whom wanted transit improvements but objected to
preliminary designs involving miles of aerial structure, were especially
114 Capital funds from the State of New York are available to match
Federal funds for rapid transit development and bus system acquisition
and improvement.
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active and able to force the redefinition of the alternatives 115 Not
Overhead Transit (NOT), an aggressive community organization against the
construction of an overhead transit system, later became a staunch
supporter of the light rail proposals and secured 72,000 signatures on a
petition to federal officials to release funds for the construction of an
LRT line.
Project History
The initial proposals for a fixed-guideway system in Buffalo date back
to 1971 116. The UMTA-funded 1971 study recommended, among other things,
the construction of an 11-mile heavy rail line running from downtown
Buffalo northwest to the North Campus of the University in Amherst (figure
3.3). The initial estimates for this line amounted to $241 million, to be
funded primarily by discretionary grants (with an 80% UMTA share,
authorized under section 3 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964),
and by local funds (20%) administered by the metropolitan transit authority
(NFTA).
In the 1971 study, a basic engineering approach to the problem was
adopted. In order to minimize capital costs, the alignment was aerial, at
the expense of community cohesiveness and growing concerns for
environmental impacts. Due to local opposition to the proposed system (the
alignment was mostly elevated), a new study (again funded by UMTA) was
115 Among the ways of participating, the citizen groups inundated the
federal agencies with letters of protest, and visits were made to
Washington to personally register complaints with UMTA and Congress.
116 A 1969 study by the New York State Office of Planning Coordination
already recommended that a rapid transit line be developed to serve
future development in the Buffalo-Amherst corridor.
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undertaken in 1972. This study resulted in the adoption of a rock-tunneled
alignment through the middle corridor and cut-and-cover alignment through
almost two miles of the outer corridor. Both decisions were influenced by
the very strong concerns of the community and the economics involved.
Balancing both long-term and short-term environmental impacts against
increased capital costs resulted in the only decision that could be made
for rail transit at that moment. The new cost estimates rose to $476
million, mainly because of an 80% increase in the underground section of
the line.
Due to the escalating costs (in addition to concerns about ridership
figures), UMTA proposed another study where, in addition to alternative
alignments, alternative modes were compared and analyzed. The alternatives
comprised four bus-based alternatives (one of them equivalent to a "no-
build" alternative), several heavy rail alternatives (the benchmark 11-mile
elevated HRT, among them), and various combinations (in terms of branches)
of light rail alternatives. (Table 3.6 summarizes the capital and
operating costs of the most significant alternatives.) The final report
came out in 1976 (and the final environmental study in 1977), recommending
the construction of a 6.4 mile light rail rapid transit (LRRT) 117 line
from downtown Buffalo to the South Campus of the State University in
Buffalo (figure 3.3). The estimated cost was $336.3 million (with
117 Light rail rapid transit (LRRT) is a variation of the more flexible
light rail transit (LRT). LRRT provides high level platform,
improving system accessibility in general and elderly and handicapped
accessibility in particular. Station design allows the elimination of
on-board vehicle fare collection. LRT's alignment flexibility is
maintained to a large extent by operating, wherever practical, at-
grade.
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Table 3.6
Capital and Operating Costs and Daily Patronage
for Selected Buffalo Transit Alternatives
(Cost figures in 1974 dollars)
Average 1995 operat.
weekday & maintenance
patronage costs Capital costs
Alternative (thousands) ($ thousands) ($ thousands)
Advanced Bus (1) 150 $22,300 $75,200
11-mile HRT 212 $23,600 $373,000
Maximum HRT (19.6 m.) 224 $25,300 $518,000
13-mile LRT 193 $26,300 $357,000
6.4-mile LRT 184 $24,900 $246,000
11-mile LRRT 212 $23,800 $371,000
6.4-mile LRRT 184 $24,400 $245,000
6.4-mile LRRT & Bus (2) 212 $23,600 $336,250
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1977.
Notes: 1 The advanced alternative combined reserved bus lanes,
exclusive right-of-way facilities, contraflow lanes,
and traffic signal priority.
2 This was the preferred alternative. In addition to
the 6.4-mile LRRT, it included a realigned and
rescheduled Metrobus system serving as feeder network
for the LRRT line.
operation planned for 1982) 118. Operating costs were estimated at $23.6
million in 1995 with an annual patronage of 63.6 million passengers. These
figures were going to provide an operating surplus of $0.6 million by the
year 1995. The capital cost estimates were prepared in 1975 by consultant
engineers under contract with NFTA. Operating costs were developed in 1975
by NFTA. 119
118 The $336.3 million supposedly included $22.7 million for improvements
necessary to complete an adequate feeder bus network to complement the
LRRT. U.S. Department of Transportation [1977], p. 10-33.
119 Incidentally, a careful review of the reports comparing the different
alternatives that eventually led to the decision to construct the LRRT
line leads to some discrepancies. For instance, the NFTA 1976
conclusions that came to light in February of that year, were
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When the final environmental report was generated, a decision was made
to hold train consists to a maximum of four units, in an effort to keep
costs to a minimum. This allowed a reduction in station length (to 300
feet), but increased operating costs slightly and reduced system capacity.
Another decision made to save capital costs included simplifying the roof
and wall architectural design of stations to cover only the middle half of
the platform area 0. For estimating bus operating and maintenance costs,
a relationship was developed, based on then-current operating costs in
Buffalo, that calculates those costs on a per mile basis, separating costs
between those dependent on speed and those that are independent of speed.
Further, it was assumed that initial 1982 operating costs would be lower
than 1995 levels, by matching patronage with a linear growth between 1982
and 1995. However, the estimated reduction over 1995 levels was
proportioned to only 75 percent of the reduction in patronage. For years
after 1995, operating and maintenance costs were assumed to remain at the
1995 level. Rail operating costs were developed for the assumed 1995
operating schedules by estimating each major component of the cost
individually -- labor, energy, administration, etc. -- and by using
employee production values which were based on rail operating experience in
supposedly based on the consultant's report that came out in June.
Furthermore, the February 1976 report stated conclusions not fully
supported in this (June) report. No clear explanation was given by
the NFTA officials about this discrepancy in publishing dates.
120 For the light rail alternative, they indicated that a key point is
that LRT is oriented towards a lower unit capital cost than the heavy
rail. Therefore, any characteristics that would prohibit low cost of
an adequate LRT facility constituted a constraint.
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other North American cities 121
As to the financial feasibility of the alternatives, the consultants
report indicated that "[t]he amount of financing appears impractical to
achieve due to Federal appropriation limits." They also indicate that,
"[f]urther on the unfavorable side, but less important perhaps, is that
inflation is expected to increase the project costs beyond that which the
current New York State appropriation would meet even if Federal funds were
available, and a further increase in the appropriation in the near future
must be rated as uncertain." In spite of these comments, made only for one
of the alternatives, and extrapolated to others as "neutral" evaluation,
the report did not try to address the issue in more detail. The financing
problem, they indicated, can be eased with some reduced alternatives 122
Even before the publication of the final environmental impact
assessment, the head of the U.S. Department of Transportation announced
UMTA's "commitment in principle" to the funding of 80% of the construction
of the LRRT system. The balance of the total $336 million was pledged by
the state. By then, the entire State of New York Congressional delegation
was united to press for approval of the Buffalo project, and in addition
community groups were putting pressure on Washington. However, UMTA
121 Interestingly enough, ridership estimation is compared at some point
with the case of the "successful" 14.5-mile Lindenwold line in
Philadelphia. They proudly stated that the patronage level for the
LRRT line was estimated at over three times the patronage on the
Lindenwold line. This probably should have raised concern about the
estimation process rather than pride.
122 They also stated that a busway branch would offer the opportunity to
request highway funds rather than transit funds, therefore making more
probable the approval of financial assistance for some transit
alternatives. Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Alan
Voorhees & Associates, Inc. [1976].
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indicated that the commitment would be subject to the completion of the
necessary environmental and legal requirements. In addition, they stated
that the federal share would not exceed $269 million (80% of the estimated
total cost) and that it would make a contract with the NFTA only with the
assurance that there would be enough money from other sources to cover any
cost overruns. NFTA noted that the $336 million project cost estimate
included a sufficient allowance for increases in labor and material costs.
The willingness of construction contractors and unions to sign a
written no-strike agreement for the duration of construction (aimed at
averting cost-escalating work stoppages) and the then innovative proposal
to create a downtown transit mall with the LRRT operating on the surface in
an auto-free zone were two of the key elements highlighted by UMTA as
determinative for the decision to fund the project. But the question of
how operating deficits and cost overruns would be met still lingered and
some wondered whether or not more thought should have been given at that
moment to an overall view of the entire project in the light of scaling
down initial proposals (i.e., basically from an 11-mile to a 6.4-mile rail
network).
Construction began in April 1979 and was completed at the end of
November 1986, four years behind the schedule indicated in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement s. As the project evolved from the
planning to the preliminary engineering, to the construction stage, the
NFTA revised its cost estimates. In November 1978, the contract between
UMTA and NFTA was signed, indicating a total cost of $449.8 million (with
$359.8 million federal share, in 1977 dollars, a sizeable increase from the
123 U.S. Department of Transportation [1977], p. 4-11.
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$269.0 million, in 1974 dollars, estimated two years earlier). The
estimate was prepared by NFTA and four principal consultants during the
preliminary engineering phase.
The Buffalo system was financed under Section 3 statutes by which the
federal government would cover 80% of the construction costs. This project
was funded, as in the case of Santa Clara LRT line, under the statutes of a
full-funding contract. Under this concept, UMTA committed federal funds in
specified incremental amounts over the life of the project, subject to the
availability of funds from Congress. The federal share could only be
increased if certain extraordinary costs were incurred 124. This concept,
by establishing obligation ceilings and grantee responsibility for excess
costs, was supposed to be an incentive for the applicants to develop more
accurate costs estimates (since cost overruns would need to be covered by
the municipality). However, in Buffalo, UMTA assisted in financing
additional project costs not included under the provisions of the full-
funding contract. Table 3.7 summarizes the evolution of costs and federal
contributions. In 1986 a revised cost estimate indicated that the project
would cost $534.8 million. Through that date, the federal contribution had
been $426.3 million.
Table 1.2 (in chapter 1) summarizes the changes in capital cost
estimates that occurred during 16 years of the planning and construction of
Buffalo's rail system and some of the reasons for those changes. Between
124 Extraordinary costs include inflation beyond that estimated in the
contract, natural disasters, eminent domain settlements, federal laws
or regulations enacted after the contract award date and that may
affect the project, and unforeseen delays in the availability of funds
from the Congress. Anything else was going to be the responsibility
of the local institutions.
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1976 and 1978, underground conditions were surveyed, and detailed plans,
including construction schedules and project cost updates, were developed.
These plans indicated a 33.8% increase (in nominal values) in construction
costs due to engineering changes, delays in starting the service
(inflation), increased contingencies, and higher insurance rates. Between
1978 and 1985, the 18.7% increase (in nominal values) was due mainly to
unanticipated inflation, expenses incurred in implementing federal
regulations, and changes in project scope. Table 3.8 focuses on the LRRT
cost growth between 1976 and 1985 based on data reported in a 1986 General
Accounting Office (GAO) study.
Table 3.7
Summary of Capital Costs for Buffalo's Light Rail Rapid System
(current values)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Approved Federal
project costs share
Grants/cost estimate ($ mill.) ($ mill.)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Basic grant application (Oct. 1976, 1974 $) 336.3 269.0
Full funding contract (Nov. 1978, 1977 $) 449.8 359.8
Amendments to full funding contract 44.9 35.9
Total basic grant 494.7 395.7
Four supplemental grants 31.0 24.6
Total - all grants (1985 $) 525.7 420.3
Including art work and start-up costs 534.8 426.3
Cost of complete estimate (1987) 551.9 N/A
--------------------------------------------------------------
Source: General Accounting Office [1986b], NFTA [1987].
Note: See table 1.2 for additional information on cost changes
in the Buffalo case.
Almost 50% of the cost changes could be attributed to scope or
engineering changes that had to be made along the way. When considering
the utilities relocation and the "unknown," the percentage almost reaches
60%. Most of these changes were later approved by UMTA, -- and hence
covered with the 80% federal share -- mainly because the Congress
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appropriated funds for assisting several cities in financing the completion
of their transit systems.
In explaining why the costs of starting and equipping the system were
not included in any of the cost estimates, the 1986 GAO report indicates
that: "[a] former NFTA official [stated] that those costs were not included
in the initial estimate because NFTA staff did not believe they could
determine a cost for requirements that would not be known until much later.
Another former NFTA official [indicated] that the costs were going to be
included in the estimate for the full-funding contract, but were deleted
when NFTA learned that UMTA would not accept a cost estimate over $450
million." 125 Eventually, UMTA awarded $6 million out of the $8 million to
cover start-up costs, because UMTA officials thought that was the mandate
Table 3.8
Reasons for Cost Growth in Buffalo's LRRT (1976 - 1985)
(on an amount of $197.5 million = $534.8 m.- $336.3 m.)
Cost growth factor percent
Engineering changes 20.3
Delay in starting service 13.5
Increased contingencies and insurance rates 15.2
Utilities relocation 2.1
Unanticipated inflation 10.6
La Salle Street station 12.7
Extension of transit mall 15.2
Other (start-up activities, station artwork,
minority business enterprise) 4.6
Unknown 5.8
Total 100.0
Source: General Accounting Office [1986b] and own
calculations.
125 General Accounting Office [1986], p. 37.
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of 1984 and 1985 congressional legislation (as well as the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982).
Another interesting development in the planning and construction
process involved a major station on the line. In 1979, the NFTA thought
that the La Salle station would not be necessary in light of the expected
extension of the system along the Tonawandas corridor (the station was
located right at the merging of the Tonawandas branch line with the
original LRRT line). In 1981, UMTA approved NFTA's request and the La
Salle Street station was dropped from the initial plan of 14 stations, and
its funds were transferred to assist in financing enhancements in the
transit mall 126. About a year later, however, NFTA asked that the station
be reinstated in the plan, and UMTA eventually funded almost $20 million
for that purpose because of congressional mandate 127. In 1983, the
enhancements in the transit mall were also funded ($14.2 million federal
share of the $17.8 cost estimate) with discretionary funds because UMTA
felt the mall was a worthwhile addition to the Buffalo LRRT project.
Almost two years after the beginning of revenue operation, with an
average weekday ridership of 28,000 passengers, the LRRT farebox recovery
ratio is 27% compared to 40% for the bus system. The LRRT adds almost $8.5
million to the $24.5 million operating deficit of the bus system 128, while
the annual operating cost per rider for the rail system is $1.0, almost 30%
126 These enhancements included structures for two more stations, a
skywalk, and a redesigned square.
127 This measures was approved when Congress passed the Emergency Jobs
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1983.
128 Operating statistics for fiscal year 1987-88, provided by the NFTA
(August 1988).
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higher than the $0.77 for the bus system. (At the end of 1988, some local
officials were even considering the possibility of closing down the
underground section of the system, leaving only the 1.2 miles of the
transit mall open. This possibility, if implemented, would seriously
diminish the initial objectives of the transit project.)
Comments on the Buffalo Case
In Buffalo, the initial conception of the transportation problem as a
means to improve the economic conditions of a depressed area was not
undermined by the unsuccessful attempt to construct a rapid transit line.
The idea evolved into something close to the initial proposal: a light rail
transit line with an unconventional design -- with the downtown area at
grade and the outer sections underground -- that would give the system some
of the operating characteristics (mainly operating speed) of the defeated
proposal.
As summarized in table 3.6, an 1977 study provided a set of capital
and operating costs (estimated in 1975) in terms of which none of the
alternatives had a clear advantage. In fact, if some sensitivity analysis
had been performed, none of the alternatives would probably have been
significantly different from the others. Interesting enough, the selected
alternative, although it considered a rearrangement of the bus system
(methodology that should have been followed with the other alternatives as
well, but was not), had the same ridership than an almost twice-as-long
LRRT, and similar operating costs and a mere 9% less capital costs.
(Because of instances like this one, the results of the 1977 alternatives
analysis always left room for criticisms by the detractors of the
proposals.)
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During the planning process, concerns were raised about the financial
feasibility of the alternatives, but no major thought was given to these
concerns, except for indicating that reduced alternatives could always be
implemented (without considering that the benefits of reduced alternatives
would probably be much less and their effectiveness very much reduced).
The NFTA responded to comments made at public hearings in July 1977
concerning operating deficits, by stating that if sufficient subsidy cannot
be provided by all levels of government involved, service in the corridor
could be reduced, or system fares raised to make up the difference. This
was a very weak argument since cutting down service or raising fares
usually leads to further cuts in service and probably larger deficits. The
careful examination of alternative scenarios in relation to which level of
demand may turn out to be attracted to the system did not receive careful
consideration. Furthermore, scaling down initial proposals should have
required a whole reexamination of the project, since the same set of
assumptions does not hold for two systems with different lengths, different
levels of service, or different technologies.
It is also important to note that in this project, the preoccupation
with cost overruns probably distracted attention from more basic design
elements. For instance, in spite of the half a billion invested in the
project, no provision was made for conveniences for LRT drivers.
Currently, drivers have to request permission from the central control
operator to leave the car and enter any open building in the central area
looking for restrooms (buildings that may be particularly hard to find
during late evening hours or weekends). Another example is the location of
the crossover at the South Campus terminal station. The crossover is
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located before the station, and since at the crossover the speeds must be
much slower, it causes delays and reduces the capacity of the line,
particularly during peak periods. Finally, in order to attend the needs of
handicapped passengers, stations in the at-grade section have an elevated
platform to serve the first door of the car. The LRT car has high floors,
but for those doors outside the platform area, some steps must be released
for people to get on and off 129. The whole operation requires
considerable dwelling time at each of the six stops in the at-grade
section, further reducing the capacity of the system.
As major obstacles to the accomplishment of the project within the
budget initially estimated, local officials mentioned (a) uncertain funding
from the federal and state governments, (b) disputes with the city over
relocation of waterlines, unexpected vaults and telephone systems, and (c)
inaccurate utility maps. Nevertheless, the 60% cost change due to design
elements (table 3.5) is a fairly large number for elements whose
uncertainty can be reduced with additional and careful analysis (unlike
other elements such as inflation that fall beyond the control of the
analysts). Some of the increase in costs were due to enhancements
incorporated into the system to attract additional passengers such as art
work. Even by these accounts, however, the project can not justify some
cost increases since several other planned amenities, such as an ice-rink
and a laser show, have not been implemented. (Buffalo's LRRT case has
become a well publicized case of cost overruns although, once cost figures
are corrected with inflation, as indicated in figure 1.1, the overruns are
129 These steps are activated at the request of passengers, who must press
a button located to either side of each door.
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not more dramatic than in other less publicized instances.)
The decision to construct Buffalo's LRRT system came from many sources
but most of all was motivated by the sagging economy in the area during the
1970s. The strong and united congressional delegation, with one of its
members chairman of the appropriations subcommittee of the transportation
committee, helped overcome some technical hurdles and secured the necessary
funding. Once again, the presence of persistent advocates for the transit
system kept the project alive beyond the results of the technical analysis.
Hence, the role of this analysis as the critical element in making
decisions became rather curtailed.
3.3. Case Studies Abroad
This section relates the author's experiences in countries outside the
United States. Without any attempt to carry out a full comparative
analysis of transit-project planning, this section discusses other elements
of the technical and decision-making processes that can help understand the
interaction between these two processes and elucidate some of the issues
presented in the U.S. case studies.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the major difference between the U.S. and
other countries -- particularly European countries -- is that, in the U.S.,
transit faces an often inhospitable environment where highway and
automobile interests subdue transit initiatives on most fronts 130
Moreover, unlike transit in Europe, which has been mostly motivated by and
linked with urban growth and development, U.S. public transit has been more
130 Whitt and Yago [1985]; Whitt [1982].
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the result of political pressures and pork-barreling 131.
In the U.S., transit programs used to emphasize ridership and are now
more concerned with costs of producing service. In Europe, by contrast,
transit programs emphasize the quality of service provided such as
accessibility, in terms of frequency, reliability, speed, and transfer
requirements, and comfort and safety. This does not mean that the cost of
producing service is completely neglected, but rather that its assessment
occurs more in relation to the potential benefits generated from service
132
changes or capital investments
Another difference between transit planning in the U.S. and other
countries is the degree of formalization of the technical and decision-
making processes. These processes are much more formal in the U.S. where
precise federal regulations have been developed to select the preferred
transit alternative in those cases seeking funds from the federal
government (see chapter 2). In other countries, these processes are more
of an ad-hoc nature with minimal statutory requirements that are only
generated as the projects come along 133. These characteristics will be
reflected in the next two case studies: Madrid's rail transit network, and
La Paz's transportation proposals.
131 Fielding [1983a], page 289.
132 It must be mentioned that the difference in emphasis arises because of
the distinct predominance of transit in attracting urban trips. In
the U.S., this predominance is very low outside a few major
metropolitan areas, and consequently transit planning is approached
from a different perspective.
133 This aspect reflects the more general fact that local governments are
more trusted and authoritarian outside the U.S..
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3.3.1. Madrid's Rail Transportation System
Introduction
This case study does not focus on a particular project (since it was
hard to single out one that could be followed from the beginning to the
end, and that had characteristics similar to the ones selected from U.S.
cities), but rather on the institutional structure, planning process, and
development of fixed-guideway systems in the Madrid metropolitan region
134. The case study illustrates a relationship between the central
government and local institutions where politics also play a major role but
that, at the same time, tends to eliminate some of the mistrust that exists
in the U.S. context and attempts to incorporate incentives that encourage
outcomes closer to those estimated in the analysis process. This situation
largely originates in the characteristics mentioned in the previous
section. Nevertheless, how the planning process is structured in the
Madrid case has some application for the U.S. context.
Madrid's metropolitan area had a population of almost 4.7 million
people in 1986, up 27% since 1970. In 1981, the number of trips on foot
amounted to almost 58%, while 29% were done by transit and slightly less
than 14% were done by private modes of travel. Nonetheless, the 1980s saw
a dramatic increase in the registration of private automobiles, after a
downward trend at the end of the 1970s. A declining economy at the end of
the seventies and the competition from private modes of transport at the
beginning of the eighties caused the steady decline of transit patronage
since 1974, with most of the decrease taken by the subway network while the
134 These fixed-guideway systems are of two kinds: the subway system, a
10-line, 104-kilometer network, and the commuter rail system, a 9-
line, 241-kilometer network.
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bus network held a slight increase. In 1985, however, transit ridership
rebounded with noticeable increases along with the improvement in the
overall economic conditions of the country. 135
The institutional framework has undergone remarkable changes for the
past 10 years as the "Community of Madrid" obtained statutory
responsibilities over transportation matters -- in addition to education,
public health, etc. -- and formed its own regional government, aside from
the municipal government which had the responsibility for the planning and
operation of the bus network. Nevertheless, for major investments, both
the regional and the local government have always had to request funds from
the central government. Hence, transportation investments have been the
product of the interplay of four primary sets of actors: the central
government, the regional government, the municipal government, and the
transit operators.
History
The subway system started as a private venture in 1917. The company
paid for any investments in infrastructure of the subway system until 1956.
In this year, the central government, through its Ministry of Public Works,
assumed the task of financing any additional infrastructure (and
constructed line 5 136) in light of the impossibility of the private
company to undertake any further capital investments. In 1978, mainly due
135 Conserjeria de Politica Territorial [1988], pp. 5-7.
136 The subway lines are labelled with numbers in Madrid's subway (e.g.,
line 1).
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to the deterioration of service 137, the central government took over the
company, and an "Intervention Council," reporting to the Ministry of
Transports, embraced the role of manager of the company 138. The members
of the Council were designated by the Ministry of Transports. At the end
of 1978, the central government proceeded to buy the shares of the company
from its shareholders by exchanging them with shares of the national
telephone company or by expropriation. (This decision was to be approved
only if 60% of the shareholders, as eventually occurred, accepted the
exchange of shares.)
Between 1978 and 1986, when the company became a part of the
"Consorcio Regional de Transportes" -- the metropolitan transportation
agency that was part of the Madrid regional government ("autonomia de
Madrid") 139 -- , the central government was in charge of every investment
in the system, except for those regarding the rolling stock. This
equipment however could be acquired only with the warranty of the central
government. This government was to pay for any operating deficits as well,
as far as the fare had to be subject to controls for reasons of public
interest.
Between 1978 and 1986, the network almost doubled its 1970 length of
54 kilometers. A plan developed in 1967, and later revised in 1971 and
137 Several dramatic accidents, with deaths of passengers, took place
during this period, precipitating the intervention of the central
government.
138 There was one line (line 10) that became part of the municipality of
Madrid, being managed however, as part of the whole subway network,
jointly with the subway company.
139 Madrid is one of the 17 regional governments that were instituted in
Spain during the first half of the 1980 decade. The region includes
the territories of the former province of Madrid.
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1974, envisioned a network of 139 kilometers. In 1984, the length became
104 kilometers, with no immediate plans to keep on with the same pace of
investments, due to declining ridership 14. In 1987, with the change in
ridership trends 141, plans for increasing the network were revived. If
these plans were implemented, the network would eventually achieve its 1967
goal of 139 kilometers.
The lines opened during the 1978-1986 period were substantially
different from the old lines. The width of the tunnels and stations, as
well as the length of the latter, were larger. Vehicle comfort was
improved. However, in order to economize in construction costs (by
avoiding complex structures to support building foundations) and due to the
strong rolling topography along the suggested routes, the lines were built
deeper underground. This design created some problems at the transfer
stations with the old system. Overall the new lines increased operating
costs and created longer access and transfer times, which initially were
the reasons for the low utilization of the new, high-standard lines. Idle
new rolling stock (almost fifty percent of the new vehicles, during the
initial periods when the new lines presented low levels of ridership) could
not be used in old lines because the cross-sectional tunnel clearance for
the new vehicles was wider than that available in the old lines.
The purpose of the creation of the transportation consortium was to
rationalize the transportation system and avoid the duplication of service
and competition between the bus, subway, and commuter rail network.
140 Ridership decreased from 518 million passengers in 1970 to 332
millions in 1984.
141 In 1986, ridership in the metro system increased by more than 2.5%. A
similar increase occurred in 1987.
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However, the consortium was created from the ownership of the subway
company, while the bus system remained in the hands of the municipal
government, and the commuter rail system stayed within the domain of the
national railway company. In addition to lack of coordination in areawide
planning, the institutional setup created a bias towards investment in
subway assets -- reflected in the technical studies carried out by the
consortium 142 -- as the new transportation agency in charge of the subway
network -- the consortium -- tried to establish a significant role in the
city's transportation matters.
Two projects can be cited as having been the subject of considerable
controversy: the extensions of line 1 and line 6. The former was a
prolongation of the subway line towards one of the poorest neighborhoods of
Madrid (the neighborhood of Vallecas); the latter was meant to be the first
step towards the closing of a circular line.
In the case of the extension of line 6, its economic feasibility (and
hence, the opening or closing of the line to revenue service after it had
been built) switched from positive to negative depending on the philosophy
of the times based, for instance, on what monetary value was put on travel
time. In addition, the technical studies had some fundamental flaws. For
example, at the time of calculating costs, no consideration was given to
142 In fact, except for some studies for the integration of fare systems
and others for demand estimation, most of the technical studies refer
to extensions of the subway network (Consorcio de Transportes de
Madrid [1987]). For instance, the last strategic document indicated
that "the metro, transportation mode of high capacity, is the
principal receptor of the trips generated at the periphery of the
city, and the basic mode for the connections inside it." Moreover,
recent attempts to rationalize the bus system confronted a strong
opposition from the bus company, with any actions by the consortium
being questioned in legal terms.
- 132 -
the additional capital and operating costs that would be necessary for the
extension of the line in terms of rolling stock, and the necessary
improvements in the signalization -- to allow for automatic train
protection and automatic train operation 14. Other controversial elements
were the number of ticket booths, for which only the energy costs were
considered.
At some point, the vice president for operations and capital
programming did not support the opening of the extension of line 6 because
he believed that, considering the demand for buses running on the same
corridor -- even in mixed traffic -- , the system would not be economically
feasible. Negative rates of return further made this actor cautious about
opening the extension. The next vice president, with a more expansionist
view of the service, opened the line to revenue operation with a good
degree of success (in terms of ridership and public acceptance). It turned
out that demand involved not only people that formerly were riding buses
but also a considerable amount of pedestrians (mostly students) going to
the last stop of the line (University City) who, in the initial studies,
were thought to be unwilling to use the subway line for relatively short
distances.
In the case of the extension of line 1 (still under construction), the
final decision as to what mode could best serve the needs of the corridor,
was labelled "political" by the technical director of the regional
consortium. Vallecas was a marginal neighborhood with a single umbilical
cord linking the neighborhood to the core of the city (across a bridge).
143 For explanation of this technological terminology see, for instance,
Vuchic [1981], pp. 437-444.
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Central and local politicians had promised a subway line to improve the
transportation services in the area. Several modes were analyzed, and
finally, mainly through the manipulation of the values for the time
benefits 144, a subway option was selected as the optimal one. The
technical study, carried out by the regional consortium with the
collaboration of outside consultants, concluded that the extension of the
line was not feasible although the consideration of other elements that
were hard to quantify -- such as the better integration of the neighborhood
into the structure of the city and the savings in the consumption of non-
renewable energy sources, since the subway used electricity instead of
combustible fuel -- would probably help justify the construction of the
preferred alternative.
This process illustrates the interaction of the institutional actors
in order to keep afloat the subway network, the consequent effects in the
analysis process, and how this process reflected different investment
philosophies at different moments. These elements can be further analyzed
through the investigation of the "program contract" with the central
administration, developed some time before the Regional Consortium took
over the ownership of the company and its management. The program contract
is the contract signed by the funding institution (the central government)
and the transit authority where the elements of the project and the
conditions for the transfer of funds are specified. This contract reflects
the compromises between the central and the regional governments in order
to finance the operation of the system as well as any new investments in
144 The value of an hour of travel time had to reach at least $7.00, in
1987, in order to balance social costs and benefits, for an area where
incomes were below an average of $4.00 per hour.
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the system. Another program contract, that of the agency in charge of the
planning and operation of the commuter rail network with the central
government is also discussed in the next paragraphs.
Program Contracts
The 1985-88 program contract between the subway agency and the central
government highlighted the objectives to be achieved during a period of 4
years (1985-1988). The fundamental objective was to increase the quality
of service as -- it was stated in the contract -- the only way to attract
automobile drivers and reduce the congestion on the city streets. In
addition, the program indicated the intent of increasing the coverage of
operating costs, or farebox recovery ratio, from the 50% existing in 1984
to 70% by 1988. The contract was signed by two ministries of the central
government (the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Transportation),
the president of the Community of Madrid, and the Mayor of Madrid in
145
representation of the subway company
In the program contract, elements such as the number of vehicle-
kilometers to be provided, productivity levels, and the fare level were
specified. Furthermore, the program indicated that if in achieving these
operational goals (and the broader objectives previously mentioned),
operating deficits increased, the central government would adequately
compensate the agency in charge of financing the subway system. These
compensations were estimated and shown in the program along with capital
investments to be covered by both the central government and the Community
145 The regional transportation consortium was not created until 1986.
Therefore, the program contract was signed by the subway agency in
charge of the planning and operation of the subway network ("Compaiia
Metropolitano") or its representative.
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of Madrid. Both the operating and capital compensations by the central
government would be taken out of the central budget and, in the event they
had not been properly appropriated, the central government would create the
necessary legislation to provide the funds.
The investments would be managed by the Community of Madrid (through
its Regional Transportation Consortium, whose creation was already
considered in the program contract) and the participation of the central
government (through its General Directorate for Infrastructure Investments)
and the subway company. A commission composed of officials from the
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Transports, Community of Madrid, and the
subway company meets quarterly to monitor implementation of the program.
Quarterly reports would indicate the degree of compliance with the
objectives and the causes for deviations. Every year the commission could
suggest updates to the program depending on the changes in the overall
environment (e.g., general macroeconomic trends that had led to the
specification of objectives and their technical descriptors). In the event
of non-compliance, the commission would inform the central government and
would propose which actions to pursue 146*
For the case of commuter rail services, the process is somewhat
different since Madrid's commuter rail system is a part of the national
railway company -- "Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Espafnoles" (RENFE) -- and
not of the regional consortium. This unusual situation is the result of
historical factors, since the property of the commuter-rail trackage and
equipment has belonged to RENFE since the initiation of the system. RENFE
146 The program, however, is not more specific than this about what to do
if non-compliance with initial objectives occurs.
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in its turn is financed and managed by the Ministry of Economy and the
Ministry of Transport. The company therefore must report to these two
ministries, and these two ministries provide the funds necessary for the
operation and capital investments of both the intercity and commuter rail
systems (for passenger and goods movements).
Developments in the commuter rail network are also guided by contract
programs between the interested institutions: RENFE, the Ministry of
Economy, and the Ministry of Transports. The 1988-91 contract program
covers a period of 4 years, and establishes the objectives to be achieved
(in terms of number of passenger-kilometers or service reliability) as well
as some incentive mechanisms to reach these objectives. The central
government covers all the operating deficits and the costs for the
maintenance and amortization of infrastructure based on the rationale that
the service is a public service and therefore of general interest to the
public. The capital investments to be realized during the four years of
the contract are also specified, indicating which institution will be in
charge of carrying them out.
This contract program for the commuter rail service includes some
interesting incentives to achieve the specified objectives. The contract
indicates that if the expected number of passenger-kilometers is surpassed,
the subsidy level for that particular year will be augmented by 3 pesetas
(about 2.6 cents at the 1988 exchange rate) per passenger-kilometer. On
the other hand, if the number of passenger-kilometers is 10% lower than the
expected value, the subsidy will be reduced in 3 pesetas per passenger-
kilometer of the difference between the actual number of passenger-
kilometers and the expected value (the one estimated in the contract
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program) reduced by 10%. The process of measuring the number of passenger-
kilometers in a particular year will be verified by a special official of
the Ministry of Economy.
As in the case of the contract with the subway company, there is a
supervisory commission, with officials from the two interested Ministries
and from RENFE, in charge of controlling the compliance of the program
contract quarterly, and proposing the necessary updates to the program.
Comments on the Madrid Case
The overall development of Madrid's subway and commuter rail networks
reflects the different philosophies about transit services associated with
different periods of time and with different actors. At the end of the
1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the retrenchment philosophy -- if service
is bad, it must be cut down -- was prevalent. The main goal was financial
soundness. The pursuit of this goal reduced the quality of service,
further reducing the demand for it and encouraging additional cuts. In an
attempt to end up with good financial results, the retrenchment philosophy
could cause the whole system to close.
On the other hand, the expansionist philosophy, prevalent in the mid-
1980s, stated that only through increases in service quality, including
higher frequencies and additional investments, could the system attract new
riders and, although deficits might increase, the overall social-economic
value would increase. According to this rationale, deficit increases were
qualitatively lower than increases in the number of passengers and in
service quality. This philosophy emphasized quality of service as the
major thrust behind the provision of transit services.
In any case, transportation officials regarded the subway and commuter
- 138 -
rail network as a public service that, due to this character, had
limitations on how much to charge passengers for a trip (i.e., the fare
level). The operating agency, hence, does not have to make a profit, but
rather must focus on a marketing strategy to attract as many passengers as
possible, leaving the coverage of deficits to the general government (to
which corresponds the policy of cross-subsidization so that low income
people can cheaply travel within the metropolitan area) 147. The strong
emphasis on the service as public service led to easier backing of
transportation investments by the central government. This situation also
arose from the dominance of Madrid as capital of the nation (compared to a
situation like the one in the U.S. where the weight of a particular city in
the federal machine is much lower) and the stronger willingness of the
central government to participate in local affairs.
The projects about the extension of lines 1 and 6 explicitly indicated
that the projects were not economically feasible (and for which reasons)
and pinpointed those other elements that could be incorporated to make the
project worthwhile (for instance, if a monetary value were given to the
integration of marginal neighborhoods into the structure of the city or to
the savings in the consumption of non-renewable energy sources). These
explicitness favored a strong acceptance of particular roles by the
different actors involved in the transit planning process, with the
147 A key item in the strategy is that the government agrees on keeping
fares low so that low income people can travel within the city, even
though middle and high income people can also benefit from the
strategy. In European cities, where the distribution of the
population consists, in contrast to the U.S., of low income people
living in the outskirts of the city and high income people closer to
the center, the issue of subsidization of transportation services, by
keeping fares low, plays a more clear and important redistributive
role than in the United States.
- 139 -
assumption that the technical studies were carried out only for the purpose
of informing decision makers.
The program contracts (for four-, five-year terms) represent examples
of the ad-hoc nature of the transit project planning process and, at the
same time, the means to handle uncertainty. Transportation officials
interpreted them as an expression of the negotiations among the interested
parties and the compromises achieved among them. The contracts are rather
specific, in terms of specifying thresholds to be reached or monetary
amounts to be spent, and at the same time rather flexible because both
parties (i.e., central government and the institution in charge of the
construction and operation of the fixed-guideway system) want to have the
possibility of adapting the contract to new circumstances and conditions.
The transportation agency wants to be able to experiment and have some
leeway as transit entrepreneur. The central government, mainly for
political reasons, wants to be able to adapt objectives and play with the
program contract at the broader level of the central budget. Hence, the
contract contains different levels of specificity and additional clauses
for how to review and update it. The contract usually extends for a period
of four or five years, during which the actors know the amount of funds
available for investments and for covering operating deficits and which
thresholds they must strive to achieve. Nevertheless, these programs, by
focusing on particular modal investments (e.g., the subway network) at
particular times eliminate much of the (transportation) planning at a
broader (metropolitan) scale.
Another interesting element of the program contracts consists of the
possibility of incorporating incentives to carry out unbiased procedures
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and to achieve specific operating objectives. Although it is too early to
assess the effects of these contracts on investments and operating
practices of Madrid's rail network (and on the accuracy of cost estimates),
in principle, incentive mechanisms -- such as the premiums for passenger-
kilometers above the expected value and penalties for passenger-kilometers
below the expected value -- should induce transit planning and operating
agencies to take into consideration all the possible elements that would
affect costs and account for potential variations in their values.
What are the implications of all these elements to costing methodology
and estimation? First of all, the "welfare policy" philosophy shifts the
emphasis from the cost components to what is needed to make the project
worthwhile and the overall benefits of the investment. For instance, the
results of the feasibility study for line 1 were focused on the value of
travel time. The feasibility of the project depended on the assumption the
decision maker wanted to make about the value of travel time. On the other
hand, the "welfare policy" philosophy may overemphasize the benefits
associated with intangible objectives -- such as the physical integration
of communities -- regardless of how important they are in reality (as
compared to other societal objectives). This overemphasis may lead to the
loss of some concern with cost-related issues such as functionality,
operational design, or cost-effectiveness. In other words, incentives to
economize -- or "design-to-cost" 148 -- may be lost. Second, the actors'
clear notion about their roles and the incentive format of the contracts
seem to favor a more transparent and less politically-biased technical
process, as decision makers do not try to influence analysts and analysts
148 This concept will be further discussed in chapters 5 and 6.
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do not easily give in to the pressures of decision makers. Finally, the
strong backing of the central government seems to encourage a less
beleaguered technical process with less distrust and less motivation to
distort it as decision makers do not feel the need to maneuver to secure a
share of central-government funds.
None of the projects discussed in this section have been completed
yet. Unfortunately, therefore, there is no way to know what the actual
effects of the approach initiated in Madrid's transportation planning
process have been in terms of the "correctness" of the technical analysis
(e.g., how accurate capital costs ended up being). Nevertheless, this case
study illustrated an approach to frame the relationship between the central
government and the local institutions that attempts to eliminate mistrusts
and incorporate incentives to encourage outcomes closer to those estimated
in the analysis process.
3.3.2. La Paz's Transportation System Study
Introduction
The La Paz case study presents a situation where the political
environment clearly attempted to override the technical process. This
situation generated communication difficulties between decision makers and
analysts as far as these analysts tried to maintain some professional
neutrality (e.g., tried to defend their own technical approach even if this
approach did not support the proposals advanced by decision makers). The
case study further illustrates the link between the institutional
environment and the analysis process, and how the latter must be tailored
to the conditions of the former should analysts wish to play a role in the
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planning process.
Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in Latin America, has the area
of Texas and California combined and the population of Georgia (around 6
million). One million people live in the capital city of La Paz. The city
is located in a valley in the middle of a plateau at almost 12,000 feet of
altitude, with its center at the bottom of a valley and neighborhoods
spreading over the steep slopes surrounding the valley. During the past
decade, due to topographical constraints, the city has been expanding on
the plateau where the largest portion of the population now resides.
Transportation between this area and the center of the city is difficult,
with no easy way to travel between both places. At the present, besides
walking the steep grades, people can only travel by bus. Travel by bus
between those two places, however, takes a long time, with waiting times
exceeding one hour during peak periods.
When a new mayor was elected in December 1985, one of his priorities
was to improve the transportation system of the city. He had the idea
(probably generated by one of his assistants) of constructing an aerial
tramway to link the neighborhood on the plateau with the center of the
city. In addition to helping reduce travel times (and probably improve
travel comfort) between these two neighborhoods, this transit system would
give him a highly visible political achievement. The electoral process
(with the mayor being elected every two years) creates a lot of pressure to
implement policies and construct visible infrastructure investments in a
quick fashion; the aerial tramway could easily help alleviate this
pressure.
The institutional environment included the following actors: (a) the
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executive branch of the municipality, with the mayor at its head; (b) the
city council, where the mayor had a meager majority, and therefore risked
losing any proposals; (c) the consultants, with different groups advocating
different types of transportation technologies and approaches; (d) the
providers of transportation technologies, with an interest in making in-
roads into a city with such peculiar topographical conditions; and (e) the
high level financing institutions, mainly the World Bank, with an interest
in getting a sound financial return from transportation investments,
particularly in those projects that were capital intensive.
Project History
During the Fall of 1986, the author was involved in developing a
feasibility study for a public transportation system in La Paz. The
transportation system of this city was in disarray, with travel times for
some segments of the population well above average levels for developing
countries. As a major World Bank project was carried out (including
investments ranging from sanitary systems to structures for disaster
prevention), World Bank officials also requested an analysis of the best
modal technology for the city. In addition, the mayor's political agenda,
with a horizon of only two years, acted as catalyst for undertaking such a
study. This was mainly because to construct any major transportation
investment (and particularly the aerial tramway) some outside financing
would be needed and the feasibility study could serve as a good analytical
support for the benefits of such an investment. Finally, the need for a
highly visible investment and the particular physical characteristics of
the city (with very steep slopes between the most populated neighborhoods)
made the consideration of novel technologies (e.g., aerial tramways) an
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attractive element in the analysis.
Before the study was undertaken, a preliminary study of the
feasibility and suitability of an aerial tramway system was undertaken by a
team of local consultants under the direction of the assistant to the mayor
during the summer of 1986. Due to lack of information, this team developed
an approach based on information submitted by the manufacturers of the
aerial-tramway technology. The informal study indicated that the aerial
tramway would be, by far, the best alternative in terms of comfort, capital
costs per passenger, and operating costs. The study did not attempt to
carry out a whole set of technical and financial analyses. With this
study, the local team attempted to persuade the high-level institutions of
the desirability of constructing the aerial tramway. Simultaneously, the
team developed the terms of reference for an international bid. It was
evident from the reading of this document 149 that the assistant to the
mayor had a vested interest in building an aerial tramway (instead of any
other alternative) because, as an architect, he was in charge of designing
and constructing the three stations proposed for the system. The team that
he directed, therefore, followed a rather optimistic approach in estimating
the capital and operating costs associated with the system (mainly in terms
of which costs to include and the use of operating performance figures like
headway, vehicle utilization, etc.).
In September 1986, a team of foreign consultants, which the author was
a part of, was assigned the task of carrying out an in-depth feasibility
study of several alternative modes including the favored aerial tramway.
149 The bidding document was hidden from other parties, to avoid any
complaints about it. The mayor allowed the author to look at it for
the purpose of making comments on the document.
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In pursuing a broader appraisal of the transportation conditions of the
city, the first problem was data collection. Census information was poor
and the team had to design its own estimating process to generate an
approximate figure for the transportation demand in the horizon year
(1990). Population figures for the different neighborhoods of the city and
other socio-economic information dated back to 1974 with very rough
extrapolations made to the year 1985. The study team developed a process
for estimating the densities and the approximate population of the census
tracts of the city based on cartographic information and aerial views of
the city. Based on these data, the visual inspection of each area, and
conversations with various officials, transit demand was calculated and,
based on that demand, so were the fleet requirements for the different
alternatives. Similarly, capital costs were not available, and operating
cost figures provided by the municipality were unreliable. By comparing
the figures with similar systems in other places, the team was able to
estimate the capital and operating costs of the different systems. For the
aerial tramway, the task was the hardest, since the information provided by
the manufacturers of the system had to be looked upon with suspicion. A
computer-based spreadsheet model of the financial consequences of
constructing and operating each of the alternatives was created. With this
model, sensitivity analyses were carried out to better perceive the changes
in output values as input values diverged from the initially assumed
values.
The team of foreign consultants enjoyed, on the one hand, a lot of
freedom in terms of how to approach and undertake the feasibility study.
On the other hand, the closeness to the decision making point created some
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difficulties, in terms of trying to address the study with a reasonable
level of professional objectivity. From the decision making perspective,
the goal of the study was very clear: to justify an investment so that it
could be approved by the city council and funded by the higher level
institution -- i.e., the World Bank. The consultants selected an open-
ended methodology in order to allow for discussion, negotiation, and
compromise. The reason for such an approach was mainly due to the fact
that the study in itself did not matter to the most interested actors: what
mattered was its results, particularly those that supported the decision
maker's goals and perspectives.
In a very dynamic institutional and political environment, the
analytic process had to be carried out within a short period of time and a
lack of reliable sources of data. The large use of secondary sources of
information, was encouraged by that institutional environment. There was
not a strong need for high precision in the estimates due to the purpose of
the project and the tense atmosphere surrounding it. The large use of
sensitivity analyses was to compensate for the lack of a more orthodox
process and to control for the uncertainty of the estimates. The objective
of the sensitivity analyses was to define some ranges of decision. By
varying the values of the variables that were thought more critical, and
generating graphs reflecting changes in the values of one variable as the
value of another variable was changing, the different transportation
systems were compared to one another.
Within the technical process, the main uncertainties were related to
productivity measures for the particular conditions of La Paz. This was
particularly acute in the case of the aerial tramway, because, due to its
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novelty in an urban setting, it was hard to find relevant information from
other places in the world. Another technical uncertainty was the
requirements for maintenance costs. The model simply applied a percentage
over the investment level. These percentages were the same within the same
technology but not across different modal alternatives. For operating
costs, some items like energy costs were highly reliable, but others, like
labor costs, were more problematic because, as before, productivity levels
(e.g., how many operators were needed to operate a particular transit
system) were not well documented. Similarly, insurance costs were hard to
estimate, since the insurance market was not well developed in the country.
150
In spite of the methodology's theoretical shortcomings, the major
disagreement between consultants and decision makers centered not on the
methodology but rather on which items to include in the cost equations and
which values to assign as cost units for the different items of the capital
and operating costs. The bids and quotations from the manufacturers of the
different transportation technologies were not clear at all. In particular,
it was not clear what was included and what was not. For instance, it was
not clear whether the costs of some of the components were in-situ and
therefore included the transportation costs or were costs at the
manufacturing place. The consultants reduced some of these discrepancies
150 The methodology from a theoretical standpoint had some shortcomings.
For instance, it did not try to carry a full demand analysis, taking
into consideration changes in demand as the fare level was changing
(elasticity studies). It did not consider cost contingencies either,
and no distinction was made between local and foreign goods.
Furthermore, it was thought that after 20 years the value of the
inputs variables was highly uncertain to receive further consideration
and, hence, the methodology did not try to consider similar useful
lives for all the transportation alternatives.
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by comparing bids among the different reports provided by the
manufacturers. Nevertheless, a final agreement on these matters could not
be reached and was only partially solved through the use of sensitivity
analyses.
The La Paz transportation study came about largely as a response to
the needs of the political actors (i.e., mainly the mayor of La Paz).
Therefore, the preferences of the key decision makers had been spelled out
well in advance the study was underway (as various international bids had
already been requested ten months before the study began). This situation
created strong difficulties in the technical analysts' attempt to
"objectively" influence decision makers' perceptions about the solutions
for the transportation problems in the city. As the study evolved, these
perceptions did not substantially change but the decision makers'
contentions about the advantages of the aerial tramway shifted from one
based on the cost advantages of that alternative to one based on the need
for some innovative project, something courageous, that could raise the
standards of the city and the illusions of its citizens.
Comments on the La Paz Case
The La Paz case illustrates a situation with a strong political
motivation, a zealous and biased interest for a particular technology (to
the extent that the decision about the preferred alternative had been
spelled out well before the feasibility study began), and a need for
outside help to gain credibility for the project and acceptable financing
terms. The decision-making environment included the mayor and the city
council, and the leverage that the approval from an internationally
recognized institution -- the World Bank -- would have given the project.
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Other interested parties included the manufacturers of the technologies and
the local architects, with a visionary view of the city and its
transportation system, likely to be in charge of designing the system
(particularly stations). To put his preferences forward, the mayor needed
a strong "support" behind any major transit proposals. This support would
be particularly effective if it could come in the form of qualified
technical analysis, and if possible from highly recognized sources.
The decision making environment was highly centralized around the two-
year-term mayor. However, to proceed with a proposal the mayor needed the
statutory approval of the city council, to which the justification for a
project had to be reported. In addition, the mayor's decisions were highly
limited by the financial capacity of the municipality to undertake large
capital projects. Overall, the two-year term and the decision-making
process prompted the mayor to devise ways to generate projects which were
both feasible and visible, and generated an inducement to influence the
technical process.
The characteristics of the situation, therefore, required the
development of a technical process with a level of flexibility that allowed
adaptations to be made on the spot, responding to the dynamic nature of the
institutional framework. This need for flexibility was, in addition,
required by the low reliability of the input data. Hence, the
transportation-feasibility model consisted of several integrated modules
151 with a high level of transparence (in terms of clearly showing
assumptions, inputs, methods, and outputs), and included the thorough
151 The modules included: demand analysis, fleet requirements, cost
assumptions, and financial analysis.
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development of sensitivity analyses. The computer-based spreadsheet
environment help achieve these components and allowed for quick changes in
the input values and model assumptions.
The interested parties reacted to the feasibility analysis by looking
at the model as a black box. This was mainly due to a lack of technical
knowledge and the novelty of the use of computer technology in the
municipality for analysis and decision-support purposes. The model quickly
became the tool to justify the objectives of the decision-making process.
Pressure centered on changing input values (mainly cost estimates) so that
the preferred alternative (the aerial tramway) would be more feasible
compared to the other alternatives and even show operating profits.
In spite of the pressures, the transparence of the model and the clear
stating of its assumptions forced the decision maker to realize about the
tradeoffs involved in constructing one alternative versus another and the
dangers (mainly in terms of financial obligations for the municipality)
that the undertaking of particular alternatives would bring about 52
This evidence was reflected by the shift in the stated advantages or
disadvantages of particular alternatives that move away from cost-effective
measures to less quantifiable elements such as the perception that the
aerial tramway was the only breakthrough option to improve the
transportation conditions of La Paz (and, one could possibly add, the
152 The study further qualified the model by discussing the issues of
institutional capability to carry out the necessary maintenance tasks,
and the problems of integrating each alternative within the existing
transportation system. In addition, the comparisons between the fare
needed to cover operating costs for each alternative and the income
levels in the city clarify the potential feasibility of attaining
revenues and meeting the specified demand. (Beteta and Menendez
[1986])
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mayor's chances for reelection).
At the end, the analysis process proved useful to change the initial
impressions about particular technologies, generate new ideas about the
city's transportation issues, and redirect the decision makers' perception
about the problem (although the mayor still continued to support the
"preferred" alternative 153) The case exemplifies the experience on how
to undertake an estimation process in a highly politicized environment, and
how such a process can be constrained by time limitations, data collection
problems, and institutional pressures. The design of the estimating
process, and the computer-based model, attempted to address the ultimate
function of the study: to compare different alternatives and serve as a
locus for the technical and decision-making processes to interact. The
experience proved that, among other factors, the transparence and
flexibility of the planning process can help the interaction between the
analysis and the decision making processes. Such a process can also help
actors to zero in on the rationale for a transportation project, its
possible solutions, and its valuative criteria.
3.4. Characterization of the Decision-Making
and Analysis Processes in Estimating Costs
This section summarizes the characteristics of the decision-making and
analysis processes that can be drawn from the case studies. These
1 Three years after the study was finished, and after tying the local
elections of December 1987 (and splitting the two-year term with the
other candidate), the mayor kept, unsuccessfully, trying to secure
funds for the aerial tramway. In his December 1989 campaign, he still
advocated the construction of the aerial tramway. Although he lost
the 1989 election in percentage votes, he secured the sufficient
support at the city council and became mayor for the third time.
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characteristics and the issues related to them will be developed in detail
in the following chapters.
The case studies clearly reflect how similar types of transit plans
and proposals come about from different motivating factors. In Boston, a
rapidly growing area, the main motivating factor was the fear of congestion
on a corridor with no fixed-guideway transit facilities, in light of a
major highway reconstruction. The elected officials from that area quickly
fueled the possibility of revitalizing an abandoned commuter rail network
traversing their constituencies' districts. In Santa Clara County, also a
growing area, the motivating factor was an attempt to gain control over
land development, through the redirection of urban sprawl towards higher
density patterns and the revitalization of the downtown area. The fact
that such a vanguard area, the forefront of the world's computer
technology, did not have a visible transit system also stimulated the
political arena in support of the construction of an LRT system. In
Buffalo, a distressed area, the main motivating factor was the need to turn
around a declining economy and, in that attempt, to revitalize its downtown
core. The perceived competition from nearby urban areas -- mainly the
canadian city of Toronto -- further funneled the interests for a fixed-
guideway system. In Madrid, old plans developed at times of economic
expansion created a need to improve the overall performance of the rail
network through additional investments. Other motivating factors included
political ones and the perception that only with investments in the subway
network the declining trend in ridership could be reversed. Finally, in La
Paz, the motivations were mainly political coupled with a complete lack of
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a permanent rapid transit system in the city. 154
Once they come about, transit plans and proposals easily become an end
in themselves with very little time or willingness left to reflect on their
real desirability. This situation translates into an attempt to diminish
the potential impacts -- for instance, in terms of capital and operating
costs -- of the initially preferred alternative and ends up putting the
technical agenda behind the political agenda, affecting how the technical
study is accomplished. This characteristic is illustrated by the fact that
in none of the case studies did the preconceived ideas about which project
to pursue change substantially along the lengthy analysis process since the
formation of the initial proposals (except for the scaling down of the
Buffalo rail system from heavy rail to light rail rapid standards).
The permanence of fixed-guideway systems and the life-long impacts
they create once they are constructed 155 contributed to the steadiness of
the support for their implementation. This type of system can help build a
strong and committed constituency willing to fight for or against the
system. Once this constituency is mobilized, the political stimulus
becomes intense and even oppressive 156. The political agenda then goes
154 In all the cases as well there was an implicit intent to put in place
systems that could serve as the trunks of expanded multi-modal
services. This goal can be better achieved, due to their permanence,
through the construction of rail networks rather than other systems.
155 This is related to what Henry [1974] calls the 'irreversibility
effect'. This effect is an important consideration for investment
decisions under uncertainty.
156 In all the cases, the survival of the proposals in spite of setbacks,
and the development of constituency support, required leadership, or
an individual, individuals, or coalition of individuals, probably
political actors, who were willing to persist on moving the project
forward. These individuals are what Bardach [1977] calls "fixers" of
the implementation game. The problem, Bardach mentions, is that too
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ahead of the analysis process, monitoring it very closely and preparing it
to support its predefined desired outcomes. As indicated in section 2.3,
the uncertainty of both cost and demand estimates at the time of project
planning further allows the decision-making political agenda to take
control of the process.
Cost estimates along with demand estimates, because of their
uncertainty, constitute one of the workhorses of the analysis process. The
output of the cost estimation process is paramount for the political
acceptability of the project -- in addition, of course, to its financial
feasibility. Capital and operating costs must stay at reasonable levels.
But an effort to keep costs down, by ignoring or scaling down some elements
of the system, would most likely turn into cost overruns once the system is
constructed. As the U.S. case studies illustrate, the reasons for cost
growth are mainly due to scope changes after taking into account the
effects of inflation. Sometimes the growth in costs comes from the
accidental or deliberate ignorance of who --or which institution -- is in
charge of paying for the costs of particular items. In the case of
Buffalo, the NFTA believed that a New York State law required privately
owned utility companies to bear the expense of relocating their lines when
their paths conflicted with proposed public improvements. The affected
utility companies pursued the matter through the federal and New York State
courts and, later, the state supreme court ruled that the utility companies
few fixers are able to know where, when, how, and about what to
persist effectively. The lack of a fixer seems to be one of the major
reasons for the setbacks in the planning of an LRT system in Denver,
Colorado. In the case of La Paz, the assistant to the mayor acted as
fixer but did not have the skills to put the project forward in an
effective manner.
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were to be reimbursed for removal, relocation, and/or support and
maintenance of their lines 157. A similar instance occurred in the case of
Santa Clara as the transit agency had to add the costs of upgrading the
trackbed of the downtown section of the LRT system (from ballast to
concrete) because the city of San Jose refused to take that responsibility.
In terms of the technical process itself, the size of the projects
that are the subject of this thesis requires a substantial amount of data,
hardware (i.e., tools to process, maintain, and manipulate the data), and
expertise (i.e., knowledge of accounting strategies, operations planning,
and experience). For capital costs, the main task consists of figuring out
precisely what items need to be included and, simultaneously, what items
are the least reliable. But in all the case studies, analysts indicated
that the most difficult task was the calculation of operating costs. The
calculation of these costs requires the consideration not only of the
operating strategies for the proposed system but also of the changes the
introduction of the new system will generate in the existing transportation
network.
In the calculation of both types of costs, a major issue consists of
maintaining the data and updating them as changes take place along the
process. The Boston case study, as well as that of La Paz, attempted to
tackle this issue through the use of then available computer technology --
mainly, microcomputers. In no case, however, a reliable and somewhat
powerful computer-based information system was in place, either because the
technology was not available or not known at the moment or because of the
157 In response to the ruling, UMTA awarded NFTA a separate grant for
utilities relocation in addition to the funds specified in the full
funding contract.
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perception that the temporal nature of the specific project planning
exercise, with very low chances of being replicated in a future situation,
did not merit the implementation of such a system.
In all the cases, the expertise needed in the technical process
required the hiring of outside analysts -- i.e., not part of the decision-
makers' organization -- to carry out the technical process and "advise"
decision makers. This situation generates a two-way relationship where
each party needs the other. The decision maker needs the analyst to
perform the technical analysis to support the final decision; the analyst
needs the decision maker to have projects to work on. This relationship
induces a partnership whereby the analyst tries to please the client --
i.e., the decision maker -- so that he or she may have a good chance of
getting additional projects. The need the decision maker has for the
analyst gives the latter some leverage to attempt to be more effective in
trying to direct the political agenda or, at least, not to be left behind
it. This situation however depends on the mobility of the political agenda
itself and, as the U.S. case studies illustrate, hardly occurs. In the La
Paz case, there was an attempt to redirect the process, but once again when
the analysts made this attempt the political agenda was at a much more
advanced stage -- in terms of spelling out preferences -- and its
redirection became very difficult. 158
Another relationship emerges out of the need for outside funds to
construct the preconceived transit proposal. The presence of the higher
institution -- e.g., the federal government in the U.S. -- and its
158 For a fuller account of this relationship see Szanton [1981] or
Benveniste [1972].
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financial powers generates the need for a planning study that "justifies"
the transit proposal. In this relationship, between the funding
institution and the decision maker's organization, another game takes
place, with each one trying to influence the other's opinion about the
design and desirability of the project. Other actors, such as the analyst
or the affected constituencies, will try to interfere in this relationship
in an attempt to make their particular opinions heard.
In the case studies, the development of the planning process (with the
decision makers' continuous support for a single alternative since the
conception of the preliminary ideas) seems to suggest that decision makers,
although fully aware of the importance of the technical process to put the
project forward, did not believe that the technical studies could influence
the final decision about which transportation alternative to pursue. If
not explicit, this statement was reflected by the events and by decision
makers' lack of knowledge of the general technical issues, controversial
values, etc. involved in the analysis process or their statements about the
merits of their preferred alternative. Another indication is the frequent
complaints about the technical process itself (in particular, in the U.S.,
about the Alternatives Analysis process).
Decision makers also stated that if they had not been able to secure
the funds to construct the project from the higher level institutions, the
transit project would probably not have been built. This belief indicates
that decision makers had a major interest in obtaining the funds needed for
the construction of the particular transit project and that they perceived
the technical analysis mostly as a requirement to secure those funds. In
the U.S., three main reasons were cited for the need of the analysis
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process: (a) to satisfy Federal and state environmental laws; (b) to get
the necessary funding from federal and state agencies; and (c) to assist
the community in arriving at a consensus.
3.5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has included a description of the case studies along with
some comments on the main issues raised in the presentation of each
particular case study. In addition, three major set of characteristics
have been identified as common themes of reference in the case studies: (a)
the technical, (b) the decision-related, and (c) those that affect the
interaction between analysis and decision. Within the technical set, three
characteristics were highlighted: (1) the sources of rises in capital and
operating costs; (2) the special features of fixed-guideway systems
(mainly, their permanence) and the implications of these features on the
development of the project and the support for it by the affected
constituencies; and (3) the requirements of the technical process. Within
the decision-related set, three other characteristics were identified: (1)
the explicit or implicit motivations for proposing the system; (2) the
local versus central government contentions about the viability of the
transportation projects and the reflection of these contentions on cost
estimates; and (3) the constraints and requirements on the decision-making
process. Finally, as to the relationship between analysis and decision,
three major characteristics were recognized: (1) the relationship between
analysts and decision makers, and between funding institutions and decision
makers; (2) the force of optimistic expectations on the analysis process;
and (3) the different interpretations of the intent of alternatives
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analysis requirements, and the perception of decision makers about the role
of the technical process. The next two chapters discuss at greater length
the first two set of characteristics as part of both the analysis and the
decision-making processes. The third set of characteristics is developed
in chapter 6 as the two processes are brought together and the analytical
framework is developed. The issue of the role of technical analysis is
further discussed in the chapter 7.
These characteristics support the use of the theoretical framework
highlighted at the end of chapter 2. They illustrate the difficulties of
achieving optimality from a rationalistic perspective; they portray the
different actors attempting to gain control of the process; and they
illustrate how the process unfolds as a struggle over ideas with a
strategic purpose generated by the political environment surrounding the
planning process. Stone [1988] refers to similar conclusions in her
discussion of how problems are defined in the policy process:
"(...) [P]roblem definition is never simply a matter of defining
goals and measuring our distance from them. It is rather the
strategic representation of situations. Problem definition is a
matter of representation because there is not objective
description of a situation; there can only be portrayals of
people's experiences and interpretations. Problem definition is
strategic because groups, individuals, and government agencies
deliberately and consciously design portrayals so as to promote
their favored course of action. (...) Representations of a
problem are therefore constructed to win the most people to one's
side and the most leverage over one's opponents." 159
The argumentative approach helps develop a framework for the cost-
estimating process and identify those components that prevent the
rationality of the process and the achievement of the intended results (the
ones advanced by the normative rational framework). The argumentative
159 Stone [1988], p. 106.
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approach also helps explain how decision makers' perceptions about the role
of the technical process coupled with their relationships with analysts
influences the technical process and why some deviations from the expected
outcomes take place.
4. THE TECHNICAL PROCESS OF ESTIMATING COSTS
4.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the technical process of cost estimating within
the context of analyzing and comparing transit alternatives. The main
components of this process are data and methods. Data are the values for
the different variables used as input to the methods; methods are the
ensemble of equations used to represent the relationship among the
different variables. The methods reflect the assumptions adopted to
imitate as closely as possible what has happened, happens, or will happen
in the real world as it concerns the monetary disbursements needed for
covering the capital and operating costs of the project. These methods may
be readily available (e.g., the calculation of the present value of a
stream of costs) or may need to be created by the estimator for the
particular situation under analysis (e.g., the calculation of the operating
costs may happen to be particular to the project under study, and as such
may require some empirical research and equation development).
The technical literature stresses that a good cost estimate is a
necessary input to informed management decisions 160. This literature
emphasizes the importance of a sound information basis for estimating
costs. This basis consists of two major elements: the quantities of the
components that will constitute the transportation system, and the unit
prices for those quantities. Other components that are equally important
are those that affect the ultimate results of the estimating method such as
the length of construction, the inflation rate, and the financing
160 Clark and Lorenzoni [1985]; Stewart [1982]; Calder [1976].
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techniques.
The subject upon which the cost-estimating process is discussed in
this thesis is a public transportation project. The planning of these
projects requires great skill and care in estimating -- in particular
capital and operating costs -- because of the presence of unknowns that are
difficult to foresee at the time of carrying out the planning process. The
size of the project activity, the need for multiple skills, and the span of
time usually required for its design and construction, result in the need
for precise planning, scheduling, estimating, and management. In many
cases, as in the ones discussed in this thesis, the need for technical
expertise forces the transportation operators and decision makers to
contract out the conduct of such studies. This conduct may fall in the
hands of several outside consultants, with different phases or components
of the study assigned to different consultants.
Most of the literature on cost estimating focuses on processes taking
place within the private sector context. Within this context, a major
consideration is the importance of making profits. This framework differs
markedly from that for the public sector where the objective of a project
may be to gain support for other projects or simply to generate political
gains for an elected official. As indicated in section 3.4, the case
studies clearly reflected how similar types of transit plans were generated
with very different objectives in the mind of their proponents.
The private sector framework helps private management understand
clearly the function and meaning of cost estimating. In the public sector,
however, that function is more diffuse and vague, and sometimes constitutes
a way to support previously made decisions rather than a way to help
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decision making. Furthermore, as the institutional framework of the case
studies illustrated, many public-sector projects are very complex in terms
of the number of actors involved or the impacts they may have. This
complexity makes it more difficult than it is in the private context to
identify the decision maker(s) or the quantities the decision should try to
maximize (i.e., the goals to be achieved). (More differences between
public and private sector projects, as they relate to the decision making
process, are discussed in chapter 5.)
4.2. Cost Estimating: Approaches and General Issues
An estimate is a judgment, opinion, or forecast of a future work or
activity. A project cost estimate, therefore, is a judgment or opinion of
the cost of that project; it is a forecast of what the accomplishment of
the works and activities needed for carrying out that project will cost, in
monetary terms.
Quantities and unit prices are the two essential ingredients of a cost
estimate. The calculation of the quantities is accomplished by using an
estimating method, whereas the calculation of the unit price to be applied
to the quantities is determined through the gathering and analyzing of
data. An estimating method is a systematic and consistent approach to
predicting or estimating the cost and schedule for the execution of the
works and activities needed to carry out the project. For each item,
whether it be equipment, bulk materials, labor, or engineering, a method
must be developed. The degree of sophistication applied to the estimating
method must be balanced by the estimating process needs, and will be
limited by the organizational capabilities of the institution in charge of
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performing the cost estimate. Cost estimating methods can be developed
"in-house" or be taken from similar exercises performed in the planning of
other public transportation systems.
4.2.1. Approaches to Cost Estimating
The two general approaches to estimating either capital or operating
costs are the "top-down" or parametric approach, and the "ground-up" or
industrial-engineering approach. The parametric approach uses historical
data from previous projects and extrapolates the cost of new project based
on increase or decrease quantity, size, weight, power level, or other
factors for that new project. The industrial-engineering approach requires
the estimating of man-hours and materials of each element and sub-element
of the project, and the pricing and accumulation of all the costs of the
elements and sub-elements into a total cost estimate. Both methods of
estimating are satisfactory for various phases of the estimating cycle.
For instance, at the time of a feasibility study -- such as in the case of
La Paz -- , an estimate based on the parametric approach may prove
satisfactory; on the other hand, for a more advanced stage of the planning
process, a "ground-up" estimate would be more appropriate. The parametric
and the industrial-engineering approaches become more closely related as
the estimating function deals with more specific and itemized project
components.
There is no clear-cut rule as to which method of cost estimating is
the best, although it would probably be possible to indicate which approach
is preferable for a particular situation. The top-down parametric estimate,
used alone, has limitations from the standpoint of visibility of estimate
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components, identification of major cost drivers, isolation of inflation
effects on each cost element, and adjustment of costs to reflect subtle
changes in the project scope. At the time of project planning, some of
these purposes may not be deemed of major importance, and hence a top-down
approach may be adequate. Furthermore, one or the other approach may
better serve the purposes of the decision-making process in terms of, for
instance, claiming which alternative is the best and advancing the planning
stage into preliminary engineering and construction. The approach used to
estimate the costs depends then on the intended final use of the estimate
and the need for an accurate overall total versus the need for details (for
instance, for control purposes). It will also depend on the estimating
tools available, the time available to prepare the estimate, the money
available for preparing the estimate, and the amount of previous historical
cost data available 161
In the case of Buffalo, initial (1976) studies were conducted under
time constraints. The detail with which some cost estimates were carried
out differed from one alternative to another (e.g., more detailed for those
for which some preliminary work had been done, like the heavy-rail
alternative). In fact, some estimates, in particular those of the later-
selected LRRT alternative, were calculated on the basis of extrapolating
cost estimates from other alternatives. Subsequent decisions, however,
took the preliminary estimates for all the alternatives as having an equal
footing and did not attempt to account for the higher uncertainty involved
in the capital and operating cost values of the extrapolated alternatives,
among them the selected LRRT system.
161 Clark and Lorenzoni [1985].
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In the Boston case, the technical process followed an approach closer
to the ground-up methodology because of federal requirements and the more
advanced stage of analysis. Federal requirements try to improve the
accountability of the estimates by requesting a larger specifity in the
cost components. This ground-up approach, however, was rated as too
demanding by the analysts in charge of applying it. They indicated that
large amounts of time had to be spent on gathering information and that the
approach did not allow for the dynamism required by the planning process.
In the case of La Paz, time, money, and data constraints, in addition
to the general institutional and political environment, dictated the method
to be followed, with most estimates based on past transit projects in other
cities all over the world. It was also a study done at an early stage of
analysis, where the attempt mainly focused on screening a set of six major
alternatives. The method followed a top-down approach with cost data based
on bidding documents and information gathered from similar systems in other
parts of the world. In the case of Madrid, with a strong political
component as well, the analysts also followed a top-down approach based on
aggregate information from other parts of the subway network.
Very little standardization in estimating procedures has occurred to
date because of the competitive and bargaining nature of the cost
estimating process itself, as well as the different requirements of the
decision-making and institutional processes. In the case of Madrid,
neither the transportation operator nor the central government were
interested in more than a top-down approach. The approach suited the needs
of the central budgetary process, and left room for negotiations in
reallocating funds from one component of the project to another. In La
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Paz, the dynamics of the political process, with a very unstructured nature
and a biased perspective on the project, clearly favored a top-down
approach.
In the U.S., the federal-government attempt to boost the
accountability of the projects that it partially funds and, in addition,
made it harder to complete the necessary requirements for the approval of
transit capital projects (in an effort to minimize demands on UMTA formula
and discretionary funds and, indirectly, reduce the size of the federal
deficit), has increasingly moved the costing approach closer to a ground-up
approach. The Boston case was one of the first attempts at standardizing
the cost-estimating process (among other components of the overall planning
process). However, in this case, the attempt did not get too far because
of the difficulties of applying such an approach at the planning stage of
analysis, not only because of the uncertainty about cost values but also
because of the perspectives and expectations decision makers and analysts
had about the technical analysis. Because of this, some elements of the
estimating process closely followed the federal guidelines; other elements
(or alternatives) did not. Hence, the characteristics of the planning
process and the conditions surrounding it, that change from one situation
to another, do not allow for easy standardization.
In any situation, the approach selected indicates some assumptions
about the investment. For example, by adopting a top-down approach the
estimators assume that the investment will behave similarly to the previous
works and projects upon which the values are taken (the cases of Buffalo,
with the extrapolation of cost values for some alternatives, and La Paz,
with cost estimates taken from similar systems in other parts of the world,
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illustrate these assumptions). In addition, different approaches support
certain functions better than others. For instance, for control purposes
in subsequent stages during final design and implementation, the ground-up
approach has obvious advantages over the top-down approach. However,
during the planning stage, this function is relegated to a second stage
since it does not present a major priority for decision makers (vis-a-vis,
for example, the decision to select one among several alternatives or the
need to comply with a set of bureaucratic rules). In this situation,
therefore, the need for a ground-up approach is largely diminished.
Furthermore, the estimation is made on certain assumptions about the
scope and schedule of the project. If these assumptions are not kept,
because for instance monitoring the implementation of the project cannot be
(or is not) performed adequately, they are not likely to produce an
accurate estimate. In other words, if monitoring is lousy, estimates will
very likely be faulty. This type of assumptions and their breakdowns were
present in most of the case studies. In fact, as was illustrated in the
cases of Santa Clara County (underpass for railroad line, highway
standards, etc.) and Buffalo (La Salle Street station, underground
utilities, etc.), the largest proportion of cost increases come from the
failure to keep the assumptions made during the estimating process into the
subsequent design and implementation stages.
Approaches, perspectives, assumptions, and functions are intertwined
and affect how the cost-estimating process is undertaken and how we
ultimately perceive the accuracy of the technical process. This
intertwining suggests that depending upon which perspectives or functions
are prevalent at the moment, assumptions and approaches should be adapted
- 169 -
accordingly.
Either of the two general approaches to cost estimating can be
complicated if different construction schedules are considered, that is, if
the possibility of starting the alternatives at different times or in
different stages are incorporated in the analysis (or if different
financial mechanisms are evaluated). The possibility of phasing the
transit investment is rarely considered for four main reasons: (a) it would
increase considerably the number of alternatives to compare (and the
computational requirements to perform in the estimating process), (b) the
total costs would probably be higher as the economies of scale associated
with a single large project would be lost, (c) the consideration of the
project as a single package would assure, if approved, its complete
construction, otherwise some parts of the project may stay unbuilt, and (d)
the demands over the decision-making process and local institutions to
follow the project over a much longer period of time are more compelling
and require more persistence.
However, the elimination of these possibilities, in a attempt to speed
up the process and gain approval for a total project, misses the point that
by phasing the investment the annual disbursements would be lower and,
although the final costs may be higher, the likelihood of getting quick
approval for smaller incremental parts would be greater (as showed in the
Boston case study). The incremental approach does not, by any means,
assure the "tidiness" of the proposals as it may induce to request funds
for segmented proposals that are inoperative by themselves and require
additional segments, and the subsequent additional funds, to achieve their
full potential. Therefore, segmented alternatives are worth full
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consideration in the analysis process, although they may not end up being
the most adequate alternative from an operating strategy or financial
standpoint.
Interestingly enough, as the U.S. case studies illustrate, the final
decision about which system to pursue usually includes only a portion of
the initially-desired project. In spite of the fact that an incremental-
investment approach is not usually considered in the analytic process, this
approach often turns out to be the one that results from the negotiation
process between the higher-level institutions and the transportation
agency. For instance, in the case of Buffalo, the possibility of phasing
of alternatives deserved some discussion but it was never carried out very
far. However, the alternative ultimately constructed ressembled a first
stage (6.4 miles) of the initial attempt to construct a larger network of
20 miles or a more limited one of 11 miles.
In some cases, the explicit indication of the phasing of the system is
not possible due to political considerations. In the case of Boston, the
project called for the investigation of seven alternatives, four of them
involving commuter rail. The implicitly preferred alternative included
three commuter rail lines terminating in Boston's South Station, a
centrally located major rail station. The federal government initially
required the study of the complete alternative, and its comparison to the
other alternatives, because they believed the full system would be the only
one that could justify the investment 162. As the cost of the system grew
162 If the system did not reach the centrally-located station, the federal
government and local groups thought that not as many people would use
the system, because transfers would decrease the quality of service.
This decrease would reduce the cost effectiveness of the system, and
the required thresholds could not be reached.
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from $200 million to almost $400 million, the federal government started
mentioning the possibility of phasing the investment mainly because funds
available for that particular type of projects were not in good supply at
the moment. In addition, the fact that some communities were protesting
against commuter trains passing through their jurisdictions, changed the
perceived support for the entire project and caused local transit officials
and the federal government to support the scaling down of the commuter
system, by starting with a reduced system (the one including the least
controversial and the least expensive lines) and continuing with the other
lines as knowledge of all the impacts improved. The reaction of the
supporters of the restoration of commuter service was tremendous, and the
governor quickly indicated that the full system would be constructed, and
successfully persuaded the state legislature to approve a bond issue to pay
for the local share of the total system (at the moment, almost $200
million). The draft environmental study, then, did not include the
possiblity of phasing the investment, although this possibility was still
in the minds of the consultants and transit officials.
4.2.2. Cost Classifications
Since the quantities of the different items required for the
construction of the transit project are one of the two major elements of a
good basis for cost estimating, an adequate process must be established to
account for all the cost items and to avoid any double counting. But this
effort may be futile if, in both the top-down and ground-up approaches, no
attempt is made to distinguish between types of costs so that the
visibility of what changes with what can be easily perceived.
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Costs can be classified according to different criteria. One of most
widely-used criteria consists of dividing costs depending on how directly
they are attributable to the specific work activity or work output being
estimated. For capital costs, we have: (a) direct costs or those
associated with the materials and labor involved in the construction of the
project; and (b) indirect costs, or costs of items that do not become a
part of, but are necessary costs involved in, the design and construction
of the project. These indirect costs comprise engineering costs,
contractors' fees, field labor overhead (which includes temporary
construction facilities, field supervision, construction tools, and labor
payroll burden), and miscellaneous costs such as insurance, freight, and
16duties and taxes 63 For operating costs, direct costs include labor --
operators and maintenance crews -- wages, energy -- fuel and electricity --
costs, maintenance parts, and ticketing and fare collection costs and
indirect costs include administration and scheduling of transportation and
maintenance operations, system security, and insurance.
Other classifications are also possible. Depending on how they change
along the life of the project, costs can be divided into fixed costs, or
costs involved in an on-going activity whose total cost will remain
relatively constant regardless of the ridership on the transit system or
the phase of the demand cycle being estimated (e.g., peak or off-peak
periods), and variable costs, or costs that vary in relationship to the
demand on the system. Of course, fixed costs are meaningful only if they
are considered during a given period of time, since inflation and
163 Clark and Lorenzoni [1985].
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164
escalation will always provide a variable element to the "fixed" costs
These classifications are useful for the purposes of relating capital
and operating costs with other elements of the analysis, namely the demand
calculation and the financial appraisal, and account for the uncertainty of
estimates and improve the transparency of the cost estimating process. On
the demand side, there are elements of a project that do not change with
the level of demand (at least for a wide range of demand values). For
instance, the cost of stations, tracks, poles, or signalization, does not
change for a range of demand values. On the other hand, the cost of
rolling stock equipment and some elements included under operating costs
depend on the ridership level, and as such their accuracy would be affected
by the accuracy of the demand estimates. Table 4.1 shows the
classification of major operating costs in fixed and variable, depending on
how they change with demand.
The investigation of the case studies indicated that this type of cost
classifications is hardly used, at least with the purpose of realizing how
much changes in output -- i.e., demand -- would affect costs. In the U.S.
cases, the accountability concern -- i.e., every single item must be listed
and included -- thwarted the possibilities of relating cost items to demand
and, therefore, did not allow for quick sensitivity analyses based on
demand. In the case of Madrid, the evaluation was carried out on the basis
of which value of travel time would justify the investment, and no attempt
was made at perceiving how positive or negative changes in demand would
affect costs (and consequently the cost-effectiveness, however measured, of
the project).
164 Stewart [1982].
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Table 4.1
Operating Costs Classification
Category Type Item
Transportation
Equipment
Way and
structures
General and
administrative
fixed administration and scheduling of
transportation operations; ticketing
and fare collection.
variable operator wages and fringes; fuel and
lube; tires and tubes.
fixed maintenance administration for vehicles;
maintenance of fare collection and
counting equipment.
variable servicing revenue vehicles; inspection,
maintenance, and repairs of vehicles.
fixed
fixed
maintenance administration for
facilities; maintenance of roadway,
track, and structures; maintenance of
signals, communications, and control
facilities; maintenance and repairs of
buildings, grounds, and equipment;
maintenance of passengers stations;
operation and maintenance of electrical
power facilities.
systems security; injures and damages;
general insurance; other general
administration.
Note: the distinction between fixed and variable refers to which costs
would change with a medium change in ridership (e.g., increase or
decrease of 15%).
In the La Paz case, by contrast, variable costs were directly related
to demand and sensitivity analysis were performed for different values of
demand 165 In that case, the explicit recognition of different types of
costs, in addition to improving the transparency of the process, helped
cope with uncertainty and the problems of escalation (changes in scope).
165 The variation of demand, however, was not related to changes in the
fare level -- i.e., demand was considered fully inelastic.
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The classification of costs also helped structure the estimation process
and make analysts and decision makers realize how decisions may change with
potential changes in the assumptions of the transit project.
More frequently, costs are categorized according to the other
classification criterion: how directly they relate to the construction or
operation of the transportation facility (i.e., direct and indirect costs).
This type of classification plays a major role during final design and
construction for the purposes of allocating costs to particular activities
with a view toward procurement and work contracting. However, during the
planning stage, the direct-indirect classification does not help reduce the
uncertainty of the estimates and elucidate the tradeoffs among transit
alternatives in the light of that uncertainty. In this sense, the demand-
based classification can better serve the needs of the decision-making
process. Furthermore, the demand-based classification could be used to
assign financial responsibilities to the institutions involved in the
funding of the project. By assigning items to particular institutions
based on how reponsive to demand the costs of those items are, a better
internalization of the funding consequences of the project would be
incorporated into the process. For instance, if a local institution is in
charge of paying for items whose costs vary with demand, an effort would be
made at the local level to estimate as accurately and unbiasedly as
possible those costs and the demand for the system and see what the
consequences would be if the estimated demand is not realized or surpassed.
4.2.3. Computerized Estimation: Database Management Issues
In addition to the quantities, the other element of the cost
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estimating basis is unit prices. This information is gathered through
surveys, quotations, historical background, comparable systems, and the
like. Together, quantities and unit prices encompass an enormous amount of
information that must be organized and managed so that it can be kept up-
to-date during the planning process. In addition, the cost estimating
process involves the use of this large amount of information for fairly
repetitive tasks. These two characteristics make the process particularly
suitable for the use of computer-based technology. Moreover, the
developments in both hardware and software computer technology during the
last ten years, has improved the possibility of making this technology
easily available to any estimating process. In addition, the automation of
the cost estimation process presents some interesting benefits in terms of
speed, consistency, fewer unintended errors, neater presentation, and
improved communications.
The theory of the application of computer technology contains the
fields of management of information systems (MIS) and decision support
systems (DSS) 166. The first field discusses the organization, processing,
retrieval, and update of the data needed for cost estimation. The second
field covers the manipulation of the data for the purposes of cost analysis
and the performance of sensitivity analyses. In general, the management of
information includes all the steps from gathering the data, to analyzing
it, to the application of the estimating unit data, to the generation of
final cost reports. For the purposes of cost estimating, the major thrust
behind these concepts falls not so much on how to organize the relevant
166 Gorry and Scott Morton [1986]; Senn [1984]; Ahituv and Neumann [1982];
Keen and Scott Morton [1978].
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information, but rather on figuring out what it means and what relevance it
has to the decision at hand. Decision support systems are MISs that also
have some processing capability designed to help the decision maker use the
information ("what if" analysis) to perceive the tradeoffs between
different courses of action.
The automation process involves several important issues. First, cost
programs must be developed or purchased. Buying a program makes it
available for use sooner, enables the user to use the experience of others
and, overall, costs less. On the other hand, the program purchased may not
meet the needs of the estimator and it may be difficult to verify the
quality of the program. Furthermore, it may be difficult to revise.
Second, the organization in charge of managing the computer-based
information system must have the technical and organizational capabilities
to develop and maintain the data collection or data management system.
Methods would be ineffective in producing reliable estimates if good unit-
cost data to convert quantities to costs are lacking. In addition, most
cost data are dynamic and subject to almost instant obsolescence and a data
management system is required to keep data current. The task of the cost
estimator in setting up such a system is further complicated by the massive
amount of the data that must be accumulated and managed.
These issues reflect the fact that the cost estimation process is just
as valuable, if not more so, than the cost estimate itself. Often a cost
is quoted without qualifications related to the conditions on which the
estimate is based. This is one reason for frequent misunderstandings and
confusion concerning the costs of an activity. For instance, the case of
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Buffalo has become known for large cost overruns 167. However, when
inflation is taken into account the increase in initial estimated costs is
not more dramatic than in other less publicized cases (see table 1.1). A
different criticism (voice by some individuals intereviewed) targets the
low number of miles Buffalo's LRRT system covers considering the amount of
money invested, but this is a much more subjective and controversial
assessment. In Boston, the near doubling of the initial estimates (from
$200 to almost $400) was mostly due to the lack of consideration of some
items in the first estimates (such as land acquisition costs and provisions
for design, administration, and contingencies) and the different years of
comparison (the feasibility study was based on 1984 dollars, the
alternatives analysis was based on 1986 dollars 168). After accounting for
"missing" elements and inflation, the two estimates were much more similar,
a fact that was unknown to some of the key detractors of the system. These
arguments are examples of the consequences of the lack of qualifiying cost
estimates. (Of course, these situations also come about as some actors use
cost figures for strategic purposes. However, this is a different issue
that will be discussed in chapters 5 and 7.)
Whenever a cost of an item, whether it is a process, product, or
service, is quoted, it should be accompanied by qualifying information
including: (1) a full description of the item; (2) the date for the cost of
item (or key milestones for an activity); and (3) how the item relates to
output (demand). Depending the stage of analysis and the resources
167 General Accounting Office [1986b].
168 This is an assumption of the author, since it was impossible to find a
consensus about which year the cost estimates of the alternatives
analysis were based on.
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available to carrying out the cost estimating function, the qualification
could also include (4) the geographical location of the item or activity;
(5) the skills and organizations assumed available to perform the work to
complete the item or activity; (6) the expected quality and service life of
the output related to the item. This structure parallels the one that in
construction management is called a work element structure (sometimes also
called a work breakdown structure) 169. The structure serves, in addition,
as a framework for collecting, accumulating, organizing, and computing the
direct costs of a work activity or work output 170.
This information structure can be organized within a computer-based
framework that allows for easy editing and updating when changes occur in
the planning process. The implementation of database relational systems
171 would further improve the possibilities of relating cost items to other
variables, such as demand, that affect the quantity levels that enter the
cost estimating methods for the purposes advanced in section 4.2.2.
In the case of La Paz, the analysts developed a spreadsheet-based
system where costs were connected to demand, quantities (level of
investment), and unit prices. The system, although at a feasibility level
169 Stewart [19821.
170 A work element structure is developed by subdividing a process,
product, project, or service into its major work elements, then
breaking the major work elements into subelements, and subelements
into sub-subelements, and so on. This framework assumes a
hierarchical relationship among the elements: the resources or content
of each work element are made up of the sum of the resources or
content of elements below it. The major subdivisions can be either
functional or physical elements. The second level usually consists of
a combination of functional or physical elements if a product or
project is being estimated.
171 Date [1986]; Salzberg [1986]; Smith [1985].
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of aggregation, allowed flexibility in the process and the performance of a
variety of sensitivity analyses. Its characteristics granted a generous
amount of time to argumentation based on quick revisions of the model's
input values or assumptions.
In the case of Boston, the amount of data involved was much larger.
The spreadsheet-based system was built in a modular fashion and did not
attempt a full relation to variables that affected the level of investment.
The system did not allow for easy sensitivity analyses. This was reflected
in some mistakes that appeared in the capital cost figures. For instance,
the first attempt to calculate capital costs included for each alternative
a low, a medium (the best estimate), and a high value for each one of the
cost items. For one of the alternatives, the upper bound (or high value)
of one of the items (contingencies) was lower than both the lower bound and
the best estimate, given an overall total for the upper bound only slightly
larger than the middle value (or best estimate). This error appeared in
several reports during the planning process, including the one submitted to
the federal government for approval -- the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement.
The importance of these issues are not so much in the computerization
per se but in what they mean in terms of organizing the technical process,
allowing flexibility in the planning process, and a more effective
interaction -- however futile if may turn out to be -- with the decision-
making process (effective in terms of quick response to changes and
requests from the decision-making process). The computer-based framework,
by specifying which items to consider and the relationship among them and
other input variables, can also help structure the thinking, learning, and
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argumentation processes.
Although the many particularities of any transit project does not
permit the easy implementation of a standard cost-estimating information
system, the considerable amount of time spent gathering cost information
could be reduced with the implementation of a management information system
to help keep track of major unit-cost components. In the U.S., this
"centralized" approach was supported by UMTA but rejected by the local
analysts on the basis that projects are too specific to merit some unified
central database. Although, the scope of this topic falls outside the
extent of this thesis, considerable room exists for the careful
consideration of the implementation of a databank that would allow transit
planners to obtain unit cost information for the quick purpose of
estimating the costs of any proposal 171. This approach would not directly
and substantially reduce the cost underestimation problem (as the case
studies illustrated by showing that unit cost information is not the major
reason for cost underestimation) but would shorten the time to perform some
of the components of the technical process and would help carry forward
some of the other proposals advanced in the framework presented in this
thesis (e.g., sensitivity analyses, criteria argumentation, etc.).
172 The Highway Design and Maintenance Model (HDM) is an example of a
computer-based program that allows the user to calculate the costs of
several road-maintenance alternatives based on some pre-specified
relationships and after the introduction of specific unit-cost
information. This program is being put forward by the World Bank in
spite of the fact that conditions in developing countries vary
markedly. However, HDM is an effective tool in structuring the road-
maintenance process. At the same time, HDM is flexible enough to
allow for the incorporation of different assumptions and the
performance of calibrations as needed. It is also a good example of a
cost-estimating tool that reduces substantially the time to generate
cost estimates for road-maintenance alternatives. (The World Bank
[1988].)
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4.3. Cost Estimation in Transit Project Planning
In the process of analyzing alternatives, an important issue is the
level of effort and detail that must be spent on developing cost estimates.
Theoretically, the level of effort and detail invested in estimating
capital and operating costs should be that necessary to ensure that the
choice of an alternative does not change with additional cost information.
Analysis then would be extended to the point that additional information
will eliminate the chances that the decision will be changed (i.e., the
expected value of additional information is zero). In other words, since
the final outcome of the alternatives analysis process is the selection of
the "best" alternative, the technical process should be carried out to the
point that the "benefit of the marginal knowledge" would be zero, that is,
to the point at which knowing more about the estimates would not improve
the effectiveness of the selection of the "best" alternative. This is,
obviously, a theoretical reasoning but sets the stage for more practical
discussion.
In practical terms, two levels of estimating effort can be defined:
one, following the parametric approach, for "typical" facilities, and the
other, much more detailed, following the industrial engineering approach,
for "special" situations 173. The first level can be applied to those
segments that consist of a "typical cross-section" (e.g., track sections)
or for a "typical facility" (e.g., station). Detailed units costs are used
with quantities taken from the typical sections to derive costs per lineal
foot for each section or per type of facility. Costs can then be computed
173 Ryan, et. al. [1986].
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to represent the capital cost of each identified typical section or
facility, exclusive of systemwide elements and add-on items. The special
situations consists of those segments or structure that do not present
"typical" characteristics (e.g., major structures or track sections on
difficult terrain). These special elements should be computed following
the "ground-up" approach, in detail, with drawings, detailed quantities,
and detailed unit costs.
Systemwide elements include those items of capital investment that
cannot be defined on a segment-by-segment basis (e.g., vehicles,
electrification). They must be calculated with units costs applied to
systemwide quantities. Some of these systemwide elements are related to
operating costs that, in turn, depend on patronage levels and, hence, on
the results generated in the demand models. Add-on items consist of
contingency allowances and the costs of engineering and construction
management services. The costs of these items are usually calculated as
percentages of the estimated baseline capital costs (depending on how
detailed the calculation of these costs has been).
The estimation of operating costs is more controversial because their
calculation depends to a great extent upon the estimation of other
similarly controversial variables: service and patronage levels. (As was
mentioned before, some capital costs do also depend on patronage levels but
not to the extent that operating costs do. In particular, this is the case
with rolling stock equipment.) Furthermore, the costs should be calculated
to optimize the performance of the system to provide the expected service
and patronage levels. This process involves the analysis of the transit
network, demand estimation, and the balancing of transit supply with
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transit demand. Once the operating statistics are obtained (e.g., vehicle-
miles, vehicle-hours, peak vehicles, etc.), the pertinent cost models can
be applied. The development of these models usually require the
application of some regression analysis with a calibration procedure to
adapt the parameters to the particular situation of the city where the
transit system is being planned. To the greatest extent possible, the
calibration should be done using "typical" conditions (e.g., no significant
changes in service levels, labor productivity, or ridership patterns).
Furthermore, service characteristics should be similar to the ones proposed
for the system being planned.
Summarizing, the prevalent approach to cost estimating in transit
project planning is a combination of both the parametric and the industrial
engineering approaches:
o For capital costs, the prevalent approach is what it can be labeled
the "segmentation" approach. In this approach, all capital items are
divided into segments with common characteristics (e.g., track section
between stations) or particular facilities (e.g., stations), composite
costs for typical cross sections are estimated within common segments
and multiplied for the length of those segments, and overall costs are
estimated for particular facilities. Finally, other systemwide
elements and add-on items are added (e.g., contingencies, engineering
and construction management costs).
o For operating and maintenance costs, the prevalent approach is the
"resource build-up" approach. This approach is usually based on past
performances of similar transit systems, but at the same time includes
a detailed analysis of productivity measures and service levels for
- 185 -
the particular context of the transportation project under analysis.
In a first step, based on the service levels that one want to achieve
(based, on their turn, on demand and the desired capacity, comfort,
and environmental impacts), quantities are calculated so that the
transportation facility will provide those service levels. Then
quantities are multiplied by productivity measures to obtained the
quantities required to operate and maintain the system. These
quantities are multiplied by the unit costs to obtain the quantity
costs, so that, by adding all these costs together, the final total
costs are calculated.
The general procedure, for both capital and operating costs, therefore,
appears rather straightforward. The main difficulties stem from the
process of data gathering and the calculation of productivity measures.
These are usually the points of conflict.
The flow chart on the next page (figure 4.1) summarizes the main
components of the technical process in cost estimating. As the case
studies illustrated, this graph represents more a normative process rather
than a descriptive one. This is because some of the components of the
graph are sometimes missing or not fully considered. That is the case, for
instance, with the financial context which is barely considered at the time
of calculating costs or is mostly considered a posteriori, that is, after
costs have already been calculated. In this manner, the financial costs
are subject to the requirements of the estimated costs rather than
subjecting these costs (and, hence, the corresponding transit alternatives)
to the constraints of the financial context.
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As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, two components must
be considered: the level of investment and the unit prices. The investment
level comes from two main sources: the level of demand and the amount of
resources available (i.e., financial context). The demand level, in turn,
depends mainly on the socioeconomic characteristics of the area (that will
give an indication of the number of rides per person) and how much the
transit facility will cost to the users (understanding cost in a general
sense, including time and comfort costs, and vis-a-vis the "generalized"
cost of competitive modes of transportation on the corridor). The demand
and fare levels are important in planning the design of the operating plan
and knowing the stream of revenues that the transit system will get from
its users. The level of revenues is complemented with the financial
context to ascertain the total level of funds available to construct and
operate the transit facility or system. The financial context sets the
terms of how much money will cost in the future (i.e., inflation and
interest rates), how much is available from higher-level institutions or
other organizations, and what can be obtained by issuing bonds or other
financial mechanisms.
The level of service variable serves as a cushion between the demand
variable and the operating plan (and possibly investment levels for some
capital items, such as number of vehicles). Several demand values would
require the same level of invesment, in both operating and capital terms,
but would yield a different level of service for passengers. However, the
level of service provided would probably affect the demand level (as less
patrons would use the system if the level of service, such as the
probability of getting a seat, decreases), but this effect is hardly
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considered.
The operating plan and the investment level are further complemented
with productivity measures for the particular technology. For each
specific technology, these productivity measures, coupled with the unit
prices of the different components of the transit facility, are in the
final step inserted in the investment level to generate the capital and
operating cost estimates. These estimates, taking into consideration the
financial context and the stream of revenues, evolve into the financial
analysis for each specific alternative.
4.4. Problems and Issues in the Technical Process
The previous section summarized the main components of the technical
cost-estimating process. That summary may suggest that, in principle, that
process consists of a clear sequence of steps that would should lead to a
final set of "correct" capital and operating costs of a transit project.
The process however presents some difficulties as they relate to the
technical process itself. The next section discusses these difficulties
and the issues that generate them.
4.4.1. The Issue of Uncertainty
The consistent underestimation of costs at the planning stage is often
attributed to the lack of consideration of all the elements of the
particular project. This shortcoming relates to the inherent uncertainty
present in any estimating process. In project planning, several factors
are highlighted as potential sources of error for estimating costs: (a)
changes in the scope of the project; (b) changes in design standards; (c)
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incorrect unit cost or parameter assumptions in the planning estimates; (d)
bad estimating analytic methods; (e) and unforseen problems in implementing
the project. Except for the application of inadequate analytic methods,
all the other factors are closely related to the uncertainty associated
with elements that enter the estimating process.
The issue of uncertainty discussed in this thesis stems from factors
beyond the inherent characteristics of any estimating function, as one can
never predict any event or value with absolute certainty. Moreover, it is
often the case with transit projects that they take several years to be
planned and completed. Hence, the prediction of capital and operating
costs (and the other variables upon which costs are calculated) that take
place far in the future becomes very difficult, even with highly
sophisticated technical resources, as the reliability of the estimates
would inevitably decrease with time (as uncertainty increases).
In addition to the impossibility of predicting the future, other
reasons for the uncertainty of cost components relate to the competitive
(i.e., argumentative) content of the estimates (the one that allows the
competition among different perspectives and different actors). The
competitive content of a cost estimate usually centers in the levels or
magnitudes (scope) of resource predictions rather than in the methods or
assumptions used in making the estimate (that is, the focus almost always
falls on (a) and (b), and less often on (c), (d), or (e), referring to the
classification discussed in the first paragraph of this section). That is
the case because the standards and scope of the project are the elements
that eventually, if the project is constructed, would have the largest
impact on the affected constituencies. Cost methods, unit costs, or how
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long it would take to construct the project, though still important in
defining the final cost of the project, do not ultimately influence the
actual effects of the project once constructed, while the visibility and
impact of the scope and standards of the project -- including operating
strategies -- in attaining the pre-specified objectives are the most
important. In the U.S. cases, all of the preferred alternatives were
initially scaled down to the minimum requirements (in an attempt, probably,
to keep capital costs at a reasonable level). Later, as communities on the
corridor requested that standards be raised, costs increased
correspondingly.
Another component of the uncertainty related to the competitive nature
of the cost components refers to the assumptions about which institutions
are in charge of covering the costs of particular elements of the transit
system. For instance, in the case of Buffalo or Santa Clara County,
technical analysts thought that public utilities would pay for costs of
relocating underground utility lines. As it later turned out, after the
inevitable legal battles, the transportation agency had to pay for those
costs -- and, therefore, should have considered them as costs to the
transportation project.
The case studies illustrate some attempts to tackle uncertainty from
the technical standpoint. These attempts were however rather tenuous. In
the case of Buffalo, the 1976 report included some sensitivity tests.
These tests consisted on escalating costs by 1, 2 and 3 percent compounded
annually between 1974 and 1995 to assume a differential with fare increases
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174. Another kind of sensitivity tests involved the consideration of
different incremental construction schedules. In the AMV 1976 report,
conclusions were reached about operating deficits with a average fare level
of $.38. With a value of $0.37, however, some alternatives that showed
operating surpluses would have yielded operating deficits. This example
indicates the low level of reliability of the estimates, and the negligible
attempt to account for the uncertainty of the estimates.
Uncertainty also constitutes a major concern to the higher-level
institutions. The institutions that eventually may fund an important part
of the transit project would prefer to reduce uncertainty to a minimum. In
the U.S., the federal agency in charge of financing transit projects --
UMTA -- issued a set of guidelines to calculate capital and operating costs
in which they require the calculation, in addition to the best estimate, of
a lower and an upper bound for all the cost items. However, the
implementation of these guidelines in the case of Boston was rather
disappointing as was indicated in section 3.2.1.
One possible way to reduce uncertainty is to increase the detail of
the cost estimates. But this may not be possible due to the tradeoff
between resources available for the estimation process and the need to go
beyond conceptual engineering. In any case, an effort can be made to
improve the estimation of costs of those components that are both major
items and have significant uncertainties in their costs (e.g., segments
whose right-of-way falls within highly developed areas, that may require
174 The only conclusion related to this sensitivity analysis was: "If
differential escalation of costs over revenues continues, large annual
deficits would be forecast. Some administrative action would be
required, such as a cut-back in feeder bus service or increase in fare
levels."
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unexpected mitigation measures and added physical amenities).
Another possibility that can help to reduce errors from a procedural
point of view consists of starting with preliminary estimates at the very
early stages of the alternatives analysis process and then periodically
update the costs to reflect the accumulation of better information. The
final cost estimates would come out of a continuous process rather that out
of a final effort made at the end of the study. This approach, however,
has the danger of taking the initial estimates for granted, keeping the
final project evaluation with the initial values (maybe because those were
the values everybody agreed on). For instance, in the case of Boston, the
initial tag of $200 million was assumed from June 1984, the date the
feasibility study was released, until March 1987, where capital cost
estimates went up to almost $400 million (this was in 1986 dollars,
however). The expectations created in the initial stages were based on the
$200 million cap. When in April 1987, the plans to scale down the project
were announced, most communities in the corridor and their elected
officials reacted angrily because they felt they had been cheated.
Another approach involves performing complete sensitivity analysis
involving changes in the values of those variables that appear to be more
susceptible to change. This process will produce upper and lower bounds
for major cost components, and will allow decision makers to assess the
accuracy of the cost estimates and how much they may eventually change. By
performing sensitivity analysis in both quantities and unit costs,
uncertainties in quantities related to possible changes in scope, design
standards, and other variables, as well as those related to unit costs, may
be better perceived and taken into consideration by decision makers.
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The sensitivity approach is something of a departure from usual
practice. Typically, most project planning cost estimates have assumed a
specific scope for the project, applied the unit cost assumptions, and used
an overall contingency factor to account for uncertainties. (Often, the
same contingency factor is used for all alternatives, regardless of their
nature and uncertainty.) Sensitivity tests can be expanded to include not
only changes in the unit cost of a particular variable but also in the
analysts' or decision-makers' perceptions about the future. In the case
studies, the transit projects were designed assuming the economy was going
to keep growing at the same pace as in the past (or close to that pace),
and that this growth was going to cause an intolerable level of traffic
congestion that, in time, would limit the potential growth of the area. As
these expectations were not realized, the assumptions of the study did not
hold and the estimates did not materialize.
Scenario design 175 is another methodological approach that was not
formally incorporated in the technical process. This approach can
complement sensitivity analysis to account for changes in broader
environment-related assumptions (to take into consideration the effect of
these assumptions in the value of cost variables, such as if the economy
does not grow at the same pace or the price of oil decreases or inflation
peaks, what would happen to construction costs and what level of investment
or transit alternative would then be more appropriate if those changes take
place). This methodology parallels the strategic-planning framework
(highlighted in chapter 2) as it translates into a thorough incorporation
of strategic issues, with a long-term view of the elements that are related
175 Pearman [1988]; Meyer and Miller [1984].
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to the goals the transit investment attempts to address (e.g., downtown
revitalization, land use and density guidance, economic growth, etc.).
Still another way is the use of contingency factors. But these
factors usually take the form of a single percentage value to be applied to
the final cost figure. A more precise method would consist of assigning
different contingency factors to different elements of the capital or
operating cost figures, depending on their reliability 176. In the case of
Boston, a 10% contingency was used overall for TSM elements; in the
commuter rail alternatives, a 5% contingency was used for trackwork, 15%
for signals and communications, and 10% for all other items; in the busway
alternative, cross sections of the right-of-way had a 5% contingency while
all other elements had a 10% contingency factor. This level of aggregation
was deemed appropriate for the purposes of the planning process. These
percentages reflected the consultants' perception about the accuracy of the
group of elements depending on how close to a top-down approach the
estimation of particular costs was.
A final option, as suggested earlier, consists of designing a modular,
transparent computer-based model with a reclassification of cost components
in terms of which are certain and which are uncertain. The model would
better allow one to (i) see and explore the ripple effects of uncertainties
and (ii) make changes to initial key assumptions (e.g., via a database
management system). This option -- that can be used in conjunction with
some of the other options indicated above -- should improve the
communication among the actors with a stake in the process and also help
176 This is the approach UMTA advocates in its guidelines. Ryan, et. al.
[1986].
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perceive the likely variations in the final costs.
4.4.2. Other Issues
Another issue that creates difficulties in the technical process is
knowing exactly what elements to include as components of a transit
alternative, apart from difficulty that comes from the inherent technical
uncertainty. For instance, in the case of Buffalo, the capital costs did
not include the necessary additions to the bus fleet that would be needed
to feed the LRRT system 177. These costs were eventually acknowledged in
response to community concerns raised at a public hearing session 178
This issue relates to what elements must be included at the time of
estimating costs as every alternative must consider any additions or
deletions that would take place for the adequate operation of the proposed
transit system (e.g., feeder bus system for a commuter-rail alternative).
However, it is no small task to figure out which changes the implementation
of a new facility will bring in the whole transportation system. If riders
are attracted from other transit services, these services may involve less
operating costs (or the fleet may be reduced and sold to other transit
authorities); this reduction in other services would decrease the overall
costs of the project. Conversely, the new facility may need additional
feeder bus lines to be able to reach the estimated demand; this need will
increase capital and operating costs. At the end, the process would
require the consideration of the transportation system with and without the
177 U.S. Department of Transportation [1977], page 4-8.
178 Ibid., page 10-33.
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project in order to accurately estimate both capital and operating costs
179
Still another difficulty in the technical process is the one generated
by the phasing issue (mentioned in section 4.2). If project implementation
must be carried out on an incremental basis due to funding constraints,
higher project costs will probably result (because of economies of scale,
since each systemwide contract would be signed in smaller parts and
purchased and installed at separate times, higher costs would be incurred;
and also because some elements, such as yards and shops, must be
constructed anyway as soon as revenue operation begins). It may also be
necessary to relocate certain elements required to operate the system from
the second phase into the first increment constructed. These arguments
were indicated, for instance, in the case of Buffalo where, in one of the
few cases where the phasing concept was discussed, the incremental
construction of one of the alternatives (the 11-mile heavy rail system)
would have increased its costs due to the need to relocate a yard -- and
demolish the initial structure. Interestingly, the cost of the incremental
implementation was estimated a mere 2% higher than the full implementation
180
Another important issue is the initial lack of consideration of the
financial context surrounding the transit project. This deficiency,
179 A similar approach should be applied to ridership, as analysts must
compensate ridership gains on some lines with losses on others. In
other words, ridership estimation would involve the calculation of
overall figures with every transit alternative being considered and
compare those estimates to the do-nothing alternative (i.e., the
alternative with no additional investment to the transportation system
in place besides the standard needs being already applied to it).
180 Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority [1976], page 104.
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coupled with a frequent overestimation of demand, tends to yield investment
levels higher than may actually be required. But in order to keep costs
low and eventually obtain the approval of funds from higher-level
institutions, productivity measures tend to be rather optimistic, and
design standards and unit prices rather low. Once the project is started,
the transportation agency hopes that involved institutions would see the
construction to full implementation.
In the U.S., conversations with UMTA officials indicated that, from
their points of view, the lack of consideration of the financial context
was one major reasons for posterior financial problems and strained
relations between UMTA and the local institutions. Once the project is
started, the local institutions realize they cannot afford the system, and
hence start requesting further funds; local politicians then take the lead
in requesting any additional funds needed to complete the project.
Regardless of these perceptions, what actually happens is not so much that
the financial context was not considered (in all the three U.S. instances,
the case studies illustrated how adequate financial provisions were made at
the local level to meet the local share of capital costs) but rather that
this consideration was not put in the context of possible increases in cost
estimates. Therefore, the optimistic cost estimate was more the source of
the problems, than the fact that the financial context was not carefully
considered. 181
181 Nevertheless, the system seems to work well for the local interests if
their purpose is to pre-select a project and then build the political
base necessary to persuade a higher-level institution (e.g., UMTA) to
pay for that project.
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4.5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter included a review of the technical process of estimating
capital and operating costs for the construction of transit facilities,
identifying its main components, the major approaches, and the main
difficulties and issues involved in undertaking these approaches. The
discussion showed how the cost-estimating approach must be tailored to the
decision environment, how cost classifications can help understand the
implications of changes in demand estimates, and how the management of cost
information can help organize and structure the cost estimating process.
In another section, the major components of this process were identified
along with its relationships. Figure 4.1 set the path to a broader
discussion of the implications of uncertainty in the cost estimating
process and the possible means to deal with it. Finally, section 4.4.2
presented other issues, such as the phasing of alternatives or the
consideration of the financial context within which the estimating function
takes place, which usually create some difficulties in the technical task
of estimating capital and operating costs.
This chapter illustrated that certain difficulties in the technical
process leave room for deviations from the rational ideal of
comprehensiveness and impartiality, although specific actions could be
taken to get closer to that ideal. The next chapter discusses the
decision-making process and ellucidates other components of the overall
planning process that can affect the technical process and how this process
is undertaken. Nevertheless, as the design of the technical process -- in
terms of which approach to follow, or how to deal with uncertainty, etc. --
affects the technical process itself, the perception of what the role of
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the technical analysis is by the ultimate users of it -- i.e., the decision
makers -- constitutes a fundamental element to understand and structure
that technical process. In the end, the success or failure of the cost
estimating process depends on how useful it is to achieve a particular role
in the decision-making process, rather than simply its accuracy or the
sophistication of its technical developments.
5. DECISION MAKING: PERSPECTIVES, ELEMENTS, AND PROBLEMS
5.1. Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the main technical approaches and
elements that are involved in the cost estimating process. That chapter
also highlighted the major technical issues that must be taken into account
for an effective cost-estimating process. This chapter focuses on the
elements of cost estimating as they relate to the decision-making process.
From the previous chapter, one may think that the cost- estimating
process consists of a clear set of steps that, once some technical
difficulties are overcome, leads to the final, accurate cost estimate for
the specific project. The reality however, reflects a different picture,
as the history of chronically underestimated capital and operating costs in
large transportation projects proves 182. Most of the studies that have
attempted to explain cost underestimation have looked at this history from
a technical standpoint, using statistical analyses to explain and tackle
the issue of underestimation. However, the case studies illustrated (and
the analytical framework presented in chapter 2 suggested) that the
investigation must also encompass other components of the estimating
process to find out where the "disturbances" come from. The other set of
components includes both internal and external effects within the
institutional and political dimensions of the transportation planning
process.
The decision-making process inherently involves organizations and
182 Table 1.1 presented some instances. See also Merewitz [1972], Charles
River Associates [1983], and Pickrell [1988].
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individuals, whose perspectives are very different from those of the
"rational" systems analyst. Allison's Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis [1971] presented these perspectives by illustrating
three different possible models to "see" a single decision process.
Simon's Administrative Behavior [1976] related the limitations that are
unavoidably present in any human decision making process and how these
limitations affect the pure rational system perspective 133
The rational model is based on Locke's positivism. The
characteristics and assumptions of the positivist perspective include: the
ability to abstract problems; the certainty of solving those problems; the
optimality of the results; the possibility of reducing problems to a very
limited number of elements and the interactions among them; the reliance on
data and models; the possibility of quantifying information; objectivity
(or assumption that the analyst is an unbiased observer outside of the
system he or she is analyzing); the ignorance or avoidance of the
individual (or averages can be used to generate effective results); and a
view of the time that is linear (with no consideration of differential time
perceptions) 184. The success of this method and its paradigms in applied
mathematics and modeling gradually led to the extension of its use beyond
science and technology, to society and all its systems.
The rational model was discussed in the second chapter. The
183 "The central concern of administrative theory is with the boundary
between the rational and the nonrational aspects of human social
behavior. Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory of intended
and bounded rationality -- of the behavior of human beings who
satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize." Simon [1976],
p. xxviii.
184 Linstone [1984], pp. 7-24.
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application to the transportation planning process indicated that the
elements of comprehensiveness and impartiality of that model have
limitations within the realm of that process. The main reason derives from
the particularities of the transportation planning process such as its
interdisciplinary nature, the scope of its impacts, and the fuzzines of the
line between its technical and political arenas. These characteristics
make the decision-making environment a complex one, one where, in addition,
it is hard to define who the decision makers are.
By contrast, in the private sector context, the application of the
rational paradigm has been rather successful. But transit projects (as
mentioned in chapter 4) are public projects and, as such, present
characteristics that, to a larger or lesser degree, differ from those that
exist in the private context. The following is a list of some differences
between the public and the private context as they relate to the decision-
making environment: (a) public decision makers tend to have a relatively
short time perspective delineated by political necessities, the political
calendar, and the short-term budget cycle 185; (b) there is little if any
agreement on the standards and measurement of performance to appraise a
public decision maker; (c) in the public arena, emphasis tends to be placed
on providing equity among different constituencies to the detriment of
efficiency, although both equity and efficiency can be part of a rational
analysis; (d) public decision makers tend to be more open and exposed to
public scrutiny and they must contend regularly with the press and media
(and their decisions are sometimes anticipated by the press); (e) public
185 The length of service for politically-appointed public decision makers
is often relatively short.
- 203 -
decision makers often seek to mediate decisions in response to a wide
variety of pressures and must often put together a coalition of inside and
outside groups to survive; in addition, they tend to regard themselves as
responsible to many superiors instead of a single higher authority; (f)
public decision making is often subject to close scrutiny by legislative
oversight groups or even judicial orders, constraining executive and
administrative freedom to act; and (g) a variety of other factors also
affect and constrain decision making in the public arena such as the
difficulties of implementing change, the resistance to change in large-
scale bureaucracies, and the frequent imperfect control and coordination
among different public institutions 186.
Added to these characteristics there are two more that make the
transportation decision-making process even more complicated. The first
one is the ever-changing focus of the political agenda and of public
priorities. The brief history of transportation planning presented in
chapter 2 is a good example of the continuous change in focus. The second
one is the frequent inseparability of decisions. For instance, the
decision to revitalize the downtown area and reduce congestion may be
inseparable from that of constructing some sort of transit system.
186 Kelman [1987] , Scott [1981], Lipsky [1980]. There are still other
characteristics that were not listed above because they do not
directly relate to the issues discussed in this thesis. Some of these
additional characteristics are: (a) decision makers do not usually
have the imperative to train a successor (because of political reasons
that affect both the incumbent and the successor); (b) the public
decision-maker must act with constraints on personnel mobility and
changes, since civil service, union contract provisions, and other
regulations complicate the recruitment, hiring, transfer and layoff or
discharge of personnel to achieve the decision-maker's objectives;
these constraints, in addition, tend to create conflicts between civil
service officials and political appointees; and (c) the insufficient
power and authority decision makers can have over autonomous units.
- 204 -
The case studies illustrated many of these issues. A full account
here would unnecessarily lengthen the scope of this chapter. A few
instances should suffice to indicate how, within the transportation
planning context, decision makers are affected by the characteristics of
the public arena. Most of the cases illustrated the short term focus of
the arguments as the major criteria for the selection of the alternative
targeted cost-effectiveness measures, the value of travel time, or the
visibility of the city and its economic viability. However, in order to
attract constituencies and reach an acceptable level of equity, stated
objectives tended to stress longer term elements, such as land use changes.
Frequent clashes resulted as the different layers of the decision-making
process disagreed over which perspectives were the most important for the
selection of the preferred alternative. Shifting priorities were a
consequence of those clashes (in addition to general trends in the
societies affected by the transportation plans) and were reflected in the
long periods of time it took to fully implement the initial proposals. The
visibility and scrutiny of the decision-making function was reflected by
frequent turning points along the process (such as the case of phasing in
Boston), as well as by the emphasis on keeping the affected constituencies
informed about the technical results. Finally, the permanence of
initially-preferred proposals -- for more than fifteen years, in some cases
-- reflected the difficulties of changing the course of action. These
difficulties come from several sources including the complexity of the
technical process, the time and effort required to ensure the support of
constituencies, and the inseparability of decisions. In other words,
initially-preferred proposals do not substatially change along the planning
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process because, as time passes, it becomes more and more difficult
politically, emotionally, and technically to do so.
5.2. Decision Making: Theories and Issues
This section presents a review of the major theoretical elements that
refer to decision-making theory as a background for the subsequent
discussion of decision making in transportation planning and the
presentation of the theoretical framework in chapter 6.
5.2.1. Decision-making Theories, Perspectives, and Elements
Decision-making theories can be classified at two different levels:
individual and general. At the individual (micro) level, two main streams
of theory have been developed: those that try to define what the decision-
maker ought to do (prescriptive or normative theories) and those that try
to define what they actually do in practice (descriptive theories). The
former are included within the tradition of operations research methods and
encompass the area of decision analysis. The latter include the areas of
psychology and behavioral studies.
The distinction between both becomes blurred when each stream tries to
address the concerns of the other 187. For instance, a normative model may
adequately predict what an individual decides to do if this individual
follows the dictates of the model; in the opposite direction, descriptive
considerations have changed the content of normative models. Contemporary
normative models for decision making are little more than sets of rules
designed to ensure that acts will be coherent or internally consistent with
187 Von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986].
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one another in the pursuit of the decision maker's goals.
At a more general (macro) level, the rational-actor model of decision
making corresponds to the first stream of theories (normative) as it tries
to prescribe the outcome of every decision-making process based on a given
set of assumptions. Satisficing, organizational, and political (or
personal) theories fit more within the psychological and behavioral
theories (prescriptive) as they try to explain decisions based on empirical
experiences.
Decision-making theories can be understood as a continuum. The
rational-actor model misses some aspects such as the political interests of
the decision maker or the pressures from the organization the decision
maker is part of. By adding other "less-quantifiable" elements, we could
think of any decision-making process as a maximization of the "stakes" that
the many actors involved in the process have in it. "Stakes" include
everything from the financial costs to some actors, to the political gains
to others, and to savings in travel time to still others, to name just a
few. The problem is not only that it would be very difficult to define
some of those stakes -- for instance the value of political gains -- but
also impossible to identify all the actors affected.
In spite of its practical difficulties, the idea of the continuum
allows us to accept that an outcone that we may assess as an "irrational"
decision is actually "rational" from the perspective of a different point
in that continuum. Allison's [1971] explanation of the same outcome from
three different perspectives reflects the idea that the "political" or
"organizational" perspectives are not necessarily irrational but just
rational from those perspectives (i.e., "rationality" is always present but
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its definition changes depending on the perspective) 188.
The acknowledgment of the continuum can help better understand
planning outcomes that evolved as a consequence of public decision-making
processes. The predominant definition of rationality -- the (economic)
utilitarian definition -- is not enough to explain particular instances of
those outcomes. Utility functions do not allow for the straightforward
encapsulation of a multiple perspective approach encompassing the
technical, organizational, and personal perspectives 189.
The need for different perspectives also stems from the fact that
different explanations -- or interpretations -- of a phenomenon are often
possible 19. These different explanations originate in elements such as:
(1) the background of analysts and the specificity in the definition of
their tasks (the personal perspective), (2) the type of organizational
structure (the bureaucratic perspective), and (3) the type of environment
(the socio-political perspective).
The background of the analysts and the specificity of their tasks
relates to how they perceived their roles in the planning process or
whether or not these roles are pre-specified 191. In the U.S. cases,
analysts, indubitably with a respectable professional competence, did not
188 Simon [1976] suggests a similar theoretical construction as an
alternative to avoid the complexities of defining rationality is "to
use the term 'rational' in conjunction with appropriate adverbs."
Then we can have a decision that is "objectively" rational, or
"subjectively" rational, or "organizationally" rational, or
"personally" rational. Simon [1976], pp. 76-77.
189 Linstone [1984].
190 Scott [1981] ; Allison [1971.
191 Drake [1973] provides a fuller discussion of this element in the
context of several transportation planning exercises in the U.S..
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perceive their tasks as purely technical but more as collaborative with the
decision-making process and possibly influencing the outcome of the
planning process; by contrast, in both the Madrid and La Paz case, the
analysts did perceive their role as separate from the decision-making
process. This element is also influenced by the definition of the goals to
be achieved by the decision-making process and how widely they are
accepted. In the U.S., some goals are not precisely defined because they
are not widely recognized but rather controversial -- that is the case, for
instance, with the issue of the land use effects of LRT and fixed guideway
systems. As the case studies illustrate, with different broad objectives
being stressed for similar types of projects and by different groups of
actors, analysts are often left to fend for themselves and find a way to
reconcile different goals to be achieved with a transit investment. The
lack of specificity in goals and tasks, on one hand, does not help
establish a solid unique basis for a formal decision-making process. On
the other hand, the lack of specificity may be inevitable to reach an
outcome within particular planning environments (e.g., the U.S. cases).
The lack of specificity in the U.S. context contrasts, paradoxically,
with the high-degree of formalization of the planning process (at least
compared to the the less-formalized nature of the other two cases). This
contrast creates strains and fewer possibilities that the formalization is
widely accepted. By comparison, in the cases abroad, the low level of
formalization allowed the process to adapt to the conditions of the
particular projects. Formalization also relates to the roles of the actors
of the planning process and the relationship among them. Formalization,
when prescribed independently of the personal attributes of individuals
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occupying positions in the decision-making structure, is an attempt to make
behavior more predictable by standardizing and regulating it but, again, is
likely to clash with the different backgrounds and styles of the actors.
Another important element of the technical-estimation process is the
organizational context within which that process takes place. This context
refers to the institutions in charge of carrying out the technical elements
of cost estimating, those involved in deciding which alternative to pursue,
and the relationship among them and with the rest of the institutions
involved in the broader planning process.
Usually, the scale of the projects that are the subject of this thesis
requires the involvement of several institutions and, mainly, of
consultants outside the public transit agency. In the U.S. cases, the
technical studies were done by outside consulting firms 192; the
transportation agencies supervised the consultants' work. Once the
preferred alternative was selected, other institutions -- engineering firms
and construction companies -- constructed the transit facility. Once
constructed, the facility was operated by the transit agency. This process
presents unavoidable discontinuities because the transit agencies do not
have the capabilities to carry out the technical studies and the
construction themselves. These discontinuities open up the possibility of
collusion between transit agencies, decision makers, and technical
consultants. Collusion stems from the interdependence among these actors as
each needs the others to work on projects, to garner support for decisions,
or simply to acquire technical information (e.g., analysts gather
192 In the case of Boston, there existed a "parent" consulting firm
coordinating the efforts of several others consulting firms, each one
in charge of a different technical element.
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information from the transit agency they are working for to calculate
particularly productivity values and operating costs). Collusion has the
potential for encouraging each actor to please the others to support their
preferred outcomes; it is almost always difficult, substantively and
organizationally, as organizations or individuals must respond to other
requirements that unavoidably influence how the work -- technical analysis,
decisions -- is performed 193
This element was present in the U.S. context where the need to satisfy
different audiences (mainly, state and federal requirements) forced
analysts, decision makers, and transit agencies to steer the analytical
studies to fit that need. In the case of La Paz, the attempt by the
analysts to avoid that collusion created some difficulties in the process
whereby technical results were not easily accepted by decision makers.
The third major element that affects the explanation of decision
outcomes is the environment within which the planning process takes place.
Does it take place in a stable environment with clearly defined goals or in
a dynamic one with changing priorities ? The latter easily applies to the
transportation planning domain where, for the last twenty years, goals have
been continuously added to transportation plans and have often become
193 The discontinuity also affects the internalization of the
responsibilities of each actor as they can easily put the blame on the
institutions or individuals in charge of other parts of the process.
The increasing role of legal liabilities on technical studies may
enhance the internalization of responsibilities (Innes [1988]). This
approach, however, may prove inefficient as lawsuits lengthen planning
studies and increase initial estimates of capital and operating costs,
as the U.S. cases illustrated. It remains to be seen if this approach
can efficiently and effectively work as a deterrent to avoid bias in
the technical results.
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looser and wider 194 The broadening of transportation plans has been a
consequence of an environment with evolving needs, expectations, and
policies (which, for instance, in the U.S. has been reflected in the
changing emphasis of the federal government 195).
The instability of the environment affects the planning process in two
ways: one relates to the environment as a source of information; the other
relates to the environment as a setting for power relations, compromises,
and conflicts. As to the environment as a source of information, the
instability generates uncertainty in the technical process -- cost
estimates depend on a variety of data gathered from the environment (see
figure 4.1). As to power relations, the instability allows actors to act
on that uncertainty in their attempts to support their views about the
objectives to be achieved with the transit plans.
5.2.2. A "Good" Decision-Making Process
In light of these multiple perspectives, it becomes difficult to
define what a "good" decision-making process ought to be. Wheeler and
Janis [1980] state that a "good" decision-making process is that process
that abides by the right rules. Von Witerfeldt and Edwards [1986] argue
that a common but often misused idea is that decisions, and hence rules for
decision making, should be evaluated on the basis of their results. These
authors further state that the quality of decisions really means the
quality of the process by which they are made, and they can only be
evaluated on the basis of information available before their outcomes occur
194 Altshuler [1979].
195 Weiner [1983]; Weiner [1987].
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or become certain -- in other words, the decision-making process would be
evaluated with foresight, not hindsight.
This approach shifts the question from the outcomes to what the
"right" rules are. The difficulties of defining the right rules,
nevertheless, make any arguments that link the outcomes of decisions to
their evaluation powerful and influential 196. For decisions whose
outcomes are rather certain, those arguments are straightforward; for
decisions made under uncertainty, the arguments are controversial and
elusive and are difficult to apply in a generic fashion. This latter
situation is the one that typifies the transportation planning process.
Five major stages of a decision making process can be distinguished
197: (1) perception of problem ("need"), and acceptance and initiation of
the decision process; (2) search for and identification of alternatives
(with little evaluation done at this time); (3) evaluation of alternatives
with considerable effort dedicated to searching for dependable information
relevant to the decision; (4) commitment after the reexamination of all the
information (and figuring out how the decision will be implemented
including contingency plans in case any risks materialize); and (5)
adherance to the decision (including the anticipation of likely setbacks,
preparation of countermeasures, and, in case a serious setback takes place,
acception of a new challenge to go through another cycle of five stages to
decide on a new course of action). Within this process, decision makers,
196 The comments gathered from the interviews and literature related to
cost underestimation support this argument as the evaluation of
transit projects is usually done on the basis of the comparison of
estimates with actual outcomes rather than on the basis of the process
that led to the final decision.
197 Wheeler and Janis [1980].
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based on the costs of the alternatives, their cost-effectiveness, and other
-- not necessarily less important -- factors, must select a course of
action. In the decision analysis tradition, the decision maker would
construct a decision tree and, based on the probabilities that each option
has, would come out with different payoffs and end up with a "best" course
of action. The field of multiattribute evaluation develops the theory of
the calculation of the payoffs and the selection of the "best" alternative
". This approach relates to what Pfeffer [1976] calls the application of
universalistic criteria.
The universalism-particularism dimension describes the extent to which
decision outcomes are affected by the particular social relationship
existing between the decision maker and those who are affected by the
decision. When consensually agreed-upon, well-defined standards are
available for evaluation, decision-making outcomes will be based upon those
standards and universalistic criteria would be applied. However, in the
transportation planning process, where the absence of shared criteria is
usually the norm -- the case studies illustrated how the emphasis and
objectives were different for different actors and at different times --
processes of social influence will account for part of the variance in
decision outcomes.
Particularistic criteria -- criteria which derive from the particular
perspectives or goals of the contending groups -- will be used more in
decision making under conditions of uncertainty. In the transportation
planning process, characterized by uncertainty about demand, costs, and
which goals to achieve, social influence tends to overshadow technical
198 Keeney and Raiffa [1976].
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considerations and the use of unversalistic criteria. These conditions
were clearly illustrated in the U.S. case studies in Santa Clara County and
Buffalo where projects were ultimately approved and carried forward not on
the basis of the technical studies but because of political mandates that
came out of the U.S. Congress.
When particularistic criteria plays a role in the process, other
decision-making mechanisms besides the technical process become important.
These mechanisms include: implicit exchanges or political logrolling (to
vote for someone's project, because this someone will vote for mine in
reciprocity), familiarity and likeness for someone else's project, and
informal communication. Whether the process operates through any of these
mechanisms, influence will be greater the more uncertain the decision
situation is (and, hence, less likely to have objective information to
anchor one's judgements). Uncertainty decreases the extent to which
universalistic standards can be applied. Nevertheless, the visibility of
the allocation process, the information generated -- however uncertain -- ,
and the outcomes will tend to ensure that some kind of universalistic
criteria are employed. Organizations, then, will be likely to employ both
universalistic and particularistic criteria in their decision-making
processes.
This dichotomy about how different criteria are applied in decision-
making highlights the difficulties of defining the right rules of the
process -- aside from following a set of stages, which may be hard to
achieve anyway when some particularistic mechanisms play the major role.
In chapter 2, it was argued that "good" decisions are those that are made
on the basis of the right information and in a democratic fashion. Since
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decisions are made on the basis of a set of (explicit or implicit)
criteria, how these criteria are defined and developed ultimately affects
the information basis and the level of "democratization" of the decision.
The definition of evaluation criteria then becomes crucial in the light of
the uncertainty of the elements of the technical process. If the outcome
of the decision has been initially predetermined, due to general consensus,
pressures, or undemocratic practices, a "good" process may be precluded.
That was, for instance, the case of La Paz, where the pressures to prove
the worthiness of a particular alternative for getting the approval for the
necessary funding thwarted a satisfactory decision-making process from the
perspective of the framework discussed here.
5.3. Decision-Making in Transportation Planning
The discussion of the case studies illustrates the many institutions
that are involved in the planning and implementation of any fixed-guideway
transit system. These institutions can be categorized according to the
roles that they play in the process: (a) providers of capital and operating
funds or subsidies (e.g., federal and state governments in the U.S.; the
World Bank for infrastructure projects in developing countries; the central
government in the case of Spain); (b) certifiers of the process and project
approval (e.g., UMTA or state agencies in the U.S.; the World Bank and
central governments in developing countries; the central government in
Spain); (c) issuers of regulations or guidelines (e.g., U.S. Congress and
U.S. DOT in the U.S.; the parliaments and central governments in developing
countries and in Spain); (d) providers of technical support and
disseminators of information (e.g., UMTA or state agencies in the U.S.; the
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World Bank and other international agencies in developing countries; the
central government in Spain); (e) budget allocators (e.g., federal and
state budget offices; central, state, and local governments in developing
countries and Spain); (f) implementors (e.g., state and local departments
of public works or departments of transportation; transit authorities with
their managers, technical staff, labor force and unions; and manufacturers
of transit technologies); (g) analysts (e.g., consulting agencies and
specific departments in transit agencies); (h) political lobbyists and
other influencing actors (at all the levels of government, such as interest
groups, citizen groups, transit unions, etc.); and (i) the business
community 199. The final selection comes out of the interaction of these
actors, concurrently with the development of the technical analysis.
Before the final alternative is selected for implementation, several
other decision processes take place that ultimately may affect the final
alternative. These decision processes include: (a) which alternatives to
consider, (b) which agency or agencies will supervise the project, (c)
which organizations will undertake the analysis project and which
institution(s) will pay for it, (d) who will be formally involved in
commenting the analysis study, (e) which methods will be followed in the
study, and (f) which criteria will be used as the basis for evaluating the
competing alternatives. Except for (f), which, as in the U.S., may be
established by some sort of statutory guidelines, institutions at the local
(regional) level usually have the widest choices in these matters, subject
to the constraints generated by the actors at other levels (e.g., the
funding institutions) and the resources available.
199 Hamer [1976].
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Figure 5.1 summarizes the major elements of current planning processes
from the perspective of the decision-making process and the interaction of
the institutions involved in such a process. Initial proposals are
generated as reaction to a preceived "need" for transportation
improvements. For instance, in Boston, the Old Colony project had existed
as a plan since the abandonment of the rail line in 1959. Only in 1984,
when congestion levels on the corridor were assessed as unbearable, and the
day the largest reconstruction effort in the state of Massachusetts 200 was
approaching, the state government activated the project and started the
necessary feasibility and environmental studies. The "need" was then
expressed as a way to reduce congestion on the major highways on the
corridor, although later it was perceived that automobile volumes would not
be reduced on those major highways but rather on the local streets parallel
to those highways. The perceived "need" was also a consequence of the
state's political necessity to gain support for the major reconstruction
project. In exchange for the rehabilitation of the Old Colony project,
politicians from the fastest growing region of Massachusetts and their
constituencies were expected to be willing to support the state's major
engineering undertaking in its history.
Once the "need" is established, preliminary alternatives are defined.
There always exist an initial preference for certain types of technologies,
and the alternatives that include these technologies are put up front and
200 This refers to the reconstruction underground of a major elevated
highway crossing the center of the city (the Central Artery). The
project was slated for construction in 1990 and was going to disrupt
the whole transportation network. Particularly from the South,
alternatives were needed to provide access to Boston's central
business district.
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may even give the name to posterior analytical studies (e.g., in Boston,
"Old Colony Railroad Rehabilitation Project"). These initial preferences
already place some other alternatives in a disadvantaged position. In the
meantime, constituency development is started by the generators of the
"need" (that are the only ones that at the moment have a stake on the
project). Parallel to these events, some preliminary estimates of capital
and operating costs come to light based on feasibility studies or
indications from interested parties (e.g., from providers of particular
technologies, like in the case of La Paz). These preliminary estimates
easily become hard currency, even if the studies they are based on clearly
state that they are only approximations and many items are not accounted
for (e.g., in the case of Boston, the feasibility study indicated the
limitation of the $200 million estimate for the full alternative; for
almost three years however, this figure was the only one mentioned by all
the involved institutions).
Based on the preliminary cost estimates, a "need" is perceived for
additional funds. These funds must be provided by higher-level
institutions that adhere to specific rules for approval. The "need" is
usually acknowledged not so much because of the transportation project
itself but rather because of the opportunity to bring "high-level" (e.g.,
federal, in the U.S.) dollars to the area. This factor overrides the
others in the case of distressed areas, as in the case of Buffalo. In
other situations, the real lack of funds to afford the project is the main
element. The decision to try to obtain the funds and go ahead with the
rules of the higher-level institution is not an obvious one because the
whole process from planning to final implementation becomes much longer
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and, ultimately, affects the overall costs of the project (due to
inflation, more opportunities for legal battles and changes in scope, and
lost revenues). But the impossibility of collecting the necessary funds at
the local level or the "need" of not missing the opportunity to obtain
"cheap" funds -- that is, funds that cost less to the local taxpayer since
they are partically covered by a higher-level institution -- , eventually
persuades the decision makers to pursue the required (bureacratic) process
of the higher-level institutions.
Once the decision to pursue the process established by those
institutions is made, these high-level institutions become another
important actor in the overall planning process. The definition of the
alternatives must be agreed upon with them, although implicitly the
initially preferred alternatives will still keep their preeminence in the
planning study. Additionally, agreements upon the study techniques and the
schedule for the delivery of specific elements of the final analytical
report must also be reached.
The formal steps of the analysis process take place simultaneously
with the building up of local and community support for the project. Some
opposition probably arises and for that technical documentation must be
quickly prepared. This forces analysts to work at a fast pace, trying,
against all odds, not to fall behind the political environment. When
opposition surfaces against the implicitly preferred proposal(s), the
decision makers usually indicate that the studies are still inconclusive on
the issue and that further analysis must be undertaken to address all the
concerns. Consensus building is a major effort at this stage since
continuous support from the funding institutions largely depends on the
- 221 -
perceived support from the communities the transit project passes by.
While the analytical study takes place, the decision makers must also spend
time at other levels of government (parallel to those of the funding
institutions), gaining additional political support for the project. If a
major representative from the region where the project is located has some
leverage in the committees or agencies in charge of allocating funds for
the project, it is more probable that the funds will be approved. For
instance, in the case of Buffalo, the area's representative in the U.S.
Congress, was a member of the public-works committe, the committee that
allocates federal funds for urban-development infrastructure projects. His
presence in the committee help funnel federal funds for Buffalo's LRRT
line.
In the meantime, the analysis process continues. Data, particularly
those related to capital and operating costs, are gathered, and methods
(models) are applied to generate the demand, revenue, and cost figures. In
addition, environmental studies are undertaken to quantify and qualify the
effects the transit project will produce in the corridor. Local concerns
must now be addressed, and new cost figures must be calculated since the
initial preferences did not consider the apparently "endless" wants of the
affected communities. The case studies clearly illustrated this issue as
elements such as station upgrading, double tracking, landscaping,
additional parking spaces, etc. had to be added along the process to meet
the concerns of the affected communities. These changes in project scope
produce an escalation on capital and operating costs. They will not be the
last, since later on, during preliminary engineering, new additions will
take place as geological conditions are surveyed, operational strategies
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are refined, etc., and new demands are likely to be made from the affected
communities.
But costs cannot be escalated without considering the requirements of
the funding institutions, particularly threshold values that must not be
surpassed to obtain the approval of the funds for the project. It is now
when a give-and-take process occurs between the analysts and the decision
makers, otherwise the analysis process may end up suggesting an alternative
different from the initially preferred one and the one that has already
taken so much effort, politically and emotionally, to gain support from the
interested constituencies. This situation encourages a good dose of
deliberate or accidental "optimism" in the calculation of the technical
figures, particularly those related to demand and cost estimates, in the
direction of putting the initially-preferred alternative at an advantaged
position.
Decisions of higher-level institutions about whether or not to fund a
project are usually based on some sort of cost-effectiveness measure. In
La Paz, the internal rate of return was the measure frequently asked for by
the World Bank to judge the adequacy of each alternative (by itself or vis-
a-vis the other alterantives). The problem with this measure (in addition
to the usual complaints about its adequacy to judge investments) is that
unless the project yields net profits (that is, revenues are larger that
total annualized costs), which is hardly the case with any transit system,
rates of return are negative. In the U.S., the federal government uses two
major performance measures to screen alternatives: (a) the estimated number
of riders on the corridor (a minimum is necessary to proceed with a
proposal), and (b) the cost per added rider (this cost must not be higher
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than a specified threshold).
Table 5.1 shows the total annualized cost per rider for the transit
projects discussed in chapter 3. The total annualized cost was calculated
adding the estimated annual operating cost to the annualized capital cost
(assuming a 30-year life with an interest rate of 10%). The cost-
effectiveness measure was calculated dividing the total annualized cost by
the ridership estimates or the number of rail boardings (in the case of
actual figures). This cost-effectiveness measure differs from the one
Table 5.1
Costs, Annual Ridership and Cost-Effectiveness Index
(Various Years and Transit Systems)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Capital Operating Annual Annl'n Cost- Cost-
Costs Costs Ridership factor effct. effct.
Estimates Estimates Estimates (life= index index
Transit Proposal (000's) (000's) (000's) 30 yrs)(curr.) (1987)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Buffalo (76) 336,000 24,400(1) 33,580 0.1061 1.8 3.8
Buffalo (78) 449,800 24,400(1) 23,725 0.1061 3.0 6.4
Buffalo (87)(2) 551,800 11,555 8,400 0.1061 8.3 8.3
Santa Clara (81) 180,044 8,786 13,080 0.1061 2.1 2.6
Santa Clara (84a)(3) 372,000(4) 8,786(5) 6,000 0.1061 8.0 8.2
Santa Clara (84b)(3) 411,000 8,786(5) 6,000 0.1061 8.7 8.9
Santa Clara (87) 559,000 8,786 6,000 0.1061 11.3 11.3
Boston (feasib.84) 181,200(6) 16,250 2,505 0.1061 14.2 14.9
Boston (87) 360,975 17,885 3,936 0.1061 14.3 14.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The years after the name of the case study refer to the year of
publication of the technical report related to that case study (see
Technical Documentation).
1 Buffalo 76 and 78 operating costs include the costs associated with
the extensions to the bus system that would be necessary to serve the
LRRT stations.
2 Buffalo 87 are actual figures.
3 Santa Clara 84 ridership is an revised estimate (from an 1987 report).
4 Santa Clara 84a capital costs are those for the project without the
transit mall.
5 Santa Clara 84 and 87 operating costs are assumed similar to those in
the 1981 report.
6 Boston 84 capital costs do not include land acquisition costs,
engineering, administration and contingency costs.
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suggested by UMTA in two elements: (a) the numerator considers neither the
time savings for existing riders nor the local contribution to the project,
and (b) ridership refers to total ridership and rail boardings rather than
net new riders (i.e., net of those that would take place in the base (TSM)
alternative). The first element tends to yield values that are higher for
the measure included in table 5.1; the second tends to yield values that
are lower. Nevertheless, the figure illustrates how the cost-effectiveness
measure increases dramatically from initial proposals to later reports. In
the case of Boston, the high value of the cost-effectiveness measure is
probably another (unspoken) reason for the major difficulties the project
is having in obtaining federal funds (and definitely one major reason for
the increase in the local share above the statutory one) 201.
The cost-effectiveness performance is not the only cost-related
criterion that is considered in the decision. The studies usually advocate
capital-intensive projects, such as LRT systems, on the basis that these
systems would yield higher benefits due to their lower operating costs.
The belief is that normalized values of operating-costs (i.e., operating
costs per passenger, passenger mile, revenue vehicle, revenue vehicle mile,
etd.) are much lower for capital-intensive systems. As a consequence of
the lower normalized operating costs, total (normalized) annual costs
(i.e., operating costs and annualized capital costs) are likely to be lower
for capital-intensive projects. This belief generates some rather
optimistic expectations about the performance of the system. Table 5.2 and
201 UMTA regulations set a maximum (conservative) value of $10.0 for the
cost-effectiveness measure (that, as has been said, is calculated in a
manner different from the one shown in figure 5.2).
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5.3 illustrate this situation for the U.S. cases. The systems planned
usually are presented with operating statistics where normalized costs are
expected to be lower that those of other systems. Actually, an interesting
situation takes place. On the one hand, operating costs per revenue
vehicle tend to be close to the maximum figure for existing systems while
operating costs per revenue vehicle-mile tend to be lower than the minimum
figure for existing systems. This situation seems to suggest that
operating costs tend to be underestimated and the estimated number of
vehicles for operating the system tends to be underestimated as well (which
reduces the amount to be spent on capital costs).
Furthermore, as passenger demand is overestimated, operating
statistics based on demand estimates put capital-intensive systems at an
advantage. However, if the estimated demand is not realized, those
operating-performance indicators do not hold true any longer. Thus,
another important element on the basis of which decisions are made tends to
be unrealistic. Nevertheless, these performance indicators constitute an
additional powerful argument to favor particular technologies and put the
project forward.
In conclusion, this section has illustrated how the need to justify
the project on the basis of a particular set of criteria mobilizes the
decision-making and analysis processes in an attempt to prove the
worthiness of the alternative that, from the outset, has received the
strongest preferences. Once the performance thresholds (in terms of cost-
effectiveness measures, for example) comply with specific criteria, the
alternative can pass the test of the higher-level institution and the final
decision can be made on the selection of the preferred alternative. An
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agreement must then be reached with the funding institution to proceed into
preliminary engineering and on which percentage of the final capital costs
will be covered by that institution.
Table 5.2
Comparative statistics from several systems in the U.S.
(Fiscal year ending between 01/01/83 and 12/31/83)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total Tot. oper. Vehicle
revenue expenses revenue
Commuter rail systems vehicles ($000) miles
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pittsburgh PAT 12 $1,924.1 290,444
Detroit SEMTA 35 $2,846.2 157,872
Chicago RTA 1,023 $194,738.6 19,447,773
Newark NJT Corp. 1,206 $131,460.0 27,526,438
Boston MBTA 259 $44,882.6 7,202,999
Philadelphia SEPTA 726 $63,079.3 15,458,068
5----------------------------------------------------------
Boston Old Colony Project (87) 90 $17,885.5 3,866,449
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total
revenue
Light rail systems vehicles
San Diego Trolley 24
Newark NJT Corp. 26
New Orleans RTA 35
Cleveland RTA 48
Pittsburgh PAT 87
San Francisco MUNI 140
Boston MBTA 229
Philadelphia SEPTA 313
Buffalo LRRT (76) 47
Buffalo LRRT (87) 27
Santa Clara County LRT (86) 50
Tot. oper.
expenses
(000)
$4,200.6
$3,074.3
$4,323.5
$7,103.1
$15,358.6
$29,815.0
$17,564.3
$37,960.3
$4,620.0
$11,555.0
Vehicle
revenue
miles
1,587,443
576,314
609,754
1,054,202
1,088,214
4,001,576
1,544,505
5 , 559 , 584
6,250,000
N/A
$8,786.0 2,727,300
Passenger
miles
35,124,848
6,269,587
16,768,515
37,155,164
18,534,793
140,340,497
30,384,581
108,088,997
88,320,000
N/A
N/A
Sources: U.S.
N/A:
DOT, Annual Operating Statistics, Section
not available
1984
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Table 5.3
Comparative indicators from several systems in the U.S.
(Fiscal year ending between 01/01/83 and 12/31/83)
Operating
cost per
revenue
vehicle
Commuter rail systems (000's)
Pittsburgh PAT $160.3
Detroit SEMTA $81.3
Chicago RTA $190.4
Newark NJT Corp. $109.0
Boston MBTA $173.3
Philadelphia SEPTA $86.9
Average $133.5
St. Dev. $42.9
Minimum $81.3
Maximum $190.4
Boston Old Colony Project (87) $198.7
Boston Old Colony Project (adjusted) $186.7
Operating
cost per Operating
revenue cost per
vehicle passenger
Light rail systems ($000) mile
San Diego Trolley
Newark NJT Corp.
New Orleans RTA
Cleveland RTA
Pittsburgh PAT
San Francisco MUNI
Boston MBTA
Philadelphia SEPTA
Average
St. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
Buff-alo LRRT (76 ) -
Buffalo LRRT (76, adj.)
Buffalo LRRT (87)
Santa Clara LRT (86)
Santa Clara LRT (86, adj.
$175.0
$118.2
$123.5
$148.0
$176.5
$213.0
$76.7
$121.3
$144.0
$40.2
$76.7
$213.0
$98.3
$164.4
$428.0
$175.7
) $169.0
Operating
cost per
revenue
vehicle
mile
$6.62
$18.03
$10.01
$4.78
$6.23
$4.08
$8.29
$4.74
$4.08
$18.03
$4.63
$4.35
Operating
cost per
revenue
vehicle
mile
$0.12 $2.65
$0.49 $5.33
$0.26 $7.09
$0.19 $6.74
$0.83 $14.11
$0.21 $7.45
$0.58 $11.37
$0.35 $6.83
$0.38 $7.70
$0.22 $3.31
$0.12 $2.65
$0.83 $14.11
$0.05 $0.74
$0.08 $1.24
N/A N/A
N/A $3.22
N/A $3.10
Sources: U.S. DOT, ibid. (1984), and own calculations.
-------------
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5.4. Difficulties and Issues
This section discusses those difficulties and issues that influence
how the decision-making process is undertaken. They aid in understanding
the reasons for some of the features of the process discussed in the
previous section (that may prevent an attempt to carry out a process that
follows the normative framework presented in section 5.2.2). These
difficulties and issues have implications on how we must view the decision-
making process and how we should devise ways to improve it (as will be
discussed in chapter 6). Three major elements are included: the types of
problems, the nature of information, and organizational issues.
5.4.1. Types of Problems
The literature on decision making highlights the differences between
types of problems and the different responses they should require from
decision makers. Ungson, et. al. [1981] discuss the issue of well-
structured versus ill-structured problems and indicate that certain types
of problems can be described as ill-structured due to (1) the ambiguity and
incompleteness of the problem-related information, (2) the extent to which
those problems are continually defined and redefined, (3) the lack of a
clear program for the desired outcomes, (4) the possibility of influences
from many actors or institutions, and (5) the extended period in which the
decision is made.
The cost estimating process in transportation planning conforms
largely to these characteristics. The case studies clearly illustrated
that (1) it is hard to gather all the information necessary (at least at
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the planning stage) for all the possible alternatives; (2) the scope of
transit projects, affecting at the same time several communities and
horizontal and vertical government layers, calls for a constant
redefinition of the design characteristics of the alternatives; (3) the
existence of many interested parties with a stake in the outcome of the
process fosters the development of formal and informal influences and
pressures; and (4) the development of a transit project, from its
conception to final approval and implementation, may take more than a
decade 202
The ill-structured nature of the planning process -- and of its
estimating component -- is compounded by the public nature of its context.
Decision problems in public agencies are, in that regard, much more complex
than in private organizations 20. This is the case because public
agencies must weigh the decision in terms of some comprehensive system of
public or community values (while private organizations are expected to
take into consideration only those consequences of the decision which
affect the organization alone).
Also, the decision maker cannot simplify the hypothetical conditions
assumed to calculate the estimates, no matter how much this difficulty
complicates the problem of selecting the "optimal" alternative, and cannot
disregard conditioning facts or consequences simply because they fall
202 For instance, Buffalo's LRRT took 16 years from initial plans to final
construction. Santa Clara County's LRT took about the same period of
time. Boston's initial proposals for the rehabilitation of the
commuter rail line already started in the mid-1970s, although the
formal proposals were not submitted to the state legislature until
1984.
203 Simon [1976], page 69.
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outside the scope of a particular project or the decision-maker's interests
204. (For instance, economic conditions or citizens complains cannot be
isolated from the process of planning and selecting the "optimal" transit
alternative.) Further complications are introduced if more than one
individual is involved, for in this case the stakes and decisions of the
other individuals ought to be included among the conditions which decision
makers must consider in reaching a decision. For instance, the cases
illustrated the give-and-take nature of the funding process, whereby
decisions along the process were reached after an iterative process between
the different actors involved. This does not mean that a final -- mutually
agreeable -- decision is always possible but that the process is
complicated by the existence of several individuals with a stake in the
outcome.
Decisions are also largely influenced by decision makers' perceptions
of the problem and of the impact of the decisions on the relevant
constituencies. In addition, decision makers develop impressions from
their previous experiences and use them whenever they perceive they are
applicable. It is in this context in which decision makers may be willing
to obscure the kinds of alternatives available because they already have a
solution in mind (as was largely the situation in the five case studies
investigated in this thesis).
In these cases where the decision has already been made, independently
of the analysts' work on the problem, a common and legitimate purpose of
the analysis process is to justify decisions after they have already been
204 This is in contrast to a purely scientific problem where the
analyst/decision maker can chose to study only those consequences of
the system he/she wishes to be concerned with.
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made. However, this situation places a strong constraint on the analyst
who should ensure that the analysis is honestly reported and that elements
of it that might argue against what has been previously decided are not
distorted or suppressed. This is hardly ever an easy situation.
5.4.2. Decision-Making and Information
In the light of the conditions indicated in the previous section,
decision makers receive considerable amounts of information about the state
of the world in addition to the purely technical one. This situation has
led to the development of analytical decision aids as a way of easing the
requirements over the decision-making process (with a tendency to focus on
building models based on theories of rational choices). Inevitably,
simplification becomes necessary and some sources of information receive
more attention than others, depending upon the requirements for making the
decision and the demands of the organizational/ bureaucratic structure 205
The use of cost-effectiveness criteria responds to these needs and its
simplicity. Yet, it is possible that the type of information the decision
needs to focus on does not consitute the most convenient criteria 206
This difficulty is usually present in those situations, as the one
205 Mintzberg, et. al. [1976]. These authors stress the importance of
paying attention to how individuals process information in
organizational contexts, with particular emphasis on how their
reactions to demands imposed by the organizational structure.
206 Ungson, et. al. [1981] indicate that the payback model in capital
budgeting decisions has been used extensively in spite of the
availability of better models. This is the case, they argue, because
the time required to achieve satisfactory returns on investment may
indeed be more accessible to a descision-maker's short-term "cognitive
storage" than other criteria such as the present value of future
income.
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discussed in this thesis, in which a single attribute or dimension tends to
dominate, but uncertainty -- and the ill-structured nature of the problem -
- makes the choice difficult.
The relevance of information as the link between the different steps
of the planning process is unavoidable and is one of the most powerful
components. The difficulties of the decision-making process and how they
are addressed influence decision makers' attitudes toward information. In
turn, information affects those difficulties, closing a circle which can
easily become a vicious one. Two main factors can make the activity of
generating and acquiring information highly unrealiable: (1) the failure to
recognize its relevance in the decision-making process, and (2) its
distorted generation. Both factors were present in the case studies as,
respectively, (1) decision makers and analysts mostly viewed the planning
process as a requirement to satisfy the needs of the bureaucratic
structures and (2) the consistent underestimation of costs revealed.
Adams and Swanson [1976] discuss the issue of accuracy in the
operations-management estimating process (e.g., PERT and CPM techniques)
and indicate that uncontrollable factors (e.g., political delays, strikes)
have a much smaller impact on accuracy than is generally believed. They
indicate that accuracy is positively related to the amount of information.
Furthermore, this amount is related to -- what they called -- decision
maker talent and perception of the importance of accurate estimates.
(These last two factors are, in turn, positively related to each other.)
The authors conclude that formal feedback to inform the estimator about the
accuracy of his estimates should be beneficial and that rewards can also
help.
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The importance of the estimate as perceived by the decision maker
should determine his motivation and the amount of effort he is willing to
spend in the search for accuracy. This perception is almost certain to be
affected by a variety of conditions in the decision environment, such as
the resources available to carry out the technical process, the possibility
of being overburdened with information, or that information may become
dysfunctional to the decision objectives (e.g., reach a compromise among
several constituencies). These conditions are the ones that may sometimes
lead to maintain -- or even increase -- uncertainty and, consequently, to
increase the likelihood of generating inaccurate estimates.
5.4.3. Organizational Issues
Some organizational issues refer to the layout of the institutional
framework, the responsibilities of each institution, and the consequent
demands upon those institutions. In the case of Madrid, the central
government backed the funding of the whole project and a "state-like"
government agency was in charge of undertaking the planning process; in
Boston, a metropolitan agency reporting to state legislature and the state
Department of Transportation was in charge of leading the planning process
while the federal government could possibly contribute funds to the
construction of the selected alternative; in Buffalo, the involvement of
the state was somewhat lower than in Boston (although, at the congressional
level, the state representatives made a difference) and the federal
government provided the largest percentage of funds for the construction of
the LRRT system; in Santa Clara County, the involvement of the state was
even lower (to the point of opposing the local initiatives) and the federal
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government again covered most of the capital costs associated with the
construction of the LRT line.
As was mentioned before, these different responsibilities create some
difficulties in the technical process for it must respond to the
requirements of the different audiences. But it also creates difficulties
in the decision-making process. For instance, as the institutions have
responsibilities over several geographical jurisdictions, the decision
makers may have to try and provide some "jurisdictional" equity with the
construction of the transit facility (as in the cases of Boston and Madrid
where plans were geared towards areas that lacked the transportation
infrastructure existing in other parts of the metropolitan areas). These
organizational requirements, however, do not necessarily translate into the
selection of the most cost-effective alternative, nor do they easily allow
the design of alternatives involving an approach of incremental
construction (that would permit more flexibility in allocating funds to
cover capital costs).
Another organizational issue pertains to the role of the institutions
in charge of carrying out the technical elements of cost estimating and the
relationship among them and with the rest of the institutions involved in
the broader planning process. Usually, the scale of the projects that are
the subject of this thesis requires the involvement of several institutions
and, mainly, of consultants outside the public transit agency. In the case
of Boston, the technical studies were done by an outside consulting firm
coordinating the efforts of several others consulting firms each one in
charge of a different technical element. The transportation agency
supervised the consultant's work. After the construction of the project by
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contracting with other companies, the transit agency will be in charge of
operating the new facility. The number of institutions involved creates
some discontinuity in the process.
This discontinuity, however, is unavoidable as some institutions,
e.g., the transit agencies, do not have the capability of carrying out the
studies themselves. Each one needs the other. For instance, the
consultant must get information from the transit agency to calculate some
productivity values and particularly operating costs. Also, the
organizational setting of assigning different teams of analysts different
tasks, creates some mismatches.
5.4.4. Other Issues
Another issue in the decision-making process is the extent to which
decision makers fully consider the consequences of their decisions. Some
authors have examined specific ways in which the higher-level subsidies for
transport projects (and transit operation) have distorted decision making,
reduced efficiency, and increased costs 207. These authors state that, in
the U.S., with large federal subsidies, state and local decision makers
consider only the small portion of costs that they have to bear and thus
tend to underestimate the full costs of transit projects. Subsidies also
create an incentive to construct new systems, the benefits of which fall
far short of total costs yet exceed local costs. Pucher [1988] asserts
that countries where both decision making and financing are decentralized
to the local of provincial level or government display considerably higher
207 For instance, Pucher [1988]; Pickrell [1985]; Pucher, et. al. [1983];
Altshuler [1979]; and Hamer [1976].
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productivity and lower unit costs than those countries where the central
government plays the dominant role. For large transit projects, however,
full decentralization may not be possible because regional or local
institutions may lack the funds to construct those projects even if they
are truly necessary. Some approach to internalization of costs in the
decision is recommendable to force decision-makers to balance the
consequences of their decisions to a greater extent and to promote
sensitivity to the different needs and conditions of each area.
A final issue is that the project-planning process often goes from
design to cost; in other words, first one decides what is wanted -- e.g.,
an LRT system -- and then one calculates how much it would cost to
construct what is wanted (trying to find the lowest cost for the
alternative selected). An alternative approach is "design-to-cost"; in
other words, to select that project that best fits the resources available.
Both approaches require a form of cost estimating. Neither would prevent
underestimation. However, the emphasis changes. The latter approach is
more difficult than the simple process of defining an alternative and
estimating its cost because it requires an iterative process of defining-
estimating-redefining-reestimating, and so on until the alternative can be
accomplished with the funds allocated. It is also more difficult because
the amount of resources available is seldom known in advance. On the
positive side, a "design-to-cost" approach helps to internalize costs into
the decision-making process, since, from the outset, decision makers are
aware of the level of resources available.
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5.5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has covered the issues of cost-estimating related to the
decision-making process. After a brief discussion of decision making
theory and the presentation of those particular characteristics that apply
to the decision-making process in transportation planning, this chapter
presented the decision-making context and how it can affect the cost-
estimating process.
The importance of the decision criteria used to rate the alternatives,
the need to acknowledge multiple perspectives involved in the process, and
the difficulties that surround decision-makers' responsibilities
illustrated the issues that frame the prevalent decision-making process.
The way information is perceived by decision makers affects its use and how
much effort is put into making it as accurate as possible. This creates a
reinforcing circle where the difficulties decision-makers find in the
process are affected by their attitudes towards information - - i.e., the
results of the technical analysis -- , attitudes that in themselves affect
how the difficulties are overcome.
The next section puts all these elements together and those discussed
in chapter 4 to generate a framework for the analysis of the cost
estimating process in transportation planning and suggest some specific
ways that attempt to address the difficulties and issues that prevent the
achievement of a "better" decision-making process.
6. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER:
A FRAMEWORK FOR COST ESTIMATING
6.1. The Interaction between the Technical
and the Decision Making Processes
The discussion of the elements of the decision making process supports
the thesis that, unlike other aspects of the human activity, such as
scientific experiments, the technical analysis in transportation planning
does not and cannot take place in isolation and is very much influenced by
the decision-making process. Furthermore, the context within which the
analysis takes place (and capital and operating costs are estimated) --
institutional/organizational setting, decision criteria, etc. -- affects
the credibility, accuracy, and usefulness of that analysis (and of those
estimates) in the planning and development stages of the project.
The assertion that the technical and decision making processes are not
isolated but interconnected was strongly supported by the interviews
undertaken with both analysts and decision makers involved in the cases
presented in chapter 3. Individuals at all levels indicated how both
processes feed each other, so that each can "learn" from the other. It is
in this learning process as well that the processes influence each other
that detaches them from a purely rational interpretation.
Four major dimensions can be singled out as influencing the
interaction between the technical and decision-making processes: (a) the
inherent limitations of the technical analysis, (b) the unstructured nature
of the decision problem, (c) the organizational setting, and (d) the type
of environment surrounding the transportation planning process.
(a) In the technical process, there exist limitations on how much can be
accomplished and at which level of detail, due to both time and budget
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constraints. At the stage of analyzing alternatives, many elements
cannot be known with complete certainty (e.g., the underground
conditions in the corridor, or the percentage of funds to be received
from high-level institutions). The lack of certainty clears the way
for the presence of ambiguity in both the design of the proposals and
the objectives to be achieved with them. Ambiguity allows the
different actors and, particularly, decision makers to portray their
proposals as plausible means of achieving a set of specified
objectives. Study constraints and uncertainty also force the type of
analysis to become more a feasibility study (worthwhileness of any
project among a specific set of projects, following a satisficing
approach) rather than an optimization exercise (the selection of the
best facility in terms of mode and size).
(b) Moreover, in the technical process, the estimation of capital and
operating costs involves a myriad of (cost) elements some of which
almost everything is known about (e.g., the number of miles of track
that must be provided between two particular points in the study
corridor) while others are open to several design alternatives (e.g.,
the kind of station to be constructed at a particular point). In
addition, some of them depend on other variables, namely the daily
demand in the corridor, and therefore their design must be
accommodated to the estimated values for those variables. Due to
these types of variables, the process of estimating capital and
operating costs fits the picture of a rather structured process (the
techniques and steps are usually fairly specific and agreed upon)
crowded with unstructured elements. Analysts must address these
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elements through communication with the decision making process which,
in principle, represents the link that channels the opinion of outside
interested parties into the technical process. This link is
delineated both formally through statutory regulations and informally
through the stakes decision makers have in the process (e.g.,
reelection, yielding to pressures from interested parties, or just
personal satisfaction).
(c) Both technical analysts and decision makers belong to organizations
(even if these organizations have a congregation of one, i.e.,
themselves). The organizational structure of the technical analysis
can affect the final outcome of the cost estimation process (and that
of the planning process, in general). For instance, the interest in
building a particular mode by the decision makers could encourage a
stronger focus on that particular mode, with more resources assigned
to the analysis of that mode and less detailed and specific
examination of other alternatives. Furthermore, how the analysis fits
the goals of the analysts' and decision makers' organizations and the
incentives present to influence their behavior animate the
presentation of the final results with its potential biases.
(d) Lastly, the type of environment surrounding the planning process
affects where the emphasis would be put in the analysis process. For
instance, the increasing attention to environmental impacts in the
U.S. has taken away resources from other elements of the technical
process, particularly cost estimation, and channeled them into the
analysis of environmental concerns or the conduct of community
hearings. To compound this situation, the fewer resources must
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confront the additional requirements put on the cost estimation
process generated by the increasing attention to environmental
impacts. At a broader level, how the higher levels of government
perceive their responsibilities in planning and funding public
transportation projects further influences how the process is
undertaken and for which reasons. For instance, in the U.S., the
federal process, with its emphasis on cost-effectiveness measures, is
seen by the applicants mostly as a bureaucratic hurdle that must be
overcome to secure federal funding, not as a real opportunity to make
the best decision.
6.2. General Framework
The four dimensions discussed in the previous section rest under the
influence of a similar number of forces/actors: the environment, the
analysts, the decision makers, and the funding institutions. The
discussion of the role and stakes of these actors leads the way to the
introduction, first, of the general framework, and, second, the analytical
framework. The framework attempts to reconcile and account for the
different perspectives on the transportation planning and decision-making
processes examined in chapters 2 and 5. After the presentation of the
analytical framework, this chapter also includes a discussion of how this
framework would translate into operational actions.
Figure 6.1 shows a schematic representation of the general analytical
framework.
The general framework identifies four major forces/actors in the
planning and, particularly, cost estimation process: environment (in a
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broader sense, encompassing from technical elements to interest groups,
etc.), analysts, decision makers, and funding institutions. The fuzzy line
separating analysts and decision makers, and the organizations they are
part of, indicates that the separation is not clear cut but rather that
communication exists between both sides. In fact, in some situations, the
organization is the same, with open communication between analysts and
decision makers. (For instance, in the case of Buffalo, the technical
Figure 6.1
General Framework
Environment
- Provider of information
- Generator of problems ("needs")
- Definition of scope
- Constraints: institutional, technological,
political
Organization
(Analytical)
- What is at stake ?
- Constraints on level of detail
- Constraints on technology
- Organizational goals
Analyst
- Personal characteristics
Organization
(Decision-Making)
- What is at stake ?
- Constraints from members
- Organizational goals
Decision maker
- Personal characteristics
Funding Institutions
- Philosophy (goals)
- Procedural requirements (thresholds)
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analysis for the calculation of the operating costs was done in-house by
members of the decision-makers' organization -- i.e., the Niagara Frontier
Transportation Authority).
The environment provides information to the process. This information
is in the form of problems (or "needs", being "needs" the perception of the
problems by the actors who are part of the environment), resources (e.g.,
data to solve the "needs"), and constraints. Constraints come in the form
of institutional constraints (e.g., legal constraints), political
constraints (e.g., some proposals may not entail the necessary political
appeal to ensure their implementation or may disproportionally and
negatively affect some sectors of the population), or technological
constraints (e.g., certain technologies cannot be applied to a particular
corridor at reasonable costs due to topographical conditions).
How "needs" are defined affects the scope of the project and who will
ultimately be affected and have a stake in the process. For instance, if
the problem is regarded as congestion on a particular road and the "need"
is perceived solely as relief of congestion, the (geographic) scope would
be limited to the corridor in the vicinities of the road and probably those
areas beyond, but close to, that road. If the problem however is defined
as the need to relief congestion on a road for the purposes of helping the
construction of another major road in another section of the metropolitan
area (like in the case of Boston), the scope is enlarged and the interested
parties would include a much broader range of individuals, community
groups, and institutions.
The environment encompasses three parties: the analysts, the decision
makers, and the funding institutions. Each of these elements are
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influenced by the environment and perceive that environment in different
ways. In the end, what each party will try to do is to affect the vision
of the other parties on the transportation problem (or "need") so that a
common enough ground is laid out to proceed with the construction -- or not
construction -- of a particular transit project.
The analyst belongs to an organization. This organization, a
consultant firm or a transit operator, would constraint how the analyst
acts by forcing him to perform in certain ways if he wants to stay in the
organization 208. Constraints also exist on the level of detail of the
analytical study. This level of detail depends, among other things, on how
much is at stake for the analyst, the uncertainty associated with
particular variables, the pressure generated by community concerns, and,
indirectly, what the decision maker is asking for and how he perceives the
technical process 209.
The decision maker also belongs to an organization. His beliefs will
tend to support the status or enhacement of the organization through
strategical and political gains, and at the same time achieve personal
advancement 210. The members of the organization (as well as other
individuals outside the organization) would also play their game and
therefore constrain the maneuverability of the decision maker. In
208 Although this situation has not been present in any of the case
studies, there have been other instances where analysts had to abandon
the organization due to their disagreement with how the technical
analysis was being undertaken. (See, for instance, the situation
cited in Wachs [1985b], page 248.)
209 See also section 4.3.
210 Allison [1974] provides an explanation of a single event, i.e., the
crisis generated by the installation of Russian missiles in Cuba, from
the rational, personal, and political perspectives.
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addition, the explicit and implicit organizational goals will also
gravitate over the decision maker as he makes up his mind about a
particular decision.
Analysts and decision makers have in addition some personal
characteristics that would affect their individual behavior and the
relationship between them. Their behavior would very much depend on how
the analyst and the decision maker perceive what is at stake by following
one or another course of action. For instance, the congnitive style of
decision makers can vary from highly analytic to strongly heuristic. The
former will look more at quatitative information, while the latter is
interested in broader concepts and would make decisions based more on his
intuition about how to solve the problem. Consequently, depending on the
cognitive style, the decision maker would tend to influence more or less
the analysis process or would trust more that process and let himself be
influenced by it.
Finally, the funding institutions, also immersed within the
environment, have a philosophy (or culture) that favors one or another type
of reasoning as to how the technical analysis should be done, and the types
of projects that should be undertaken and for which reasons. To accomplish
these goals, these institutions establish some requirements for the
technical process to follow, as well as thresholds that must be surpassed
to prove the worthwhileness of the transit alternative so that this
alternative can continue to be developed as specified in the bureaucratic
(administrative) process towards its final implementation.
Based on this general framework and the four dimensions that influence
the interaction between the technical and decision-making processes, four
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main elements compose the analytical framework. First, as it relates to
the environment and the limitations of the technical analysis, the
uncertainty associated with the components of the general framework affects
the behavior and results of the process. Second, as it relates to the
analyst and the unstructured nature of the elements included in the transit
facility -- and of the goals to be addressed by that facility -- , the
planning process is affected by technical problems (e.g., data collection
problems, limits on analytical techniques, etc.), and the definition of the
boundaries of the project (i.e., scale frames and scope of the project).
Third, as it relates to decisions made during the technical process and the
organizational setting, the final results (to be announced after the
technical process is completed) would likely be balanced against what is at
stake and the incentives analysts and decision makers have to favor or
discredit a particular course of action. Finally, as it relates to the
relation of both analysts and decision makers to the funding institutions
and the types of environments, the decision criteria influences which
variables and arguments are put forward and which have more possibilities
of being used as tools for hedging in the light of uncertainty.
6.3. Derivation of Analytical Framework
The next sections develop the four components of the analytical
framework at length. Each section includes: (a) description of the
component, (b) identification of the different types or elements of that
component, (c) discussion of the implications of the component for the
rational planning paradigm, and (d) review of the ways that component can
be influenced by specific actors involved in the transportation planning
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process.
6.3.1. Perspectives on uncertainty
Uncertainty can be defined as the attribute associated with something
(e.g., the number of transit vehicles) that is subject to chance or change
because its definition cannot be known in advance. Cost estimates are
calculated based on either historical records or engineering estimation
techniques. Each element has associated a level of uncertainty. The
overall uncertainty of capital and operating costs comes from the
uncertainty associated with each of the elements that influence the final
calculation of those costs.
In chapter 4, the presentation of the technical cost estimation
process -- summarized in figure 4.1 -- illustrated how the final capital
costs depend on the level of demand whose value has associated a
considerable level of uncertainty and that, in its turn, depends on other
uncertain values such as the socio-economic characteristics of the region,
technological advances, or even the tastes of the population. In the case
of operating costs, demand also affects the uncertainty of the final
figures, and so do productivity levels and the general behavior of the
economy in the future (in terms of inflation, interest rates, etc.).
There are several ways to categorize uncertainty 211. For the
211 There is a common distinction between descriptive and measurement
uncertainty, the former being that related to which elements should be
included, the latter being that related to how to measure the selected
elements. Mahmassani [1984] categorizes uncertainty in five groups:
(1) the unknown, (2) the occurrence of exogenous events, (3) the
randomness in values of impacts, (4) the vagueness in definition of
criteria, and (5) the uncertainty on which criteria and trade-offs we
are going to use to decide among alternatives. Christensen [1985]
classifies uncertainty in four groups depending on how much the actors
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purposes of the cost estimation process, uncertainty can be divided into
three categories, according to the degree of avoidability of the
uncertainty associated with a particular variable or component:
o Inevitable (or unavoidable) uncertainty relates to those variables,
such as travel parameters (e.g., trips per capita) and, consequently,
demand, or inflation, for which we cannot in advance know everything
with complete certainty. There is nothing much the analyst can do
about reducing this uncertainty except for aknowledging it and
approaching it from a multiple-scenario perspective within which
several plausible futures and different assumptions for each of these
futures are developed 212*
o Actionable uncertainty relates to those variables for which we can, to
some extent, improve the uncertainty of some of their components by
'affording ground for an action." For instance, we could ideally set,
regardless of demand, a price level to achieve some level of revenues.
Or we could establish an operating plan for the proposed transit
alternatives such that operating costs are kept to a certain level
(within a more limited range of the uncertainty inevitably associated
with these costs) and regardless of demand.
o Avoidable uncertainty relates to variables for which we can avoid the
in the planning process agree on the means (technology) or ends
(goals) for a particular project. Friend and Hickling [1987] prefer
to categorize uncertainty by those areas upon which the response that
can be taken varies: uncertainties about the working environment,
uncertainties about the guiding values, and uncertainties about
related decisions. The classification presented here draws largely
upon a combination of those suggested by Mahmassani (levels of
uncertainty) and Friend and Hickling (possibilities of response).
212 See Pearman [1988] for a description of methods of scenario
construction suitable for transportation planning applications.
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uncertainty related to the elements that influence that variable. For
this last category we can distinguish between non-analytic (or
negotiated) and analytic uncertainty. The former relates to variables
like government and other funds for which we could, from the outset,
know through negotiations or contracts what percentage of the capital
and/or operating costs the transit operator would be able to secure.
The latter relates to variables like productivity or unit costs for
which we can, by collecting additional information, reduce uncertainty
to an acceptable level. The tradeoff between how much time, effort
(including political leverage), or resources we can spent on reducing
the uncertainty related to these variables versus what we perceive we
can gain from that reduction would determine how much the avoidable
type of uncertainty would be reduced.
The classification illustrates that additional information can reduce
uncertainty, but not impose certainty. (Moreover, how much the analyst can
spend on acquiring additional information is always limited.) Also,
decision makers may prefer to maintain uncertainty to some levels -- of the
actionable or non-analytic types, in particular -- for the ambiguity
created by the existence of uncertainty can give them the political
leverage needed to reach compromise and negotiate with the different
interested parties 21.
The classification further suggests that policies that aim to
establish narrow criteria -- that is, criteria that focus on a small and
very specific predefined set of variables and their values -- for the
213 For a more detailed discussion of the role of ambiguity in policy
analysis see Stone [1988], pp. 123-126.
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purpose of accepting or rejecting projects may not be advisable. On one
hand, narrow criteria can help reduce uncertainty as to what conditions a
project must satisfy to gain final approval. On the other, if criteria are
very narrow, problems may likely arise in terms of achieving cooperation
and compromise, encompassing a variety of concerns, and avoiding biases.
For instance, the surge of environmental issues in transportation planning
has increased the uncertainty and ambiguity of the process but, on the
other hand, has provided the opportunity that allows the dialogue and the
building of constituencies, bringing together people with different wishes
and political interests. A criteria for evaluation purposes based on cost-
effectiveness measures cannot easily incorporate these issues and would
reduce the possibilities of a productive dialogue 2. This suggestion
does not provide a clear indication of which range of criteria should be
used and when those criteria are sufficiently wide to prevent biases and
encompass the variety of concerns. Nevertheless, it further suggests that
the planning process will have to put more emphasis on the basis upon which
each individual project would be evaluated rather than to establish, from
the outset, a unique yardstick for all them.
6.3.2. The Planning Environment (Technical Issues)
The technical process has other determinants, besides the inherent
uncertainty of the variables, that create additional difficulties in
accurately estimating the capital and operating costs of a transit
214 In the U.S. cases, participants complained about the federal emphasis
on cost-effectiveness criteria indicating that those criteria reflect
a narrow focus -- some said "East-Coast mentality" -- as they cannot
incorporate concerns that vary widely from some regions of the country
to others.
- 251 -
facility. Two of them are the effects of the perspectives of the actors
involved in the process and the effects of the information gathering and
manipulation activities. (Chapter 4 highlighted and discussed other
difficulties and issues related to the attempt, in the analysis process, of
achieving more accurate cost estimates.)
The first determinant affects the coordination between what the
technical process is trying to address and the broader social and political
environment. For instance, the decision maker must pay attention to other
perspectives in addition to the rational-technical process, such as the
socio-political environment and the organizational conditions. The pace of
these broader processes -- i.e., how fast events related to these processes
occur -- would likely differ from that of the technical process. If this
process goes behind the broader processes, it would become sidetracked and
used just as a justification to the decisions made largely outside the
technical sphere.
The second determinant involves a methodological question. Costing
methodology is simple, but lengthy, particularly for operating costs.
Changes may require to look back at a whole series of operating strategies,
productivity assumptions, and unit cost measures. If for whatever reasons
the cost of the project changes along the way, the technical process may be
unable to incorporate those changes and become outdated. This conflict
arises from the frequently static nature of the technical process and the
dynamism of the environment surrounding it. When that happens, the length
of the process and the resources already spent create a drag (for political
and emotional reasons) that easily prevents efforts to reconsider major
components of the analytical study.
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Time and Scale Frames (project scope)
Analysts, decision makers, and funding institutions have different
time frames, scale frames, and overall perspectives. As to time frames,
some focus on the short term (e.g., the benefits in the first ten years
after the construction of the facility are very limited and the operating
costs very high, hence the system is not good), others in the long term
(e.g., the benefits will accrue as changes in land use will improve the
conditions of the city core, revitalizing it and restoring its centrality).
As to scale frames, some focus on small scale effects (e.g., the system
will improve my trip time downtown), others focus on a larger scale (e.g.,
the system will bring people from outside counties into downtown). As to
overall perspectives, the higher-level institutions may contend that their
role relates more to balancing the national budget and transit projects do
not fall within those concerns since those kind of projects are geared to
addressing local problems; the regional institutions may contend that
cities are strong elements of the national economy and therefore the
higher-level institutions should contribute to the construction of large
projects that can help improve environmental conditios and reduce energy
consumption; and local governments may contend that by themselves they are
unable to undertake such large invesments although they must provide for
the needs of its citizens (and in addition bring jobs and higher-level
funds, if possible).
These different frames affect the technical analysis because the
inevitable large number of interested parties makes harder for that
analysis to address all the issues that may be raised, and because decision
makers need to account for all the concerns. The case studies clearly
- 253 -
indicate how changes in the final costs are, in a sizeable percentage, due
to additions or changes in the design of the system. In some cases, some
important components of capital costs were put back and forth along the
process (e.g., the case of La Salle station in Buffalo). As the process
unfolds, community groups perceive the project with a different interest
while the analyst/decision-maker must twist their assumptions to sort out
or fit the demands of most parties (community and funding institutions).
The different frames have led to the consideration of a broad set of
variables. In the U.S., a large proportion of the study resources must be
dedicated to environmental issues, and not so much on costs. For instance,
in the case of Boston, 19 reports were published, with only two directly
related to capital and operating costs. Costs are however an important
element for funding institutions and eventually a major concern after the
system is constructed. Once the system is in place, the affected parties
can get used to noise or vibration (up to a certain limits) but not to
taxes and cost overruns or operating deficits.
Information Systems
The technical process requires large amounts of (cost) data. Some
data can be found cheaply and quickly, and with low uncertainty (e.g., the
cost of a light rail vehicle), while other data are hard to find, and even
if found it has associated a high level of uncertainty (e.g., underground
conditions, or labor costs). Furthermore, once data are organized and
stored, the dynamism of the process requires an adequate design of an
information process that allows the easy maintenance and update of (cost)
data.
The dynamism of the information is hardly recognized, and makes harder
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to address the concerns raised in the previous section (about changes in
the scope of the process) and limits the potential use of information not
only as a decision-support tool but also as a negotiation-argumentation
instrument promoting the dialogue among conflicting views. The case
studies clearly illustrate the limited role of information as merely a tool
for accountability (data bank) and its design as a way to take advantage of
the economies of handling of mathematical operations (routines).
One of the major reasons indicated for the limited role of data as a
decision-support tool is the perception that data lack generality, being
created and manipulated for such a particular case that it does not deserve
to be expanded to achieve a role broader than accountability. This view
prevents the implementation of more powerful, flexible, and dynamic
information systems. Moreover, the cost of establishing and maintaining
large data banks are perceived to be too expensive in the light of its
perceived subsequent low use in the planning process.
These perceptions largely originate in a rationalist view of the
process. The recognition of the limits of this rationalist perspective
would help to recognize that, as Klosterman [1987] indicates, the
information can become "a focus for political dispute, negotiation and
bargaining as participants in the modelling process resolve fundamentally
political questions of identifying the most appropriate data, assumptions,
and results." This approach, however, must be undertaken trying to avoid
endless discussions over minor elements of the technical process 215, and
instead foster the dicussion of assumptions, methods, and facts that
215 The case of La Paz, Bolivia, illustrates how a process can become
bogged down to the discussion of which overall capital costs should be
used as input to the financial analysis model.
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underlie conflicting perspectives on the transit project.
6.3.3. A Decision Model for Cost Underestimation
The past two sections discussed those components of the framework upon
which analysts or the decision makers can act from a technical perspective
(e.g., by reducing uncertainty, developing an information system, etc.).
In this section, the behavior of analysts or decision makers, as they
ponder what to do in the light of their personal goals, the probabilities
of achieving them, and their stakes in the process, is explicitly
incorporated. Through the use of decision analysis tools and the
development of a decision model for cost underestimation, this section
helps understand the interrelationships between the different decisions
that can be made about the study and how probable underestimation can be.
The decision process regarding the choice of analysis method (not the
one related to which alternative to pursue, but to how to carry out the
technical analysis and which costs to announce) can be thought of as the
following: a decision maker wishes to get a particular transit project
approved for particular reasons (e.g., a vision of how the region should
grow, political gains or just personal satisfaction). To do that he hires
a consultant (analyst) who specializes in that kind of project (and
particularly in calculating costs). Because he wishes to avoid the burden
(emotional and monetary costs) involved in carrying out and submitting a
study that will not be approved, the decision maker tells the analyst to
inform him of the progress of his findings before making an announcement of
the technical study. The consultant's previous experience indicates that
his prediction is correct a given percent of the times (for those cases
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when the project is constructed).
In this situation, there are four major components in the cost
estimation process: (a) how much the consultant believes the facility is
going to cost after performing the technical calculations (the consultant's
best guess); (b) how much the consultant (or decision maker) says the
facility is going to cost (regardless of what the consultant believes it is
going to cost); (c) how likely it is that the facility will be constructed;
and (d) how much the facility ends up costing.
Those four components are not independent but interrelated. How
likely it is that the facility will be constructed depends on how much the
facility is expected to cost. We can assume that the likelihood of the
construction depends solely on some specific criteria -- e.g., a cost-
effectiveness index or some other general criteria -- established by a
higher level institution (the funding institution). Approval of the
project, however, is not deterministic but probabilistic for, although the
project may or may not meet those criteria, the construction is not
automatically accepted or rejected but rather depends on many other factors
and particularly on how close the project falls to meet those criteria 216.
The final costs of the facility do not depend on what the consultant
says the facility is going to cost; it depends on the initial design and
other factors such as community concerns, legal disputes, construction
216 This assumption resembles the U.S. context where, although criteria
have been established for approving or rejecting transit projects, the
possibilities of getting the approval is much broader than those
established by the criteria and depend on many other political,
institutional, and economic factors. Some probabilities can then be
assigned to each expected cost. In other countries, formal criteria
do not usually exist, but we can assume that implicitly costs or some
cost-related thresholds have some effect of the decisions of the
higher level institution.
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management expertise, and the like. What the consultant says does not
alter the cost probabilities of the facility, but they are correlated
because the consultant is knowledgeable (i.e., the consultant's accuracy
for the particular type of facility). The correlation between these two
probabilities -- consultant's accuracy and the final costs of the facility
-- allows one to calculate the conditional probabilities of how much the
project ends up costing given the consultant's estimates, based on
consultant's record of accuracy (i.e., conditional probability of being
correct given the final cost of the facility).
Finally, the consultant is influenced in what he says the facility is
going to cost by his/her preferences (expected utility) for likely
consequences of his/her report (as well as his/her desire to forecast
accurately). The expected utility would for instance depend on how likely
it is that the facility will be constructed or on how much is at stake by
not being accurate and how the consultant (or the decision maker) feels
about the consequences of disclosing one cost or another. Incorporating
expected utilities into the model adds another component to it, for by
investigating the effect of penalizing or rewarding one of the actions --
e.g., under-estimation -- , we can perceive the possibilities of influencing
the consultant's (or decision maker's) decisions about what cost to
disclose.
Although the model does not incorporate actual utility values, the
case studies clearly support the assumptions taken in the development of
the model. First, most of the actors involved in the analytical process
strongly favored the construction of the prefered alternative (versus no
construction) and felt that if funds were not ensured the project would
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have never been constructed. Second, the length of the process and the
perseverance of the interested parties further support utilities that are
higher for those outcomes that result, ceteris paribus, in the construction
of the project. Second, the fact that changes that ultimately affected the
accuracy of the estimates were mostly changes related to the scope of the
project, indicates that analysts usually make their best at calculating the
right costs and would always prefer to be right (i.e., generate the correct
estimates) than to be wrong (i.e., underestimate or overestimate).
Finally, combining the last two, the actors should usually prefer to be on
target (i.e., be accurate) and, in addition, see the project constructed.
(What is more difficult to know is how much these utilities vary from one
set of conditions to another. However, this does not affect the
conclusions of the model if changes in the initial conditions -- with
different sets of utility values -- yield similar (and consistent)
conclusions.)
With these relationships and assumptions the model tries to
incorporate the consultant's analytical capacity -- i.e., how good the
estimates are -- coupled with the possibilities of biasing the results --
not necessarily by selecting the wrong costs or manipulating the results
but by selecting optimistic values or minimum standards -- so that the
transportation facility gets approved and constructed. The output of the
model gives us an indication of how often and under what conditions the
consultant (or decision maker) may bias the results by publishing a cost
that is under or above the one actually estimated.
With the description of the components, we can now formally develop
the different decision steps and the decision model from the perspective of
- 259 -
the consultant (and decision maker) 217:
1. Initially there is an unconditional probability for a given type of
project (e.g., an LRT line at grade). The cost of this type of
project has some probability distribution, which we assume to be
discrete and symmetrical with a low, a medium, and a high value 218.
These probabilities are called P(A), P(B), and P(C), or the
probability of a low cost, medium cost, and high cost respectively.
For instance, unconditional (prior) probabilities (for a given
project) could be 50% for a middle value, with 25% for a low and a
high value. In other words:
P(A) = 25% P(B) = 50% P(C) = 25%
2. The consultant has a record of accuracy associated with similar types
of projects. This accuracy comes not only from the consultant's
analytical capabilities but also from how much time and money is spent
on calculating costs and generating more detailed analyses of costs
(reducing analytical uncertainty) by gathering additional information
on unit costs, quantities, and productivities. These are conditional
probabilities, such as P(a/A) or probability that the consultant
estimates that the cost is A given that the cost is actually A. If
the consultant is correct 80% of the times, this probability -- P(a/A)
217 By taking the analyst/decision maker perspective, we assume that the
consultant and the decision maker(s) are working in the planning of
the facility whereby the consultant makes the calculations and
together the consultant and the decision maker announced how much the
facility will cost. The role of the decision maker is important since
he would probably be the actor with the greatest interest in the
construction of the facility.
218 The approach can be easily expanded to include many more values, or a
continuous probability distribution. These extensions are not
necessary for the purposes of the exercise developed in this thesis.
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-- will be 80%. For instance, the accuracy of the consultant could be
as follows:
Correct: P(a/A) = P(B/B) = P(7/C) = 80%
Underestimate: P(a/B) = P(a/C) = P(B/C) = 10%
Overestimate: P(B/A) = P(T/A) = P(T/B) = 10%
3. We must also assume some probabilities for the construction of the
project, depending on how much the project is expected to cost. These
are therefore conditional probabilities (e.g., probability of the
project being constructed given that the (disclosed) expected cost is
low). For instance, a whole set of probabilities of construction
would be:
P(yes/A) = 100% P(yes/B) = 50% P(yes/C) = 25%
P(no/A) = 0% P(no/B) = 50% P(no/C) = 75%
4. Finally, each outcome from the decision tree, in terms of the
construction or no construction of the facility and the accurate or
inaccurate estimation of the costs, has an associated utility (for the
consultant and/or decision-maker). These utilities can be derived by
pairwise comparison of every two outcomes, the ranking of the
outcomes, and the calculation of a consistency index to check that the
pairwise comparisons do not contradict each other 219. Each set of
rankings and expected utilities indicate a hypothesis about the wishes
of the consultant and/or decision-maker or the rewards and penalties
219 Saaty [1980] explains a methodology to develop a ranking of
alternatives based on pairwise comparisons. The methodology is based
on the perceptions of the decision maker (or group of decision
makers), and hence incorporates more than just quantitative values (in
fact, judgments can be verbally expressed). Through the use of
eigenvalues -- i.e., the solutions to a particular type of matrices
such as A w = n w, where A are the relative weights obtained through
pairwise comparison and w is the vector of individual weights -- we
can derive the ranking of activities and their relative weights.
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that each outcome would cause the consultant and/or decision-maker
(e.g., if underestimation is penalized with less funds for the
project, outcomes that involved underestimation would have a much
lower utility). For instance, the next table shows the utilities in
the case that the highest utilities are perceived when the project
gets built and the estimates are accurate, while the lowest utilities
are perceived when the project does not get built (with lowest utility
when cost is expected low, and highest when cost is expected high).
In between, utilities are higher when the project gets built but
overestimation occurs, and lower when the project gets built and
underestimation occurs. Utilities have been valued between 1.0 and
0.0 without loss of generality. (See next paragraph for additional
interpretation of utility values.)
Outcome Ranking Utility
Expected A, gets built, and costs A (AGA) 1 1.00
Expected B, gets built, and costs B (BGB) 2 0.95
Expected C, gets built, and costs C (CGC) 2 0.95
Expected B, gets built, and costs A (BGA) 4 0.90
Expected C, gets built, and costs A (CGA) 5 0.85
Expected C, gets built, and costs B (CGB) 6 0.80
Expected A, gets built, and costs B (AGB) 7 0.70
Expected B, gets built, and costs C (BGC) 8 0.65
Expected A, gets built, and costs C (AGC) 9 0.50
Expected C, and does not get built (CnG) 10 0.40
Expected B, and does not get built (BnG) 11 0.25
Expected A, and does not get built (AnG) 12 0.00
Note: A is the low cost, B the medium cost, and C the
high cost. Outcomes AGA, BGB, and CGC indicate accurate
estimates; outcomes BGA, CGA, and CGB indicate
overestimation; and outcomes AGB, BGC, and AGC indicate
underestimation.
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For a probabilistic interpretation of the utility values, we must
refer to the concept of certainty equivalent 220. A certainty equivalent
of a probabilistic outcome is the utility at which the decision maker is
indifferent between that probabilistic outcome and that utility for a
certain outcome. In the case of this chapter, this certainty equivalent
could be calculated by first specifying the most and the least preferred
alternatives (and assigning utilities of 1 and 0, respectively) and then
asking the analyst (or decision maker) at which point he/she would feel
indifferent between a particular outcome (say CGA) and a lottery with
probability p at best outcome (i.e., AGA) versus probability i-p at
worst outcome (i.e., AnG). In the case shown in the previous page, the
analyst feels indifferent between outcome CGA and a 85% probability of AGA
and a 15% (i.e., one minus 85%) of AnG. 221
On the basis of the four sets of information (i.e., unconditional
probability for a given type of project, consultant's conditional
probabilities, conditional probabilities for the construction of the
220 Keeney and Raiffa [1976], chapters 4 and 5.
221 Actually, this is a case of a two-attribute utility function. The two
attributes are: accuracy (discrete with three values: accurate, over,
or under) and building the facility (discrete with two values: is/is
not built). The two attributes are not independent since how the
decision maker (or analyst) feels about accuracy depends on the
construction of the facility (and the final cost of the facility which
is correlated to his/her accuracy). Conversely, analyst's utility
from the construction of the facility depends on his/her accuracy in
predicting the final cost. Based on these concepts, the utility can
be probabilitistically interpreted as the point at which the analyst
(or decision maker) feels indifferent between a particular outcome and
the lottery with p of getting the best outcome versus i-p chances of
getting the worst outcome. In this section, through the consideration
of three cases (the last one, assuming independence between the two
attributes), results should be general enough to reach convincing
conclusions and test the validity of the model.
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facility, and analyst's or decision maker's set of utilities) we can now
generate a decision tree and compute other conditional probabilities. To
begin with, we need to know what the probabilities are that the project
costs an amount -- e.g., low -- given that the consultant has said that the
project will cost another amount -- e.g., medium. In other words, we are
looking for P(A/a). To calculate these values, we can apply Bayes theorem.
This theorem indicates that:
P (X & Y)
P(X/Y) = -----------
P(Y)
Therefore, in our case,
P (A & a)
P(A/a) = -----------
P (a)
<== joint probability
<== unconditional probability
We must then calculate the joint probabilities, and from them the
unconditional probabilities. This is an example:
Prior prob.
/
A 25% -
//
--- B 50%-
\ 25/
C 25% -
Consultant's accuracy
a 80%
B 10%
10%
a 10%
B 80%
T 10%
a 10%
B 10%
7' 80%
Joint probabilities
A & a 20.0%
A & B 2.5%
A & 7 2.5%
B & a 5.0%
B & B 40.0%
B & 7 5.0%
C & a 2.5%
C & B 2.5%
C & 7 20.0%
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Then, the unconditional probabilities are:
P(a) = 27.5% P(B) = 45.0% P(r) = 27.5%
And the conditional probabilities will be:
P(A/a) = 72.7% P(A/B) = 5.6% P(A/7) = 9.1%
P(B/a) = 18.2% P(B/B) = 88.9% P(B/r) = 18.2%
P(C/a) = 9.1% P(C/B) = 5.6% P(C/7) = 72.7%
Based on these values and the expected utilities for each outcome, we
can develop the full decision tree. This is shown on the next page. The
numbers (in bold face) next to what the consultant says the project will
cost - - i.e., A, B, and C -- are the expected utilities of each decision.
Based on these utilities the consultant/decision-maker will announce one or
another cost, resulting in the underestimation, accurate calculation, or
overestimation of the cost values.
In this particular example, the consultant/decision-maker will select
A as the cost to be announced all the time since that option is the one
that yields the highest expected utility in all the three branches of the
decision tree. By changing the initial conditions and assumptions, we can
now investigate what this decision model tells us about the underestimation
of costs.
We can establish a baseline case with the assumption that the
consultant is accurate all the time and that the project is always
constructed (regardless of its expected costs), and that the prior
probabilities and utility distribution are the one assumed in the previous
example. In this situation, the results will never be biased and the
consultant will always announce the costs that he has calculated through
the technical process.
In addition, the total combined utility is the highest, around 0.96.
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This overall utility is obtained by multiplying the (unconditional)
probabilities of what the consultant has estimated the project is going to
cost by the utility of each selected outcome in each branch of the decision
tree. In other words,
Overall utility =
P(a) * max.util.[(A, B, C) in a branch] +
+ P(B) * max.util.[(A, B, C) in B branch] +
+ P(7) * max.util.[(A, B, C) in 7 branch]
When all the possible outcomes report a utility of 1.0, the
probability of construction is 100% regardless of estimated costs, and the
consultant is accurate all the time, the overall utility would yield a
value of 1.0. Deviations from that situation, because outcome utilities
are lower than 1.0, or because the probability of construction is lower
than 100% for some of the costs, or because the consultant is not accurate
all the time, would yield overall utilities lower than 1.0. Therefore,
this overall utility gives an indication of how far we are from an "ideal"
situation where utilities have maximum values and probabilities for
construction and accuracy are 100%.
By changing the initial values for the consultant's accuracy and the
probability of construction, but keeping the same utility distribution, we
can obtain the results on the next table.
These results indicate that when the consultant's accuracy increases
there is, in general, a tendency to select the estimated costs, that is,
not to generate any bias. When the differences in construction
probabilities among the three outcomes is low, however, there is a tendency
to overestimate costs (for instance, the case where the three construction
probabilities are 50%). This is mainly because, for the particular set of
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What cons
thinks it What consult. Will it be
will cost says it costs constructed ?
How much it
ends up
costing Outcome Utility
/
A 0.90 \
C 27.5% ? --- B 0.57
/
Yes 100% -
No 0% -
Yes 50%
No 50%
/ A
-B
\C
/
Yes 25% -
C 0.51 \No 75% -
/
Yes 100% -
/ \
A 0.71 \ No 0% -
B 45.0% ? --- B 0.59
/
C 0.50 \
/
A 0.58 \
7 27.5% ? --- B 0.49
/
/
Yes 50% -
/ \0
\ No 50% -
Yes 25% -
No 75% -
/
Yes 100% -
No 0% -
/
Yes 50% -
\ No 50%
Yes 25%
/
C 0.53 \ No 75%
/A
- B
\ C
72.7%
18.2%
9.1%
100.0%
72.7%
18.2%
9.1%
100.0%
72.7%
18.2%
9.1%
100.0%
5.6%
88.9%
5.6%
100.0%
5.6%
88.9%
5.6%
100.0%
5.6%
88.9%
5.6%
100.0%
9.1%
18.2%
72.7%
100.0%
9.1%
18.2%
72.7%
100.0%
9.1%
18.2%
72.7%
100.0%
AGA
AGB
AGC
AnG
BGA
BGB
BGC
BnG
CGA
CGB
CGC
CnG
AGA
AGB
AGC
AnG
BGA
BGB
BGC
BnG
CGA
CGB
CGC
CnG
AGA
AGB
AGC
AnG
BGA
BGB
BGC
BnG
CGA
CGB
CGC
CnG
1.00
0.70
0.50
0.00
0.90
0.95
0.65
0.25
0.85
0.80
0.95
0.40
1.00
0.70
0.50
0.00
0.90
0.95
0.65
0.25
0.85
0.80
0.95
0.40
1.00
0.70
0.50
0.00
0.90
0.95
0.65
0.25
0.85
0.80
0.95
0.40-
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utilities selected for this example overestimation reports higher utility
than underestimation. (This is a questionable alternative but falls on the
conservative side and supports the main conclusions.)
In addition, the model indicates that when the construction
probabilities are sufficiently reduced for expensive projects,
underestimation is the most likely outcome. For instance, the case where
the probability of construction is 40% for A and 0% for the other two
costs, there is a tendency to overestimate. However, when the probability
increases to 80% for A but stays at 0% for the B and C, there is a tendency
to underestimate.
For a given accuracy level, it can be shown that underestimation
begins as soon as there is a sufficiently large differential between the
probabilities of construction between the lowest and the medium and highest
cost values. For instance, for a 100% consultant's accuracy, when the
probability of construction for A is 100%, underestimation will take place
if the probability of construction for B or C is lower than 64%. When the
probability of construction for the lowest cost decreases, the differential
at which underestimation begins augments, indicating that if construction
is less likely, the willingness to underestimate -- for the set of
utilities assumed in this case -- is reduced.
We can now assume a different set of expected utilities. For
instance, we can assume that utility is still high if estimates are
correct, but low if they are overestimated (the consultant may feel bad to
be above the mark, lowering the possibilities of getting funds for the
project). If underestimation is small, then utility is fairly high and
lower the larger the underestimation is (the consultant may feel bad to
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Probability of
construction
Consultant's ------------------
accuracy A B C
100% 100% 100% 100%
80% " " "
45% " It 
i
33% 222 " t i
100% 10
80%
45%
33%
10
6
100%
80%
45%
33%
100%
80%
45%
33%
Cost selected
------------------- Overall
A
A
A
B
B
B r utility
B C 0.96
B C 0.92
B C 0.87
B B 0.86
0% 90% 70% A B C 0.89
" " " A B C 0.84
i I "o B B B 0.80
it " B B B 0.80
- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -------
0% 67% 33% A B C 0.75
" t " t A A A 0.73
f It A A A 0.73
" A A A 0.73
- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -- -- -- -
7% 50% 40% A B C 0.62
i i A B C 0.60
" " " C C C 0.58
i " C C C 0.58
100% 50% 50%
80% i "t
45% " "I
33% " "I
100% 80% 0%
80% "1 i
45% i It
33% i "f
100% 40% 0%
80% i it
45% i i
33% i i
50% C C C 0.63
" C C C 0.63
" C C C 0.63
" C C C 0.63
0% A A A 0.58
" A A A 0.58
" A A A 0.58
" A A A 0.58
0% A C C 0.40
" C C C 0.40
" C C C 0.40
" C C C 0.40
underestimate by a wide margin). Utilities for no construction are higher
than in the previous case when the consultant selects the high or medium
222 This percentage would ideally correspond to the accuracy that would be
obtained by random choice.
----------------------
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values (he/she may feel that with high or medium costs, no construction is
expected and therefore he is not so disappointed if the project is not
constructed) and zero again if the lowest cost is selected. The following
table shows this set of utilities.
Outcome Ranking Utility
AGA 1 1.00
BGB 2 0.95
CCC 4 0.90
BGA 9 0.30
CGA 11 0.10
CGB 7 0.40
AGB 2 0.95
BGC 5 0.80
AGC 7 0.40
CnG 6 0.50
BnG 9 0.30
AnG 12 0.00
With this new utility distribution (and assuming the same prior
probabilities), the results are the ones shown in the next page.
These results indicate that, once again, when consultant's accuracy
increases the tendency is towards less bias of costs. But now when
accuracy decreases there exists a stronger tendency to underestimate,
compared to the previous example (since overestimation does not report high
utilities anymore). When the probabilities of construction are high for
the lower costs (i.e., close to the 100% certainty), the consultant will
again tend to underestimate costs. On the other hand, when the probabili-
ties are very small for the higher costs but high for the low costs (e.g.,
the case of 53% for A, and 0% for B and C), the consultant will tend to
overestimate costs in spite of the probability differential (because he/she
does not feel so disappointed when construction does not take place due to
the announcement of high costs). For the set of utilities of this case,
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Probability of
construction
Consultant's ------------------
Cost selected
------------------- Overall
accuracy A B C a B T utility
-------------------------------------------------------------
100% 100% 100% 100% A A C 0.95
80% " " " A A B 0.89
45% " " " A A A 0.83
33% " " A A A 0.83
-------------------------------------------------------------
100% 100% 90% 70% A A C 0.92
80% " " " A A B 0.87
45% " " " A A A 0.83
33% " " " A A A 0.83
-------------------------------------------------------------
100% 100% 67% 33% A A C 0.88
80% " " " A A B 0.84
45% " " " A A A 0.83
33% "t " " A A A 0.83
67% 50% 4
" "t
it it
550% 50%
I "
of It
"f i
100% 53% 0%
80% "1 "o
45% i 
it
33% i "t
100% 49% 0%
80% I "s
45% i 
t
33% i 
i
0% A A C 0.65
" A A C 0.61
" A A B 0.56
" A A A 0.55
0% A B C 0.61
" A B C 0.57
" B B B 0.53
" B B B 0.53
0% A A C 0.51
C C C 0.50
C C C 0.50
C C C 0.50
0% C C C 0.50
" C C C 0.50
" C C C 0.50
" C C C 0.50
the differential at which underestimation begins decreases with the
decrease in the probability of construction for the lowest cost. Finally,
when the construction probabilities are similar for all the costs, the
consultant will tend to bias the cost estimates less often (i.e., the cases
where the probabilities are 67%, 50%, and 40% for A, B, and C respectively,
100%
80%
45%
33%
100%
80%
45%
33%
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or 50% for the three costs).
Still assuming another set of utilities, we can run another simulation
considering that utility is highest (i.e., 1.0) whenever the consultant is
accurate, two-thirds (i.e., 0.67) whenever he overestimates the cost, one-
third in the case of underestimation, and zero if the project is not
constructed.
Outcome Ranking Utility
AGA 1 1.00
BGB 1 1.00
CGC 1 1.00
BGA 4 0.67
CGA 4 0.67
CGB 4 0.67
AGB 7 0.33
BGC 7 0.33
AGC 7 0.33
CnG 10 0.00
BnG 10 0.00
AnG 10 0.00
With these utilities, the results of the model are the ones shown in
the next page.
In this situation, where underestimation is heavily penalized while
accuracy is rewarded, and the consultant (or the decision maker) gets no
utility from the cancelation of the project, there is a tendency to
underestimate the costs when there is a sufficiently large differential
between the probabilities of construction for the medium and high cost
alternatives compared to the low cost alternative (see, for instance, the
case where probabilities are 50% for A, and 0% for the other two costs).
On the other hand, when the probabilities are similar across the different
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Consultant's ------------------
accuracy A B C
100% 100% 100% 100%
80% i " "
45% t " 
I
33% " " 
"f
100%
80%
45%
33%
Cost selected
---------------- Overall
A
B
100% 90% 70% A
It " A
it it B
f it B
100% 100% 67% 33%
80% "1 I 
i
45% i it 
it
33% i " 
i
100% 67% 50% 40%
80% i " 
i
45% t it 
it
33% I I 
it
B
A
A
A
B
B 'r utility
B C 1.00
B C 0.90
B B 0.78
C B 0.75
B C 0.88
B C 0.78
B B 0.68
A B 0.68
B C 0.67
B B 0.62
B B 0.53
A B 0.50
B C 0.52
B A 0.46
B C 0.38
A B 0.38
100% 50% 50% 50% A B A 0.50
80% I " A A A 0.45
45% " " " A A A 0.39
33% I i A A A 0.38
-------------------------------------------------------------
100% 100% 0% 0% A A A 0.50
80% " " " A A A 0.50
45% i i A A A 0.50
33% " " " A A A 0.50
-------------------------------------------------------------
100% 50% 0% 0% A A A 0.25
80% "t " A A A 0.25
45% " A A A 0.25
33% t " " A A A 0.25
-------------------------------------------------------------
options, the consultant will tend to be accurate, and less so -- with a
tendency to underestimate -- , when his overall accuracy decreases.
Consultant's accuracy, once again, tends to favor unbiasing the results.
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Summarizing, the model indicates the following conclusions:
a. The concern for securing the construction of the facility has a
significant impact on the possibilities that the results will be
biased. If higher cost estimates reduce the likelihood of the transit
facility being built, then the consultant will tend to shift estimates
to be biased low (assuming the bias is not detectable as
"deliberate").
b. If the project is constructed regardless of how much the consultant
says it is going to cost (i.e., the funding institution assures the
project will be constructed, or earmarked funds are created for the
construction of the facility), underestimation is unlikely.
c. Underestimation will more likely take place when there is a
sufficiently large differential between the probability of
construction for the lowest cost and the medium and high costs. This
differential tends to increase or decrease (hence, underestimation
will be less or more likely) -- as shown in the first two cases --
depending on the probability of construction for the lowest cost and
how the consultant (or decision maker) feels about the benefits of
underestimation (as reflected in the assumed set of utilities).
d. The higher the consultant's accuracy, the more likely he will announce
the actual estimates, and the lower the tendency to bias the results.
e. How the consultant (or decision maker, depending on who is in charge
of announcing the results) perceives the utility of the consequences
of underestimation, overestimation, and the no construction of the
facility largely affects the likelihood of biasing the results. By
penalizing underestimation and rewarding accuracy, the consultant will
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tend to select the estimated costs, and not to bias the results.
One conclusion illustrates that when the consultant reduces the
uncertainty of the cost estimates (i.e., the consultant's accuracy is
closer to 100%), underestimation is less likely. An explanation for this
result is that, when accuracy is high, the consultant have less tendency to
bias the results, because his/her utility normally decreases when the
disclosed costs are well off the final construction costs. Another
conclusion illustrates that if the decision to build the facility is
certain from the outset, underestimation is less likely. (Of course,
avoiding the bias of the (disclosed) costs may likely not be the only
purpose of the high-level institution as this institution makes a decision
about the construction of the facility.)
The model further exemplifies how uncertainty allows ambiguity and the
possibility of biasing the results, and how the technical analysis can be
distorted by the interests that take place in the decision-making process.
Furthermore, the incentives from the funding institutions can play a major
role in adjusting the behavior of the analyst/decision maker to proceed
with more "unbiased" procedures.
6.3.4. Decision Criteria
Analysts and decision makers are not the only actors in the process.
The funding institutions also have a role, must make decisions about which
project to fund, and have other competing interests gravitating over them.
To make their decisions, these institutions must develop mechanisms for
evaluating each project against other proposals for funding (i.e., other
transit projects). The many components and variables of large transit
- 275 -
projects create an intricate and laborious task. Therefore, in order to
address the complexities of the whole process, the funding institutions
establish thresholds and criteria that a project must comply with to go
forward in the cycle and eventually received funds for its construction.
Appendix C includes the present UMTA policy for approval of transit
projects 223
However, criteria are a way to establish one perception of the
problem. As soon as two parties do not agree on the criteria, conflicts
will arise as well as the possibility of behaving contrary to the desired
outcome, unless the right incentives are established. A narrowly-defined
criteria -- based on a limited number of evaluative variables -- can serve
the purpose of reducing the complexity of the process and creating a way to
evaluate projects that in principle have no single basis for comparison
(e.g., a light-rail project in one town with a busway in another town). On
the other hand, narrow criteria may be counterproductive in terms of
distorting the decision process depending on the decision environment and
223 The UMTA approach basically uses two cost-effectiveness indices to
evaluate the realtive merit of a proposal against other proposals.
These indices are determined in the alternatives analysis process.
One of the two indices account for the level of local effort in
contributing to capital funding. The indices depend upon the
differences in costs, travel impacts, and financing between the
proposed investments and the TSM alternative (that must always be
included in any alternatives analysis). A penalty is introduced if a
more cost-effective alternative is discovered. This penalty comes in
the form of a composite index between the selected alternative and the
more cost-effective alternative "discovered". What initial
alternatives are considered and shown in the EIS, therefore, may
influence how UMTA rates the alternative selected by the local
decision makers.
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the uncertainty associated with the variables that enter the process 224.
The tendency to come out with aggregate measures (e.g., aggregate
performace indicators as those suggested by UMTA) can be valuable as a way
to narrow down the number of possible alternatives, but not as a single
decision rule to decide on the merits of the selected alternative.
Aggregate values disregard welfare and political concerns that ultimately
are the ones that likely have an overriding role in the decision making
process. In fact, if aggregate values do not conform to local preferences,
they may be manipulated to reflect such preferences, thus reducing the
validity of the technical process 225.
As was mentioned before, when uncertainty (lack of consensus about
purposes and the means of achieving them) is high, the ability of applying
standard (universalistic) criteria is difficult 226. By contrast, the
absence of specific criteria would likely favor processes of political and
social influence bringing the planning process completely outside the realm
of the technical sphere.
The different perspectives on the problem to be addressed with the
construction of the transit facility (time and scale frames) generates a
different preferred criteria at the different decision-making levels. The
224 Criteria selection was discussed earlier within the context of the
uncertainty associated with the components of the planning process.
225 UMTA's rating system tries to reflect the benefits of each project and
avoid any bias toward a particular type of project or geographical
area of the country. That system - with a strong emphasis on cost-
effectiveness criteria -however, has raised a lot of controversy
because it does not allow enough possibilities for obtaining funds for
a project in a particular area when they are requested for reasons
different from the estimated cost-effectivene
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funding institutions may be interested on cost-effectiveness criteria,
while the local decision makers may be concerned about expanding service to
be able to achieve particular transportation goals in other parts of the
region or to attract the votes of other sectors of the population. The
mismatch among the preferred criteria at the different decision-making
levels opens up the possibilities for distrust, biasing, and the distortion
of the technical analysis.
A middle ground between narrow criteria and no criteria at all was
more closely followed in the cases outside the U.S.. In the cases of
Madrid and La Paz, no specific criteria existed before the planning process
was undertaken. However, initial discussions took place (e.g., the program
contracts in the case of Madrid) to lay down the conditions to be achieved
with the transit project. This approach is a way to reach a compromise
between the advantages and disadvantages of the two extreme approaches for
evaluating projects -- i.e, narrow criteria and no criteria at all.
Nevertheless, cost considerations also played an important role as
incentives were established to encourage the attainment of particular cost-
effectiveness objectives in the construction and operation of the selected
alternative.
6.4. Presentation of Analytical Framework
The conceptual approach of this research is based on an analysis of
the characteristics of the technical process that allow the decision-making
process to interact with it. This conceptual approach consists of the
elements described in the previous section (6.3).
Figure 6.2 shows a schematic representation of the analytical
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framework. The figure highlights the components that affect the
interaction between the technical and decision-making processes. These
components should be inscribed within the broader framework shown in figure
6.1.
The technical process initially generates, to respond to a perceived
need, estimates that reflect some preliminary ideas about the scope and
Figure 6.2
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timing of the project (1). Simultaneously, the decision-making process
reacting to signals or pressures from the environment, generates its own
ideas about the scope and timing of the project (2). The conflict induces
some reevaluation of the technical analysis (3).
The technical process is also influenced by the technical issues (4)
mentioned in chapter 4, some of them generated by the conflicts explained
in the previous paragraph (5), other by the information gathering and
processing activities (6), which in turn are influenced by the uncertainty
associated with any of the elements indicated in figure 4.1 (7).
Simultaneously with these flows, some criteria are generated for the
purpose of selecting the "optimal" alternative (8). These criteria are
evaluated in the decision making process (9) and send back to the technical
process if perceived not satisfactory (in terms of their values or the
concerns they addressed) (10 and 11).
From another side, and concurrent with the events described in the
last two paragraphs, some expectations are built as to the "optimal"
project (based or not on the initial estimates generated by the technical
process, and affected by other factors, such as the probabilities of
getting additional funding). These expectations create some decision
payoffs from the decision-making process where some actors may not want to
miss the opportunity of getting the project ahead (12). These decision
payoffs are also affected by the decision criteria (17) and the incentives
or desincentives that may accompanied those criteria. These payoffs evolve
in an (accidental or intentional) optimism that permeates into the
technical process through (a) how the uncertainty associated with the
elements of the technical analysis is treated (13) and (b) how information
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is collected and gathered (14).
Finally, the technical process operates on uncertainty (15) by
decreasing its level if need is perceived and funds are available.
Uncertainty is also appreciated in the decision-making process (16) where
further reevaluation of the technical analysis may be requested. (If a
complete reevaluation is dimed adequate in the decision-making process, the
level of uncertainty may increase rather than decrease from previous
technical exercises.)
6.5. Prescription and operational extension
The framework advanced in figure 6.2 helps better understand the
dynamics of the planning process and the possible under-estimation of
costs, and illustrates the different perspectives that can be taken to
analyze a decision-making process (see also section 7.3). It also shows
the interaction among the different components of the technical and
decision-making processes and allows the development of prescriptive ideas
and operational measures with a potential for improving both processes.
The operational measures are designed to confront the issues and
difficulties highlighted in the analytical framework taking into
consideration the different decision perspectives.
Decision makers respond to uncertainty by promoting those elements of
the technical process that better support their preconceived ideas about
the project. In the face of uncertainty and their attempt to address the
requests and needs of the myriad of interest groups, decision makers tend
to force (deliberately or unpurposefully) the technical process to
emphasize the issues and establish the values that better confirm their
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(personal) goals. Sensitivity analyses, carried out to a full extent,
should help avoid the difficulties generated by the inherent uncertainty of
the planning process 227.
Sensitivity analyses must encompass not only the simple change in some
of the values of the input variables, but also changes in the basic
assumptions (in terms, for instance, of ridership, financial conditions, or
potential funding sources), and changes in the design of the facility. The
stronger development of sensitivity analyses would also help address the
conflicts that arose from the different scale and time frames of the
participants in the process.
Sensitivity analyses can be further expanded through the construction
of alternative scenarios. The technical process can be strengthened if
consideration is given to the possibility that some of the assumptions
taken do not turn out to be as it was initially thought -- such as the fact
that utility companies may or may not pay for relocation costs or the
communities affected by the transit facility may or may not want fancy
landscaping. This approach, however, will only be acceptable if modelling
methods are simple, flexible, and clear enough so that the technical
process does not grows to unmanageable dimensions and so that the
participants in the process can easily perceive the tradeoffs between the
different variables and alternatives. The development of scenarios would
foster public debate over data and would provide a solid process to decide
227 In the U.S., this approach has been advocated by UMTA as indicated in
its new Alternatives Analysis Guidelines. Nevertheless, the extent of
these sensitivity analyses is very limited, and still faces the
resistance of the local planning institutions due, among other things,
to the perceived large computational requirements of sensitivity
analyses. There exists therefore ample room for improvements.
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how to handle ambiguity and uncertainty.
The decision model developed in section 6.3.3 supports the idea that
additional information would lead to less biased results, based on the
assumption that additional information would always increase the accuracy
of the results (what is certainly likely in the process of estimating
capital and operating costs). Sensitivity analyses and additional
information can be coupled together in the design of computer-based
information systems supporting the negotiating-argumentative role of the
technical process. These information systems must contain quick and robust
maintenance/update procedures and structured strategies for undertaking
sensitivity analyses. In addition, computer-based information systems must
be carefully implemented to avoid the common pitfall that they end up
serving to blur rather than to clarify the planning process 228. The
systems must be transparent and the assumptions clearly stated so that the
participants can perceived the tradeoffs between the different inputs and
the results of sensitivity analysis.
The fact that several audiences look at the project (and the technical
process associated with it) in different ways and with different interests,
creates mismatches that eventually distort the very meaning of the
technical analysis (and the confidence the interested parties have on it).
On one account, too specific decision criteria cannot address the concerns
of the several audiences (e.g., the federal government focussing on cost-
effectiveness measures, and the state government focussing on environmental
and land use issues) and promotes lack of trust, lengthening of the
228 The case of La Paz is an example of the possibility of intentionally
using computer-based models for political gains. See also Klosterman
[1987].
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process, and biases in the technical analysis. A broader set of criteria
for selecting worthwhile transit investments coupled with a more open
negotiation and discussion of which criteria must be ultimately applied can
help achieve a more substantial compromise between the different audiences
and avoid distortions in the technical process.
Such an approach, accompanied by an adequate and necessary visibility
of its development, will shift the focus of social-influence processes --
institutional and political -- to the decision among competing criteria,
rather than directly among competing candidates or proposals. This means
that attention will be directed not only towards which transit project is
the preferred one but also towards the particular set of criteria to be
used in evaluating the several alternatives under consideration. In this
way, the use of criteria -- e.g., a cost-effectiveness criterion -- that
does not meet the needs of particular interest groups -- local decision
makers -- would be reduced. In addition, the local context, largely
ignored in averaging methods and so crucial in planning processes at the
local level, would receive more consideration.
The implementation of such an approach assigns a critical value to the
acknowledgement, from the outset of the technical process, of which
consequences stemming from any alternative or action should be included in
the list of benefits and costs to be used for judging technical, economic,
or social feasibility. Essentially, this involves a judgment about whose
point of view should be taken and, in turn, about which costs and benefits
should be considered as internal to the project and which would be regarded
as external. Importantly, as the group of individuals with a stake in the
process changes, a shift in "point of view" may occur (and the final
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decision may change accordingly).
On another account, and as indicated in the decision model developed
in section 6.3.3., there is much room left for establishing the right
incentives so that the planning process becomes less distorted (rather than
just instating a fixed set of guidelines that must be compulsorily
followed, as now is being attempted by UMTA). For instance, the decision
model evidences that when no constraints are put on the probabilities of
getting funds for the construction of the transit facility, the likelihood
of biasing the results decreases. Conversely, if such certainty is not
implemented (for obvious reasons, such as appearing too complacent in
providing funds), another possibility is to create incentives that would
discourage biasing the results in the form of premiums when the final
figures (e.g., capital or operating costs) turn out to be close to the
estimated ones.
Still another alternative in this direction is an approach currently
being promoted in several agencies of the US federal government (although
mostly for construction, not for planning) 229. This approach, labelled
"value engineering," consists of creating a parallel process of technical
review by an independent party (not directly involved in the project).
Through brainstorming and feedback, new ideas and comments on how each
229 General Accounting Office [1983a], [1983b], and [1984]. Recently, in
a case of an LRT system in Houston, Texas, a peer review process was
set to investigate the technical recommendations of the selected LRT
alternative (selection accomplished through the UMTA-established
alternatives analysis process). The review panel, composed of John
Kain, Don Pickrell, Peter Gordon, and Michael Meyer have looked at
both the technical and political aspects of ridership and cost
estimates as the decision makers were concerned about potential cost
overruns or demand underestimation. Michael Meyer termed this process
"value planning." (Communication with Michael Meyer, August 15,
1989.)
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alternative is trying to achieve the specified goals may help realize about
potential flaws and particular ways to perform better in the construction
(or planning) process. In addition, the institutions involved in the
construction (or planning) of a facility would have the incentive to
perform better due to peer review pressures. However, at the planning
stage, this approach may promote feelings of interference in the local
decision-making process. This is what happened, for instance, in the Santa
Clara case when officials from the California Department of Transportation
indicated their belief that the process was being biased and the local
institutions complained about interference in local matters.
Another component of the technical process where some potential for
improvements also exist is that of cost classifications. The main purpose
of these classifications is twofold: first, they can help better perceive
the tradeoffs between alternatives as changes on some items (e.g., demand)
effects variable costs; and second, they can serve to design a funding
process that better internalizes costs to the local decision making process
by tying outside funding sources to particular project items. For
instance, the most uncertain items could be borne by local institutions
while the most definite ones (or those that do not vary much with demand,
for instance) would be borne by higher level institutions. The linking of
funding sources from higher levels of government to more reliable items
would internalize at the correct (local) level those items that can be more
influenced and affected by the local decision process.
One may argue that such an approach may induce undue conservatism, as
local decision makers would avoid getting involved in costly transit
projects regardless of their potential economic benefits (for the locality
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or for the society as a whole). Although it is hard to generalize, this
does not have to be the case as the most uncertain items -- i.e., those
that would be borne at the local level -- may not necessarily be a large
proportion of the total cost. Rolling stock, station and right-of-way
landscaping, street reconstruction, utility relocation, and engineering
studies, do not account for more than one third of the total capital costs
230. Nevertheless, the approach may also force considering less ambitious
design standards that stay closer to local possibilities. Operating costs
-- that according to this approach would need to be borne largely, if not
entirely, at the local level -- would make a harder case for this approach
as local funds are usually tight and frequently require the transfer of
funds from higher levels of goverment.
Other possibilities can also help internalize costs to the decision-
making process. As was mentioned in section 5.4.4, the project-planning
process often goes from design to cost; in other words, first a decision is
made about what is wanted -- e.g., an LRT system -- and then the
calculation of capital and operating costs is carried out (probably trying
to find the lowest cost for the alternative selected). An alternative
approach is "design-to-cost"; in other words, first a decision is made
about the level of resources available for a particular types of projects -
- e.g., transit projects -- from all the possible sources and then a
selection is made about that project that best fits those resources.
Although the "design-to-cost" approach would not prevent underestimation,
it would help decision makers to be aware of the level of resources
available and the limitations imposed by that level; it would also promote
230 Transportation Research Board [1978], pp. 49-51.
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discussion and negotiations among the interested parties by forcing an
iterative process of "defining-estimating-redefining-reestimating" that
emphasizes, from the outset, the level of resources available 231
Overall, this combination of ideas suggests an approach that attempts
to tackle the level of uncertainty of some elements (mainly the elements
that compose the technical data and methods) and, at the same time, opens
the discussion over the assumptions and definitions of other elements of
the transit planning process (mainly the goals to be achieved with the
transit project and the criteria to be used to judge the merits of each
alternative) 232
6.6. The Value of the Theoretical Framework
in Improving the Estimating Function
The discussion of the technical and decision-making processes in
chapters 4 and 5, respectively, and of the analytical framework in chapter
6, have led to suggested improvements in the estimating function that may
231 In this approach, the higher-level institution would start by defining
the transportation needs for the area (in response to a perceived
need), and continue by allocating funds (based on their own set of
estimates) to the local institution (or institutions), disbursing
them, and letting the local decision-making process to make use of
those funds for the construction of the locally-preferred alternative.
In other words, the higher-level institution would very much stay out
of the local decision-making process as it relates to the selection of
the transit alternative. Faced with a given amount of external funds,
local decision-makers would have to internalize the true costs of
their preferred alternative and tend not to underestimate the costs.
232 This approach goes contrary to present U.S. federal policies that
attempt to reduce the amount of discretionary funds for transit
project (Section 3 funds) while increasing formula funds (Section 9
funds, or those allocated through formula depending on population,
land area, population density, revenue vehicle miles, passenger miles,
transit route miles, and transit operating costs). UMTA [1988];
General Accounting Office [1987], pp. 246-248.
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not necessarily transcend into more accurate cost estimates but will induce
a decision-making process that would tend to reflect the limitations and
difficulties of the transit-project planning process. The standard
planning process has been overcome by the disapperance of the "stable
state" 233. The planning environment has become one of ever changing
needs, regulations, and base conditions. Within this environment, the
classic "goal-definition-analysis-evaluation-selection" model of planning
sanctioned by the traditional rational paradigm does not match the
negotiated, politically-influenced process of decision-making found in the
case studies.
The framework incorporates the concerns raised in chapter 2 about the
rational paradigm, the critiques to this paradigm, and the role of
alternative paradigms. It includes elements that can enhance the
effectiveness of the technical process of estimating costs as well as
complementary measures to foster a dialogue that would strengthen the "non-
rational" elements of the decision-making process. Sensitivity analyses,
improved information systems, negotiated criteria, and "accuracy"
incentives are the elements that the framework identified to make the
process closer to the normative basis assumed in section 2.5.
In addition, the framework proves invaluable in looking at the
transportation planning process through the identification and
categorization of the elements that create the issues and difficulties
found in the case studies. By categorizing uncertainty, we can better
discern the constraints and opportunities that exist for reducing the level
of uncertainty related to particular components of the technical process.
233 Sch6n [1971].
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By identifying the elements that lead to announce one or another set of
costs, we can better perceive the choices that are made during the
transportation project planning process. By recognizing the different
perspectives of the actors in the process, we can better single out the
changes that ultimately affect the accuracy of the initial (cost)
estimates. Finally, by recognizing the conflicts created by the actors'
different implicit goals, we can acknowledge the effects of establishing
particular evaluation criteria.
The framework proposed in section 6.4 reflects the methodological
approach followed in this thesis. This approach looks at the
underestimation problem in a broad fashion and brings insights that could
not be perceived from a purely econometric methodology 24. It acknowledges
that a seemingly simple problem --the calculation of capital and operating
costs -- can be viewed in several ways (from the technical perspective and
the decision-making perspective). The methological approach, by exploring
alternative problem definitions and corresponding theoretical structures,
tries to avoid suggesting a sophisticated solution to the wrong problem.
The framework helped identify the actions that would lead to an
estimation process that reduces the chances that bias results are
introduced. This does not mean that cost estimates would be more accurate
but, at least, that decisions would consider the possibilities of being
inaccurate.
234 For instance, the one followed by Merewitz [1972].
7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1. Summary of Findings
The previous three chapters presented a detailed discussion of the
technical process, the decision-making process, and the interaction between
both, as they relate to the estimation of capital and operating costs of
transit projects. The discussion led to the following major general
conclusions:
As to the technical process:
o The prevalent approach to estimating capital and operating costs
during the planning stage, the build-up approach, tries to combine
characteristics of both the top-down and group-up approaches in an
attempt to address the difficulties of achieving a complete and
precise cost-estimating process and the constraints generated by time
and budget limitations and those that come from the socio-political
environment surrounding the planning process.
o Full accuracy can never be achieved because of the inherent
uncertainty associated with some of the elements of the technical
process -- uncertainty that cannot be fully avoided by gathering
additional information, controlling (acting) over the variable, or
reaching a negotiated compromise with the institution or institutions
that control the values of particular variables.
o Classifications of capital and operating costs, according to their
uncertainty and interdependence (e.g., their relation to the demand
variable) or how directly they are related to the transportation
project (e.g., construction or operating versus administrative costs),
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are seldom applied as a tool for better planning, control of
uncertainty, and/or delineation of funding responsibilities.
o Sensitivity analyses have hardly been incorporated to cost estimating
procedures. The large number of items normally present in cost
estimating has prevented the application of sensitivity tests.
Reducing the number of items and increasing the scope of sensitivity
analysis would better serve the needs of a dynamic technical analysis
and the uncertainty associated with it.
o Computer-based information tools have not been applied to its full
extent because of the perception that the calculation of costs for a
particular project is too specific and has almost no replicability in
another project. Furthermore, the implementation of computer-based
information systems has usually responded to an attempt to improve the
efficiency of cost calculations rather than to the possibilities of
using those systems to effectively support decisions and/or serve as
an analysis tool in the negotiating process.
o The emerging computer technology backed by the necessary institutional
support at the various decision-making levels should allow the
implementation of adequate computer-based information systems (for
cost estimating in transit project planning). To be fully effective
and accepted, however, they must be carefully designed bearing in mind
the elements of the framework developed in chapter 6 (i.e.,
uncertainty, scope and time scales, decision criteria). This will
require systems that are transparent and simple and upon which
assumptions can be built in and sensitivity analyses easily performed.
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As to the decision-making process:
o The institutional and political pressures over the planning process
largely affect how decision makers perceive information and how much
attention they will put on it (a more detailed discussion is developed
in section 7.2). The case studies clearly illustrated the strong
pressures over the technical process motivated, to a great extent, by
the need to justify previously-taken decisions.
o Difficulties in the decision-making process (that can simultaneously
be viewed as challenges) mostly stem from the characteristics of the
transportation planning process -- its ill-structured nature, the
uncertainty of its elements, the many interested parties gravitating
over it, the length of the process, and the unavoidable disjointed
organizational setup. To address these difficulties, approaches have
tended to confine the process through the implementation of standard
technical methods and measures. Yet, it is likely that the type of
information decisions must focus on does not fit within the confines
of those standard methods and measures.
o Information is not equally relevant to the several layers of the
decision-making process and access to it may not be available to all
of them at the same time. In principle, the authorization for a new
transit system should be sought after the final evaluation and
selection of a complete alternative. However, the case studies
illustrate that local decision makers try to seek authorization as the
decision process takes place, either at the outset or during the
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development of the technical analysis 23. For the higher levels in
the authorization hierarchy, time is typically limited and decisions
must be considered in the light of other strategic decisions and
overall resource constraints. Moreover, outside political forces are
often brought to bear on the decision at the point of authorization,
not before. All this compounds to different in-depth knowledge about
the alternatives by the authorizers and other interested parties that
the developers of the solution (analysts and local decision makers)
probably have. The final authorization is then made by people who
often do not fully comprehend the proposals presented to them, and
"the comparative ignorance of the [authorizer] is coupled with the
inherent bias of the sponsor" 236 (i.e., the local decision maker).
And as to the interaction between the technical and decision-making
processes:
o The general framework identified four major actors in the planning
and, particularly, cost-estimating process: environment (in a broader
sense, encompassing interest groups, community groups, etc.),
analysts, decision makers, and funding institutions. These actors
confront the particular transit project with viewpoints which normally
differ in their scope and time frames. These differences create a
situation where the decision maker must respond to conflicting
235 In fact, in the U.S., due to past experiences, new transit plans start
by testing the waters of the federal government in order to come out
with some initial probabilities for the chances to attract federal
funds.
236 Mintzberg, et.al. [1976], pp. 259-261.
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audiences. In the attempt to respond to those divergent audiences,
the decision maker would try to influence the technical process,
stirring the technical results towards an end that is not necessarily
the one dictated by a purely rational method.
o Moreover, in spite of the rational nature of the estimating function
itself, the cost-estimating process does not fully consider the
effects of capital and operating costs in the broader context (e.g.,
financial consequences, contingency elements, local capacity, etc.)
due to the influence and coercions from the decision-making process,
creating tensions between funding institutions and local decision
makers that do not contribute to improve the accuracy of cost
estimates.
o Changes in the technical analysis, particularly those that eventually
generate increases in the estimated capital and operating costs, come
mostly from the long time that it takes to implement the selected
alternative and from changes in the design of its elements. To a
lesser extent, but also important, increases come from costs related
to items whose construction or relocation costs initially are assumed
to be in the hands of institutions outside the responsibility for
funding and implementing the transit project.
o The expectations created in the decision making process that arise
from initial project proposals (to perceived needs) and their
consequent preliminary technical analyses, what is at stake (for
decision makers and analysts) in the announcement of the results of
the technical analysis, and the narrowness of the cost-effectiveness
criteria for funding a project are factors that influence study
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decisions and the deliberate or accidental biasing of the results
and/or design of the transit facility with unrealistic elements.
o The fact that the long time that it takes to develop transportation
plans (from its conception to final implementation) does not help
achieve more accurate cost estimates, would tend to suggest that a
faster process would improve accuracy. However, a reasonably long
period of time is needed to allow for an effective political and
social dialogue. If the shortening of the process hampers the chances
of a fair dialogue, the accuracy of the analysis would likely diminish
anyway. By looking at the planning stage as a argumentative-
negotiating exercise, a compromise could be reached in designing an
analysis process -- incorporating elements such as those described in
section 6.5 -- that would not hinder the political process and
notwithstanding would reduce the time from initial project conception
to implementation.
o The objective of the process of analyzing alternatives should be, in
principle, to assist choice, as opposed to making a choice. However
that process is often perceived as the mechanism to making choices and
ends up being distorted in the attempt to justify previously-selected
choices or in delaying the process so that the previously-chosen
alternative has a greater chance of being adopted (or not adopted).
(See section 7.2 for further discussion of this point.)
These conclusions highlight the interrelationships between the
different elements of the technical and decision making processes. They
pave the way to the discussion of the role of technical analysis in
decision making and to a further review of the debate about rationality in
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planning initiated in chapter 2. These two topics are covered in the next
two sections respectively.
7.2. The Role of Technical Analysis in Decision Making
Current Roles
The case studies clearly indicate that technical analysis has a role
in decision making -- an exercise in bureaucratic paperwork and political
tactics -- and that that role is not the supposedly intended one -- the
assistance to the decision-making process. The role is distorted because
of the way the analysis process ends up being (or is) structured. Such a
process tends to be reactive, not starting until a preferred alternative
has already been decided upon. Other alternatives may not be considered,
may be given only limited attention, or may be "straw alternatives" tossed
off to meet the requirements of higher level institutions only.
Furthermore, as the instances investigated in this thesis have
illustrated, so much time and so many resources are committed to the
development of an analysis supporting the alternative selected as
preferable from the outset that, as time passes, it becomes harder and
harder, financially and politically, to give serious consideration to major
revisions or to new options. The relevance of the long and tedious
documents to the decisions about the project then diminishes and the
technical analysis ends up being simply a paperwork exercise, a hurdle that
consumes resources and adds time to the project development process 23,
237 Such a process would favor those projects in regions where decision
makers are more perseverant or have a higher influence or leverage at
the federal level. However, it would not comply with the definition
of a "correct" planning process indicated at the end of section 2.5.
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The escalation in resources and time reinforces both itself and the
futility of the technical analysis. This analysis then seldom serves as
the basis for responsible, fully-informed decision making. 238
The technical analysis, however, still serves another role, and, at
this role, it does serve it well. This role is that of structuring the
process: indicating what elements to include, what to discuss, what to look
at, what to confront, etc. focusing the terms of discourse and shaping the
planning debate 239. This role is an important one but its usefulness is
largely curtailed by failing to achieve the other major intended objective
of the technical process -- namely, the effective support of the decision-
making function.
Perspectives on Decision Making
The case studies and the discussion of the analytical framework
illustrated the decision-related characteristics of the urban
transportation planning process, among them: (1) the ill-structure nature
of its elements (as is typical in socio-technical systems), (2) the
significant value content of its decisions, and (3) the significant human
238 De Neufville [1987] identifies three types of explanations for
apparent failures to apply data or studies in policy making: (1) the
"partisan" view argues that data and studies are, at most, used to
support decisions previously made; (2) the "two worlds" argument
states that data and studies are often irrelevant because the analyst
and the decision maker operate with divergent assumptions, problem
formulations, variables, and time schedules, resulting in studies that
appear too late and often focus on variables that are not relevant to
decision makers; and (3) the "enlightenment" argument contends that
data and studies are influential, but they should be viewed only as
background and not as primarily having an impact on particular
decisions (p. 86). These three types of explanations were present in
the cases investigated in this thesis.
239 Innes [1988] refers to data for problem framing (p. 278).
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aspects (societal or individual) that are part of the process. Together,
all these characteristics nurture the strategic character of transportation
decisions, offering the opportunity for the introduction of multiple
perspectives in the analysis of the decision-making function. Furthermore,
for the type of transit projects discussed in this thesis, there exist not
one but several decision processes. These decision processes act on the
technical process (and eventually the technical process on them) in order
to reach a compromise on a common set of assumptions, data, methods, and
results (and put particular ideas forward).
From one perspective, decisions can be analyzed by looking at the
different audiences the technical process must respond to (e.g., federal
and state governments in the U.S.). Each one emphasizes a different
element of the technical process and therefore puts different pressures on
the estimating component of that process. For the higher levels of
government (funding institutions), thresholds are needed to compare
alternatives from very different projects (at least in terms of the goals
to be achieved and, possibly, urban environment) that are competing for a
given amount of funds. At the local level, on the other hand, the same
thresholds are not relevant at all since the purpose of the project will
differ from that of the higher level institutions. At any level, figures
must be credible, particularly at the local level, for the local
institutions must cover any funds required above those provided by the
higher level institutions.
From another perspective, decisions can be analyzed in light of the
uncertainty of the elements that are part of those decisions. How
decisions will be made would depend on the level of uncertainty associated
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with the decision elements. For instance, for those situations for which
there is a good level of agreement on the goals, assumptions, and data of
the estimation process, a more 'rational' process, focusing on acquiring
information, would be more likely. For those cases for which there is
little agreement, then ad-hoc procedures would be more appropriate.
Decisions can further be analyzed by looking at the stakes of the
interested parties. Who is included in the process and what kind of
information is deemed relevant would ultimately affect the scope of the
estimation process and the changes that may need to be incorporated later
on in the process. Decision payoffs, or what benefits and costs the
decision will report to the particular decision maker, would influence the
use of the technical information and how much further to go in terms of
gathering information and how to announce the results of the estimation
process.
Issues and Constraints
It is important to acknowledge that, in light of uncertainty,
information is always interpretive, and "interpretations can be more
powerful than facts" 240. Moreover, the inevitable role of politics in
transportation planning acts as a catalyst for political activity in an
effort to control interpretations. Furthermore, information is never
complete, never fully and equally available to all participants in the
transportation planning process, and may be deliberately withheld. The
"strategic manipulation of information" 241 must always be considered in
any attempt to analyze or carry out the technical process in transportation
240 Stone [1988], page 6.
241 Ibid., page 21.
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planning.
The interpretive nature of the transportation planning process has led
some authors to conclude that technical analyses are ultimately a middle
ground to satisfy several decision making processes (or institutional
actors) and are used to produce arguments for each institutional
participant to push selectively for those components that better support
their positions 242. Others prefer to state that transportation studies
are an expression of power relations between the different layers of the
decision-making process 243. Nevertheless, as discussed in the introductory
section of chapter 2, transportation studies reflect the technical,
bureaucratic, and political doctrines that are dominant at particular
moments -- the broader framework presented in section 6.1 -- , giving
preference to certain types of reasoning and indicators at those moments.
The framework presented in this thesis suggests that the preferences
are influenced by five major factors that affect the connection between
technical analysis and decision making: (a) uncertainty, (b) time and scale
frames, (c) information needs and flows, (d) decision payoffs, and (e)
decision criteria. Decision makers use uncertainty to broaden the support
for particular preferences in an attempt to advance their personal or
political goals. By making use of the uncertainty, they can force the
technical analysis to support their preferences. The technical analysis,
in addition, due to the myriad of interests gravitating over it, must be
designed to address a variety of time and scale frames. Some of these
242 Johnston, et. al. [1988]; Deiter [1985]; Dorschner [1985]; Edner and
Arrington [1985]; Hamer [1976].
243 Whitt and Yago [1985]; Offner, et. al. [1982]; Whitt [1982].
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frames will likely be in conflict; the shifts in their emphases, responding
to the preponderance of particular ideas at particular moments in the
project development process, will ultimately generate outcomes that have
small chances of being closed to initial plans. These small chances are
further reduced by the length of time it takes to develop the projects and
the hurdles likely put by other institutions to those projects. The
reduced chances nourish decision makers' disdain towards the technical
process, which then becomes a paperwork exercise, not a decision-assistance
tool.
In relation to the scope of the project, the attempt to achieve broad
goals with the transit project, beyond the pure transportation-related
goals, further endangers the assistance role of technical analysis, for
this analysis is surpassed by a socio-political agenda set by the broader
goals. These broader goals may not have an easy translation into the
transportation study (in terms of benefits, for example), and hence there
is a good possibility that the technical analysis becomes distorted by the
attempts of the broader and more dynamic political agenda to push the
project ahead. Furthermore, the criteria established for the approval of
the preferred alternative forces the technical analysts (with decision
makers' authority over them) to generate rather optimistic outcomes that,
again, may have little chances of being replicated when implemented.
Finally, how the decision makers perceive the chances of accomplishing
their intended goals -- generated by the myriad of competing interests
acting over the decision makers --also affects the chances of biasing the
technical process, reducing its effectiveness.
Very often, while the technical analysis focuses on the costs and
- 302 -
benefits of transit alternatives to society as a whole, decision makers
barely find the net social benefit criterion, which is basic to the
technical analysis, relevant to their often more limited objectives. If
the costs of a decision are (or can be) spread over a large number of
people while the benefits are concentrated on a narrower constituency whose
support the decision maker seeks, that decision maker will have an
incentive to conceal the costs and force the technical analysis to reflect
his/her preferences, even if actual costs are in excess of benefits. In
such situations, an "unbiased" technical analysis may give results which
decision makers (or elected officials acting over them) are hardly
interested in knowing. (The decision model developed in section 6.3.3
illustrated how the biasing process can take place.)
Towards Strengthening the Role of Technical Analysis
With these issues and constraints as a background, the crucial
question becomes whether it is possible to link more directly technical
analysis to decision making and, if it is, what can be done to accomplish
that purpose. Ideally, the theory should highlight the kinds of
information that are useful to decision makers and under what
circumstances, and give an answer to the questions of how and when
technical analysis can assist decision makers in shaping their perceptions
or the content of their decisions 2". In this thesis, some elements in
the direction of that theory have been identified. These elements should
lead to a more effective role of the analysis process in decision making.
Subsequent to that role, it is expected that some of the reasons for the
underestimation of costs will subside and the chances of generating results
244 De Neufville [1987], p. 86.
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closer to expectations will improve.
The operational extensions discussed in chapter 6 and summarized at
the beginning of this chapter attempt to make decision makers (and those
affecting decision makers) aware of the implications of their decisions as
they concern the capital and operating costs of transit alternatives. By
internalizing the analysis process and its results, decision makers should
strive for the best (and least unbiased) results they can achieve and
request this effort from the technical analyst, within the time and budget
constraints of the particular project. This does not mean that full
accuracy -- in particular, for capital and operating costs -- will be
achieved but that analyses will be carried out in a more conscious and
objective fashion. The actions in that direction can be summarized as
follows:
o Require the performance of sensitivity analyses of simultaneous sets
of variables to help perceive the relationship between alternatives
and the robustness of results. These analyses imply the
acknowledgement of the uncertainty associated with each variable and
the nature of the data (including key interdependencies).
o Complement sensitivity analysis with development of scenarios. This
scenarios would, first, pay attention to potential changes and trends
in the broader environment surrounding the transit project and,
second, analyze how these changes or trends would affect the values
that enter the cost-estimating process. Furthermore, scenario writing
would give passage to the confrontation of the different viewpoints
about the transit project and would allow the reflection of that
confrontation in the technical process (avoiding that this process
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reflects the decision maker's viewpoint only).
o Require the development of cost classifications, at least between one-
time and recurrent costs and between demand responsive and non-
responsive costs. These classifications would allow focusing on
discussion among different levels of government on which items each
one would be responsible for, and at the same time would induce and
help decision makers to perceive what would happen if expectations for
some variables (mainly, demand) do not materialize.
o Make better use of emerging computer-based information systems and
technology to speed up process (in the sense not only of generating
prompt results along with potential developments in the political
process but also of being able to redo a piece of the analysis
whenever new and actual data become available), share information with
past and present project development exercises, keep track of changes
in and sources of cost-related items, etc. By speeding up the
process, chances that the technical analysis respond in a good manner
to the requirements of the decision making process and the dynamism of
the surrounding political agenda will increase.
o Make the cost model or approach, either formal or informal, as
explicit and clear as possible. Particular approaches may blur rather
than clarify the process, although the selection of an obscure
approach may be done deliberately for other purposes (for instance,
attempts may be made to make any particular kind of data -- primarily
financial data -- hard to find or interpret). Analysts should strive
for transparency as a major characteristic of the cost-estimating
approach and its structure should provide incentives to do so.
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o Complement this explicitiness with a process that creates some
pressure on the analyst through argumentation. For example, an
approach similar to "value engineering" (see footnote 229) whereby an
independent review of the project is undertaken, outside the direct
sphere of the decision-making process, to evaluate and assess the
validity of the technical results (e.g., the cost estimates).
Nevertheless, such an approach to be endorsed by all or most of the
actors involved in the process must strive for pondering all the
constraints and opportunities related to the particular local
conditions (to avoid, for instance, that a narrow review be rejected
at the local level).
o The approach must reflect the kind of decision at stake and the need
of carrying a flexible technical process that can respond to the
dynamism of the institutional environment. A sophisticated analysis
process would probably be uncalled for if the decision environment is
highly tempestuous and aggressive. An initial simplified analysis
could help decision makers establish the framework for posterior
detailed analyses within a more controlled environment. Furthermore,
in light of the satisficing side of decision making and the fact that
qualitative analysis is central to assessing proposals by decision
makers, in some situations it would be advisable to follow a design-
to-cost approach whereby resources available are first identified,
then the value of the proposals is established ("value" in a general
sense as the overall value the project would bring about), and then
iterative tests are performed to see if the expected costs and
benefits are acceptable. In this approach, the decision problem,
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through successive iterations, is simplified to make it more
manageable and avoid a general weakness of a purely cost-benefit
approach that requires knowledge and accuracy about issues and
variables which are unknown, ill-defined, and uncertain, particularly
for innovative transit systems. In other situations, an approach that
combines maximizing with satisficing may be adequate, whereby for some
variables and criteria, the analysis would be performed up to optimum
values, while for others, satisfactory performance would be enough for
the decision at hand 245
o Though some standardization may be necessary or beneficial, narrow
criteria should be avoided as the basis for funding a transit
alternative. (For instance, standard procedures can be designed in
such a way that alternative evaluation criteria can be considered in
the process.) Some components of the technical process are relevant
to certain decision-making levels but are in conflict with other
components that are relevant to a different decision-making level.
The most conspicuous example is that of evaluation criteria and
effectiveness thresholds that must be passed to move the project
forward. Emphasis on narrow criteria simplifies the evaluation
process but may induce distortions in the overall planning process.
By shifting the focus of discussion to that of alternatives and
evaluation criteria, interested parties will become aware of the
components of the technical analysis and realize about tradeoffs
between variables. This focus would allow affected interests to
participate actively in project development -- to propose
245 Mintzberg, et.al. [1976].
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alternatives, suggest impacts that need to be considered, and
otherwise have a say in the outcome of the studies -- and would be
crucial to the success of a revised, more effective, transportation
planning effort 246
o Though some screening mechanism may always be necessary by the higher
level institution, this mechanism can be achieved in phases, starting
with a broader set of criteria in the initial stages (criteria that
should include the merits of each alternative on the basis of the
seriousness of the problem and the objectives that are pursued by the
ultimate beneficiaries). That set would be narrowed down to a more
specific one as the last stages of the process are reached (and as the
number of alternatives becomes smaller including those that are
worthwhile to the local decision-making process). At the last stages,
the criteria should nevertheless encompass performance measures
related to the broader set of merits established in the initial stages
of the planning process. The higher level institution would need then
to choose among both competing projects and competing criteria and
select which ones deserve further consideration and, eventually,
funding (and to which extent) based on the institution's goals towards
urban transportation and the political agenda prevalent at the moment.
246 In this direction, De Neufville [1987] states: "The positivist view of
knowledge on planning practice has encouraged planners to try to be
value neutral, to focus on measurable issues and general principles,
and see the production of information as distinct from the political
process. A phenomenological conception of knowledge on the other
hand, focuses on unique and particular situations, and on the everyday
world; it emphasizes the subjective meaning of the problems to the
actors, it assumes knowledge is constructed in a community rather than
having an independent existence, and it accepts that information is
shaped by preconceptions. (...) Knowledge developed interactively with
knowledge users becomes influential in decisions."
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This process would gain in flexibility but would need to be combined
with the other suggested actions (e.g., sensitivity analyses,
performance incentives, and so on).
o As a consequence of the previous point, the specific methodological
and evaluative approaches of the analysis process can hardly be
standardized 247. There may exist, however, some benefits in
standardizing some components as a mechanism to improve the quality of
the process and/or its manageability, or reduce the costs of carrying
it out. Nevertheless, these conveniences must be weighed against the
dynamism of the planning process. This process requires innovation
for depending on which criteria are deemed more appropriate, the kind
of analysis may change. For instance, if the overriding purpose for
one transit project is to improve air quality, the information and
technical methodologies of the analysis process would likely differ
from another situation where the major concern is to reduce
congestion. Moreover, innovation can help simplify the technical
process in some situations, and reduce the time to complete it.
o Establish incentives so that the planning process becomes less
distorted. For instance, reward good performance on the basis of the
criteria selected (for instance, reduction in the carbon monoxide (CO)
level in the corridor). These rewards would, for instance, increase
the funding level depending on how the final project accomplishes the
preestablished criterion thresholds (for instance, a 10 percent
247 Procedural guidelines, however, may be necessary to indicate the steps
that must be followed to request funds for a project, including the
minimum amount of information that must be reported for the higher-level
institution to initiate its own evaluative process.
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reduction in the CO level would increase funding for transit vehicles
by 10 percent). This approach should encourage, first, to establish
reasonable criteria and, second, to try to achieve the goals intended
with the transit alternative.
o Establish incentives relating the level of influence of the local
decision-making process with the funding of particular components of
the project. To the largest extent possible, those components that
are largely related to local decisions should be borne by the local
institutions. The purpose of this mechanism is that of internalizing
at the correct (local) level those items that can be more influenced
and affected by the local decision process.
Overall these actions would strengthen the technical analysis and its
relationship with the decision-making process as decision makers would have
to spell out their perceptions about the transportation "problem" early in
the process so as to reflect them in the analysis process. Those actions
also increase the communication among the actors as they must discuss the
contents and purposes of the technical analysis and agree on the decision
criteria. In this vein, the technical analysis would be become the central
argumentative element of the process rather than mostly a mere bureaucratic
hurdle.
Nevertheless those actions have the dangers of creating a stalemate
whenever actors are not able to agree upon the elements of the technical
analysis or the evaluation criteria. They will also increase the amount of
time that higher-level institutions would need to put into the discussion
of the criteria and the evaluation of different alternatives. And they
will never eliminate political favoritisms. In the end, however, the
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suggested actions should render an estimating process that reduces
deliberate biases and yields more accurate outcomes.
Conclusions
These strategies take into consideration that decision makers mostly
see the technical analysis as a response to higher-level requirements but
largely useless. This perspective distorts the technical process although
it serves well the purpose of putting ideas and actions forward. The
different actors have different time and scale frames and different
objectives to be achieved with the transit project. The clash of these
differences cannot be solved if the analysis process is confined to narrow
limits. For the process to be more effective, it must allow for
negotiation not only in the goals to be achieved but also in how to
undertake the analysis (e.g., evaluation criteria).
The communication between the technical and decision making processes
increases the possibilities of biased estimates. On the other hand, the
communication is needed as the only way for the technical analysis to
perceive the many issues involved in the transportation planning process
and to incorporate them in the technical evaluation. Without that
communication, a larger discrepancy between estimates and actual values
would probably occur. The communication serves as a way to reduce
uncertainty, particularly the one labelled "actionable." It also serves as
a learning tool for the interests involved in the planning process 248.
How much learning can take place, however, is not trivial. The
sophistication of some of the techniques may be too high to prevent any
learning. In addition, learning may happen in the opposite direction,
248 Ines [1988].
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since distortion is always possible (e.g., people may think that one
alternative is better than another based on distorted, biased information).
Some of the strategies indicated above attempt to reduce the biasing
of results and improve the possibilities of learning. In addition, the
technical studies can set a basis for litigation, encouraging analysts and
decision makers to avoid excessive distortions of the process. Litigation
however is a poor function for a transportation study. The alternative is
to open the analysis process to scenario writing and design, sensitivity
analysis, and discussion of evaluation criteria. This approach can be, if
nothing else, "an important tool for communication" 249, and can help
generate a "learning" environment. The adequate articulation of such a
framework would allow the "synergy" of the technical (positivist) approach
and the social-argumentative approach.
The purpose of the technical analysis is not to achieve the truth
(that may only be the correct purpose under very particular situations),
but rather to inform the interested parties about the consequences of
alternative actions and, ultimately, help them reach a consensus about
which alternative to pursue. However, since the technical process falls in
the hands of some actors (and not of others), and knowledge about the
elements of the process is never complete, it also serves the strategic
purposes of particular actors. That is why by recognizing the components
of the framework presented in this thesis, mechanisms can be established to
improve how the technical process is undertaken to avoid distortions and
biases. In this vein, particular mechanisms such as those presented in the
preceeding section can contribute to achieve consensus and serve the
249 Pearman [1988], page 83.
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decision-making process effectively, by giving it the right warnings and
the right incentives.
7.3. Recapitulation: Some Views with Hindsight
A manifest dissatisfaction with the results of technical analyses in
transportation planning and the burden that (deliberate or accidental)
technical errors may create on national and local economies led to
investigate the reasons for the underestimation of capital and operating
costs from a process (behavioral) perspective and to identify the
components of a framework that shows the interaction among the elements
that shape those technical analyses and the decisions that accompany their
results.
As data and methods cannot usually be adapted to the complexity and
dynamism of some public policy issues, the underestimation issue is looked
upon within the realm of an approach --the social-argumentative paradigm--
broader than the one that would be dictated by a more quantitative one (for
instance, a statistical approach). The social-argumentative approach looks
at the process as a tool both for argumentation and for structuring the
dialogue. It led to highlight the difficulties imbedded in several
components (such as the decision criteria, the management of information,
the perspectives on the problem, and the ill-definition of some of its
elements), and to suggest particular actions to address those difficulties.
This section develops a view with hindsight about the possible ways
the proposed framework and the subsequent recommended actions could improve
the cost-estimation process in transit project planning and what would have
happened had these actions been applied to the situations of the case
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studies. In addition, it further highlights some general conclusions about
the conditions (or characteristics) that would actually influence the way
decision making uses technical analysis.
The effective consideration of the normative basis stated in section
2.5 implies the opportunity to make informed decisions. The strengthening
of quantitative techniques is a necessary step in this direction. However,
this strengthening must always be accompanied by the recognition of its
limitations and the acknowledgement of its potential roles. Difficulties
seldom lie with the quantitative elements in the strict sense. The design
of an efficient system on paper does not necessarily helps overcome the
resistance offered by, for instance, institutional restrictions or a host
of economic and political interests that inhibit an unbiased and impartial
analysis of options. The reason for this mainly stems from the fact that
who benefits from and who pays for the construction of a transit facility
may require far more attention that the question of which alternative is
more efficient or generates the greater net of benefits over costs (e.g.,
has the best cost-effectiveness index, however this index in defined).
That is why the proposed framework underscores the need for changes in
method and attitude arising from the inability of the more quantitative and
conventional methodologies for handling the socio-political, institutional
and personal aspects of problems that stir a substantial involvement of
public interests. And that is why the framework also emphasizes the
consideration of how the analysis can be constrained by the institutions
and individuals affected by the implementation of its results.
This does not mean to translate into the discredit of the development
and improvement of technical methods and approaches. Technical analyses
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are a fundamental tool in assisting and shaping decisions (as shown in the
La Paz case study). Nevertheless, decision-makers and analysts alike must
appreciate its limitations and acknowledge what to expect from it. In
particular situations, what to expect from technical analyses should be
rather modest, and that may dictate the use of particular methodological
approaches (in terms of complexity, flexibility, etc.). Technical analyses
can help (1) reduce the complexity of problems to manageable proportions;
(2) eliminate from consideration the demonstrably inferior alternatives;
(3) find one alternative that all interested parties can accept even though
they are not fully satisfied; (4) widen the area of informed judgment; and
(5) yield insights, particularly with regard to the dominance and
sensitivity of the parameters 250
In order to achieve those roles, technical analyses must be understood
as an argumentative and structuring component -- that emphasizes the
process rather than the product -- within the overall planning exercise.
Furthermore, in order to reduce the possible distortion of its results and
increase its assistance role, the stakes of the actors must be somewhat
internalize into the process. When analysis emphasizes the product and the
actors' stakes are barely internalized, the technical analysis often
becomes an end in itself and tends to be used for unintended purposes (like
the support of previously-made decisions). The US cases clearly
illustrated how participants can become bogged down in technical quibbles
to fit the results within the guidelines of the higher-level institution
and meet universalistic criteria in their attempt to make the initially-
preferred project worthwhile to the eyes of that higher-level institution.
250 Quade [1989].
- 315 -
What are the main implications of the proposed framework and the
suggested actions for the case studies ? In general terms: (i) sensitivity
analyses should have shown that some alternatives were not discernable from
others; (ii) incentives (along the lines of those used in the program
contracts discussed in the Madrid case) should have prevented excessive
distortion of demand and cost estimates; (iii) discussion of evaluation
criteria at the beginning of the technical process should have produced a
less beleaguered process; and (iv) some systems may not have been built
(although this would have been unlikely in the situations of the US case
studies discussed in this thesis because of the strong political
motivations prevalent during their development) or at least should have
been built to less-ambitious design standards.
In addition, the whole planning process should have taken less time as
the discussion of technical and methodological disagreements from the
outset would have cleared the way to a more speedy process at the end,
avoiding the threat of stalemate, endless discussions about very specific
figures, and decisions drastically made outside the technical arena.
Advancing the discussion of the most controversial points (including
evaluation criteria) at the beginning should likely reduce the time to
complete the studies (and implement the selected alternative). This is
because, though additional time would need to be spent at the beginning, at
the end, the process would run smoothly and with less tendency to bias the
results and produce undue tensions among the interested actors.
The adequacy of methods to the decision environment (i.e., level of
sophistication, cost classifications, etc.) and the use of flexible
database management systems would further allow one to put in place an
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iterative process whereby assumptions can be tested and tradeoffs easily
perceived. Analysts should then be able to respond faster to shifts
generated in the political arena and increase their chances of shaping that
arena instead of being fully overpowered by it. These aspects underscore
the value of quantitative analysis and the value of flexibility (as
happened in the case studies abroad).
In response to a local initiative, the process should start with
discussion of the goals, the range of possible options, and the criteria
for the selection of the best alternative. The local participants would
tend to portray the alternatives as the best for the purposes of particular
goals (and may tend to select those goals and criteria for which those
alternatives are best). The higher-level institution, with its own set of
concerns (goals), may or may not coincide with the local level in its
perception of the problem, the goals, or the evaluation criteria. If it
does not, the proposal would be rejected. If it does, the proposal can go
forward and new discussions would be started to work on the technical
details, identify particular alternatives, and the specific criteria to
evaluate them. This would mean that project construction would be granted
at this moment, subject to a limit for the funds to be disbursed based on
the extent to which the goals are important for the higher-level
institution (and possibly the pressures from the political side) and
perhaps earmarked to particular items of the project proposal. The
agreement would involve incentives for good performance (in terms, for
instance, of reaching the expected demand and keeping costs within small
variations of the estimated ones). Similarly, bands of performance
indicators should indicate the higher level institution the reasonability
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of the results of the technical analysis (and peer pressure can be
introduced by calling, as it has been done recently in the US, on the
expert advice of independent parties).
In Buffalo, a concern about economic development (and comparisons with
the city of Toronto) forced the presentation of the alternatives with
rather low capital and operating costs and with a radically unconventional
design. A more open discussion of decision criteria might have indicated
that the construction of the rail transit system might not have been the
most adequate means to bring economic development to the region and that a
different set of design standards (less ambitious and more flexible) would
have been more adequate (with more emphasis on the achievement of economic-
development goals). Sensitivity analyses should have shown that the
preferred alternative was not necessarily the best performing one
(according to several criteria) and the potential variations in its costs
and the burden to the local economy if some of the assumptions change.
Performance incentives should have decreased the apparent lack of interest
in knowing more about utility networks along the transit corridor and the
potential costs to relocate them.
In Santa Clara, the concern was congestion as well as rehabilitation
of the downtown area (with the aim of changing land use patterns towards
higher residential densities). Community participation was extensive but
the technical analysis could not follow it (or did not try to). There was
a latent dichotomy and competition between freeway and transit advocates
and, within this latter group, between bus and rail supporters. Had the
analysis been used to take consideration of these arguments, more insights
should have been gained into ridership estimates and the implications of
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these estimates on the rest of the variables. Moreover, evaluation
criteria would have played a more predominant role. The in-depth
discussion of assumptions, goals, and criteria from the outset would
probably have led to the development of a more transparent technical
process and would have reduced the possibilities of (deliberate or
accidental) distortions.
In Boston, the local interests emphasized congestion and environmental
concerns, within the constraints generated by existing transit
technologies. The proposed actions would have diminished the apparent
juggling with cost-effectiveness measures and would have reduced the mutual
distrust among neighborhood groups and local institutions as well as the
strains between the state and federal governments. The technical process
would have been improved with the discussion of criteria and a more open
questioning of assumptions and tradeoffs (e.g., phasing of alternatives,
changes in ridership) with communities and the federal government. The
mistrust (largely created because of the emphasis on cost-effectiveness
criteria) prevented a complementary relationship between the local
decision-making process and that of the higher-level institution.
How can the higher-level institution compare alternatives that come
from different places if criteria among them are different ? (For
instance, Buffalo's system emphasizing economic development, Santa Clara's
land use changes, and Boston's traffic congestion.) As indicated in page
307, criteria would follow a pyramidal pattern whereby, initially, for the
purposes of coalition building, a set of broader indicators is used and,
further along the process, these criteria becomes more specific, though
incorporating (through performance measures) the concerns expressed by the
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local interests at the outset. The higher level institution would then
have to compare competing projects and competing criteria with its own
agenda of goals and political constraints, and decide on which set of
projects to fund and to what extent.
In this approach, furthermore, decision makers at the different levels
would based their decisions on a broader set of indicators and tradeoffs,
not necessarily more information. Moreover, the approach takes into
account that decisions do not always fit the homogeneous decision-makers'
model as often the individuals whom a study is done for are no more that
key participants in a decision-making process; it can enhance the
possibilities of a productive dialogue that uses the technical analysis to
bring others to discuss their points of view and reach a consensus.
In addition, the assistance role of the technical analysis can be
better achieved if decision makers perceive the need to get involved in its
development and outcomes. That perception can be heightened with the right
incentives, the internalization of some of the outcomes, and the correct
structuring of the process to better serve (not necessarily reflect) the
needs of the decision-making function. But how would the decision makers
be induced to pay greater attention to the technical process ?. If the
process focuses more on decision criteria, decision tradeoffs, and decision
payoffs (incentives), they would likely tend to intensify their interest
about the implications of their decisions as their own role in the
development of the technical process becomes more fundamental.
Some of these conclusions may seem obvious. It is however surprising
to find how unlikely they are taken into consideration. This is mainly a
consequence of a prevalent perspective that limits the purpose of the
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technical analysis and the way criteria and methods are selected to choose
among alternative projects. The acknowledgement of a perspective that sees
the technical process more as part of an argumentative and structuring
process can contribute to improve its function and strengthen the overall
transportation planning process.
7.4. Limitations of the Research
The process-orientation of the research (process in the sense of
explicit and implicit procedures) proved valuable to achieve the objectives
of the thesis. By looking at the different steps of both the technical and
decision-making processes, the thesis helped realize about the
difficulties, constraints, and issues involved in the cost-estimating
function. Furthermore, the multiple-perspective approach assumed to
analyze the decision-making process helped identify the different
components of that process and their connection with the technical process.
It also helped perceive the stakes of the actors involved in the process
and the various decision-making processes that take place in transit-
project planning. The approach also helped explain the relevance of
technical analysis and its role as a means to meet organizational
requirements or justify previously-made decisions.
By taking such an approach, however, the research did not permit to
focus in detail on particular elements of the estimating function and to
achieve more specific conclusions about particular elements of that
process. Some examples of these specific elements or conclusions are the
following: (a) under what specific conditions costs would be accurate; (b)
how sensitivity analysis should be carried out; (c) which kind of
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organizational setup would better support particular decision-making
environments; (d) what would be the specific components of an effective
computer-based cost information system; and (e) which kind of specific cost
models are suitable for specific institutional environments and
characteristics of decision makers. Furthermore, some specific components
of the analytical framework, such as the decision model developed in
section 6.3.3, could not be actually tested (although their development was
strongly supported by evidence gathered from the case studies).
Finally, the process-oriented approach limited the number of case
studies the research could focus on. The consideration of a larger number
of case studies could have brought additional insights into some particular
issues. For instance, the consideration of a broader set of case studies
may have helped identify situations where a stronger positivist role of
technical analysis in decision making was in effect (at least stronger than
in the cases discussed in this thesis). A broader set of case studies may
have helped to single out that combination of, say, technical
characteristics, decision makers' personalities, and institutional
conditions that more likely makes objective technical analysis an
overriding factor in the process of selecting the preferred alternative.
7.5. Areas for Further Research
This thesis has presented a framework for the estimating function in
the planning process. Further research could be undertaken on each one of
the elements of that framework. By focusing on some of these particular
elements, further insights could be gain on how the analysis process could
be forced to be closer to a normative ideal (as it relates not only to the
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rational paradigm but also to the social-argumentative one).
The following are some areas that deserve further research:
(a) Approaches to sensitivity analysis and scenario writing; alternative
techniques and their characteristics; and how they should be
implemented to make them useful to decision makers. This research
would not simply focus on the rational techniques to sensitivity
analyses and scenario writing but also on how their use can be
tailored to the decision-making process so that their results are
considered in an effective manner for the decision makers to perceive
the tradeoffs between uncertainty and outcomes.
(b) Particular technical components of the analysis process such as the
role of contingency factors in the estimating function, the
development of cost classifications, or the design of efficient and
transparent database structures. This area could also include
approaches and specific proposals to improve government regulations
for capital project evaluation. This research would be geared towards
strengthening the theoretical basis of the cost estimating function on
those components, methods or techniques, that have the possibility of
improving the linkage of the technical analysis with the decision-
making process.
(c) Kinds of (explicit or implicit) decision criteria being used by
decision makers to select transit alternatives. This research would
analyze in depth the issues related to decision criteria discussed in
section 5.3, and would identify and compare the appropriateness of
particular different types of criteria in terms of their equity
(across alternatives) and efficiency (allocating specific costs and
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benefits to different alternatives) characteristics, and their
technical requirements (or how hard it is to calculate a particular
type of criteria).
(d) Assumed role of technical analysts and decision makers in the
transportation planning process. This research would undertake an
empirical investigation (through surveys) on how technical analysts
and decision makers perceive their roles in transportation planning
and how those assumed roles actually affect the development of the
process (e.g., time to undertake a particular study) and its final
outcome (e.g., its accuracy or effectiveness).
(e) Organizational issues. This research would delve into the
investigation of the types of organizational frameworks that sustain a
stronger or weaker role of the technical analysis. In light of the
unavoidable discontinuities of the transportation planning process,
this research would test alternative hypothesis about the types of
organizational settings that tend to minimize the negative effects of
those discontinuities (see section 5.4.3).
(f) Incentives to the achievement of a normative ideal, along the lines
advanced in this thesis. Further research should be undertaken on
incentives that can be incorporated to particular criteria or
institutional processes to (a) make interested actors (e.g., decision
makers) to effectively internalize the outcomes of their actions
(e.g., decisions) and (b) reduce distortions in the planning process.
(g) The cases illustrated that transit proposals often come about because
of the perception that only fixed-guideway systems can help revitalize
central areas or redirect urban growth (influencing land use
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patterns). The exact relationship of the construction of transit
facilities to these impacts is far from conclusive. At most, theories
seem to support that transit facilities are necessary but not
sufficient to generate those impacts. There is a need to nail down
the investigation of what factors, particularly institutional, would
help achieve the goals that so often are assigned to transportation
projects of the kind investigated in this thesis. (Initially, transit
projects may help boost particular urban areas; but later, if
increases in operating deficits are not offset by gains in
productivity, those projects can become a burden to the local economy,
unless subsidies are secured from higher level institutions.)
(h) Comparative operating costs. As illustrated in some of the case
studies, local decision makers often claim that rail operating costs
are lower than bus operating costs. This assertion is a key one in
the attempt to raise constituency support for rail-based alternatives.
Transit systems in place, however, do not definitely back this claim
(in part because ridership falls below expectations). Further
research should be done in this topic with the aim at better relating
operating costs to the characteristics of particular transit systems
and to ridership figures.
(i) Finally, the role of computer-based information and, in more general
terms, the impacts of the way information is presented to decision
makers. It is often hypothesized that computer-experienced decision
makers would be more suspicious or less confident of computer-derived
information than would the non-experienced. (Computer- experienced
people know its limitations and, therefore, are probably less
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influenced by information that is computer generated than they would
be by information presented in a more traditional format. On the
other hand, non-experienced people may hold the computer in reverence
and thus place too much confidence in computer-generated information,
and may be more influenced in their choice activity by information
that was computer generated than by identical information presented in
a more traditional medium.) The research would look at the
implications (advantages and disadvantages) that alternative methods
of presenting information have on decision makers' choices (e.g., the
possible biases that computerized information may introduce into the
selection process).
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A Detailed Description of UMTA's System
for Rating Proposed Major Transit-Investments
1. Introduction
This paper provides a detailed description of the system used by the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) to make funding decisions on major
transit projects proposed for Federal assistance. The rating system has been
designed to provide a rational approach to the allocation of Federal funds in
a setting where the demand for Federal assistance far exceeds available
resources. Recent estimates of the costs to complete all of the
fixed-quideway projects being considered in the country approach $20 billion.
In contrast, Federal discretionary funds currently available for new start
projects are approximately $400 million per year.
The paper focuses on UMTA's development of project ratings and allocations of
discretionary funds. The ratings and funding decisions are based on data
produced cooperatively by State/local agencies and UMTA during planning and
enqineerinq studies. Since the rating system requires no additional
information beyond that routinely available from these studies, this paper
gives little emphasis to basic technical methods. A discussion of these
methods is presented in "Technical Guidelines for Alternatives Analysis,"
available from UMTA's Office of Grants-Management.
This explanation of the rating system is provided with the expectation that it
will permit a better understanding of UMTA's decisionmaking and sharpen the
focus of planning for major transit projects on th cost-effective use of
Federal, State, and local resources.
1(a) Background
On May 18, 1984, UMTA published in the Federal Register a revised policy on
major transit investments. The policy reaffirmed UMTIA's process for planning
and development of major transit investments, established in previous policy
statements. More significantly, the revised policy clearly stated the
criteria and methods UMTA uses to evaluate the merits of proposed major
transit projects for Federal assistance. These criteria were used by UMTA to
recomend projects for Section 3 new start funds in Fiscal Year 1985.
In the future, some modification may be made in the details, though not in the
overall structure, of the rating system. In designing the system, UMTA ha
necessarily restricted its data requirementsto the information currently
available from completed studies -- alternatives analyses and preliminary
engineering efforts. A likely area for improvement over currently available
data is in the measurement of transportation benefits accruing from the
projects. With specific quidelines from UMTA, local and State agencies will
be able to produce more detailed estimates of these benefits than the somewhat
aqqregate measures that are currently available. As these data are developed,
some aspects of the rating system may be revised to incorporate the
information.
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1(b) Applicability
This system applies to proposals for funding under the "New Starts and
Extensions" category of Section 3 and to similar fixed-quideway projects
proposed for funding under tne discretionary portion of the Interstate
Transfer program. Ratings will not be developed for fixed-guideway projects
proposed for funding exclusively with funds under Section 9 or under the
formula-allocated portion of the Interstate Transfer program. However,
projects in both of these categories will be subjected to threshold tests for
minimum levels of cost-effectiveness.
1(c) Overview and Definitions
The UMTA rating system is best described as a method for the allocation of
Federal assistance. It is used to ensure that whatever discretionary Federal
funds are are available for major investments are directed toward the best
projects. To accomplish this, the system compares projectsaainsteach oQ er
and identifies thosethathave the highest relative merits. This approach is
quite different from one that would evaluate each project in isolation and
attempt to identify each project's absolute merits -- whether its benefits
exceed its costs.
A clear definition of terms is crucial to an understanding of the rating
system and its use in funding decisions. Five terms represent the key feature
of the development and application of the system.
Federal objectives in urban transportation
Criteria to measure performance on each objective
Indices that measure combined performance on all objectives
Ratings that indicate UMTA's overall assessment of the project
Funding decisions that optimize the allocation of available funds
The entire ratinq system is based on a specific statement of UMTA's
objectives in assistance to State and local governments providing public
transportation services. These objectives are clearly stated in past
legislation, have evolved over the years in dialogue between UMTA and the
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Congress, and are reiterated in the May 18 policy statement. Section 2(a) of
this paper summarizes the objectives.
To indicate the extent to which a proposal meets these objectives, UMTA has
identified, for each objective, one or more criteria to measure project
performance. These criteria are designed to reflect all of the benefits
generated by each project and to avoid any bias toward a particular type of
project or geographical area of the country. Section 2(b) identifies the
criteria and explains how performance on each criterion is measured.
To combine the various criteria into a small number of indicators of
investment worthiness, UMTA computes two indices that compare the trade-offs
between costs and benefits from two perspectives. One index represents the
Federal perspective, comparing benefits against the required Federal
investment. The other represents society's perspective, comparing benefits
against total costs. In computing the indices, UMTA applies several threshold
tests to screen out any projects that are clearly unattractive proposals for
Federal assistance. Section 3 of this paper explains the computation of the
indices and identifies minimum performance levels required for projects to be
considered for Federal funding assistance.
The indices are applied with judgment, recognizing that uncertainties exist in
the data used in their computation. Rather than a mechanical conversion of
the indices into a ranked list of projects, UMTA assigns a rating to each
project to reprdsent its overall -mritl. The number of proposals assigned any
particular rating is determined solely by the merits of the proposals.
Projects receiving the same rating are ordered judgmentally, with reference to
their performance on all criteria and emphasis on the magnitude, stlity.
and reliability of local financial cnmmitments. Section 4 discusses UMTA's
assimellt[1 d rating to each project.
Given the project ratings and the estimated balance of UMTA's authorization
not covered by letters of intent, UMTA recommends funding of the most highly
rated projects that have completed preliminary engineering and a Final
Environmental Impact Statement. In making this recommendation, UMTA considers
other highly rated projects currently in preliminary enqi.neering, since these
projects are liklely to be ready tor funding decisions within the current
autorization cycle. Section 5 of this paper discusses the development of
funding recommendations.
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2. Objectives and Criteria
A meaningful evaluation of major investment proposals from the Federal
perspective depends upon a clear statement of the Federal interest in urban
mass transportation. Drawing upon both recent and past legislation for
guidance, this section sets forth UMTA's goals and objectives and identifies
the measures that UMTA uses to quantify project performance on each criterion.
2(a) Federal Objectives in Urban Mass Transportation
The rating system is based on the overall objectives of the UMTA program,
derived from the findings and purposes contained in the Urban Mass
Transportation Act. Two primary purposes of the program, according to the
Act, are to "assist in the ev-lnPm~nt nf JMDroved mass transoortatin
facilities, equipment, techninues. and methods' and to "encourage the planninq
and establishment ot areawide urban mass transrortation systems needed tor
economical and desirable urban develo'ment." In the most general sense, then,
'the overall Federal interest in transit is the provision of an essential level
of urban mobility for the public by financially assisting the development of
efficient urban mass transportation networks.
The primary emphasis here is on transportation service and the mobility it
provides. Several other considerations, ranging from economic development to
pollutant reductions to energy conservation, are secondary, but are so closely
related to improements in mobility that they are implicity included in both
the Federal objectives and the evaluation system. Beyond these, however, are
additional considerations, such as image and amenity, that are outside the
primary Federal interest. The rating system does not preclude local
governments from proposing projects which tend to maximize such benefits, but
it identifies the extra costs and accounts for them in the rating process.
2(b) Criteria for Assessing Project Performance from the Federal Perspective
There are no perfect criteria for measurinq how well proposed transit projects
meet the Federal objectives. However, the Congress and UMTA have identified
several criteria that reflect the extent to which a major investment proposal
attains these objectives within the limited resources of the UMTA capital
program. These criteraaeSdesccntyith 94Apoitos
ConTerence Report. They include:
o cost-efj-ctiv.eness:
o local fiscal effort, including the stability and reliability of local
funding sources:
o private sector participation;
o tie resul -t- aterntives analysis:
o participation of disadvantaged business enterprises: and
o support by local governments and t~he commu~t.
All of these criteria are incorporated into UMTA's rating system. The first
four criteria are used to compute indices that provide an objective basis on
which to compare investment proposals. The fifth criterion, participation by
disadvantaged businesses, is applied through a minimum standard that proposals
must meet to be eligible for Federal funding. The last criterion, local
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support, is highly related to local fiscal effort and private sector
participation. It is also considered, together with all of the other
criteria, in the development of UMTA's final judgment on the overall merits of
each project.
For each criterion listed above, one or more measures have been developed to
quantify the performance of projects in terms of that criterion. The selected
measures are comprehensive, in that they capture fully the benefits of
interest to the Federal perspective, and objective in that they avoid any bias
toward a particular kind of project or particular geographical region. Thus,
the measures provide a sound basis with which to identify projects that
provide the highest return on the investment of limited Federal resources.
Cost-Effectiveness Within UMTA's rating system, cost-effectiveness means the
extent to which a project returns benefits relative to .tI01 The
cost-errTectivenes of a proposed major investment is measured in terms of its
added benefits and added costs when compared to lower cost options. The lower
cost option S primary interest is the Trani-iot ~tion ystem Management (TSM)
alternative included in every alternatives analysis. The TSM alternative
includes such low cost actions as traffic engineering, transit operational
changes, and modest capital improvements. It is designed to address specific
transportation problems in the corridor and demonstrate the extent to which
these problems can be solved without a major investment in new facilities.
The TSM alternative is designed within real world limits -- street capacity to
accommodate bus movements, financial resources to fund operating deficits, and
so forth -- and is therefore a realistic option that represents a true
alternative to major new transit facilities. The TSM alternative provides a
baseline beyond which it is possible to isolate the added costs and added
benefits resulting from a proposed major investment.
The TSM alternative also plays a key role in ensuring an even-handed
comparison between cities whose transit properties may today have very
different levels of service efficiency. For a property that has already taken
most low-cost steps to improve their operations and service, the TSM
alternative is likely to include significantly fewer actions than would the
TSM alternative for a property where less has been done to improve
efficiency. In both cases, then, the TSM alternative represents the best that
can be done without a major investment, rather than what has been done so
far. Since cost-effectiveness is measured against the TSM alternTT7T--The
Fting system avoids crediting a less efficient property with benefits that
could be achieved through low-cost actions that have already been taken by
other properties competing for Federal assistance.
Since the rating system is used to make decisions within UMTA's capital
program, the costs considered are total capital costs over the expected life
ofthe_prdjiecTt yic ylT40 to 50eea Bnefits are also-iialuodovFer the
entire life of~heU project. From the Federal perspective, the benefits
considered are:
o attraction of new transit riders:
o improvement in service (travel times) for existing riders: and
o reductions in operating and maintenance casts for transit operators.
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The first two measures capture very well the direct benefits from a
transportation improvement. They focus on transportation benefits, which are
primary from the Federal perspective. The third measure reflects the Federal
interest in reducing operating costs and deficits as a means of strengthening
the financial position of local transit operators. It should be noted that
where alternatives lead to increases in travel times or operating costs, these
disbenefits are counted as added CostS.
Obvious questions arise on the extent to which these few measures can capture
the wide variety of benefits resulting from a major transit investment. Two
considerations are key to the answer to these questions. First is the
recognition that most of the secondary benefits of a transit project are
direct consequences of the service and patronage impacts ot that project.
Because of this dependence, the measures are good surrogates for a wide range
of non-transportation benefits. For example, where substantial numbers of new
riders are qained, there will be associated benefits--less highway congestion,
lower energy consumption and pollutant emissions, and so forth--whose
magnitude depend directly on the magnitude of the ridership gain. Further,
improvement in service to existing riders is a good indicator of improved
mobility for the transit dependent and increased accessibility to employment
locations.
Even such an indirect impact as economic development is well represented by
gains in new ridership and improved service for existing riders. The
likelihood that'a transit project will have significant impacts on development
patterns is largely determined by its ability to provide significant increases
in accessibility and patronage. As a result, a project with little or no
service and ridership impacts will likely have similarly modest development
impacts. Thus, the evaluation system does recognize differences between
projects in terms of their potential impacts on development.
The second key is that the function of the rating system is to allocate funds
within a set buciqlet. this tas requires only the ordering ot projects
according to their relati1ve merits rather than calculation of their absolute
merits. Since the transportation benefits ot a project are proportloni ru
its overall benefits, the ordering of projects based on transportation
benefits alone is the same ordering that would result if the secondary
benefits were measured as well. Consequently, the indirect measurement of
secondary benefits is quite adeqtiate for the purposes of the rating system.
Direct measurement of the secondary benefits would become critical only if the
system were designed to judge the absolute merits of each project -- whether
its total benefits exceed its costs.
It is important to note that "new" riders are computed as the difference
in ridership between two alternatives, not between two different years. Thus,
new riders are generated only by the transit service differences between the
two alternatives, not by any growth in ridership caused by changes in
population and employment over time. This definition avoids any bias that
might occur in the comparison of a project in a rapidly growing city with one
in a city with a moderate growt*h rate.
The use of both the "new rider" and "existing rider" measures further ensures
region. The "new riders" measure works well in situations where transit is
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currently less competitive as an alternative to the automobile -- where that
the evaluation is not biased toward any particular type of project or highway
congestion makes bus service slow and unreliable, for example. In these
situations, the primary objective is usually the attraction of new transit
riders from their automobiles. However, in many other cities, transit is
already a competitive alternative to the automobile -- often because of very
high parking costs in the downtown. In these situations, the primary
objective of a major improvement is better service for existing transit
riders. Thus, th of both the addition of new transit riders and service
impprrodv to existingTTders capturesa rIth'p imary
transportation benefits in very different settings.
In general , then, the attraction of new riders and service improvements for
existing riders are good measures of the transportation benefits that are of
primary Federal interest: they are also good indicators of a wide range of
other benefits associated with major transit projects. Together with
reductions in operating and maintenance costs, these indicators provide a
comprehensive and objective basis for comparing proposed investments.
Local Fiscal Effort Local funds are defined to include capitalcontributions
from local and State governments, as welI as transportation and other
agencies. They do not include funds from UMTA's Section 9 program or the
Interstate Transfer program. From UMTA's perspective, local fiscal effort
plays three important roles in determining project merit. First, any excess
match above the statutory minimum enables UMTA to assist a wider range of
capital projects within its limited capital program. Second, local fiscal
effort is an excellent indicator of the depth of the 16EaI'commitment to
transit in general and to the proposed improvement in particular. Third a
stable and reliable source of funding for the long-term operation of a local
transit system reduces the risk that shortfalls in operating revenues willjeopardize the usefulness of the capital investment in new transit facilities.
An obvious concern here is the relative importance of the cost-effectiveness
and local fiscal effort criteria. Local match and overmatch are treated by
UMTA as credits against the cost of a project that make the Federal investment
more productive. Thus, a significant local fiscal effort can work to make a
proposal more attractive for ' v ment but lack of local financing
eyon e a u ory minimum local match does not introduce any pena ty. As a
result, highly cost-effective projects remain attractive candidates 6o
investment even if they do not include an overmatch. Cities with marginal
projects can work to improve their attractiveness by increasing the local
fiscal effort.
Private Sector Contributions Again from the Federal perspective, capital
contributions by the private sector act as both a means for reducing Federal
costs and as an indicator of local support for the proposed investment.
Therefore, private sector funds are treated similarly to funds from States and
local governments.
The Results of Alternatives Analysis One of the most important products_gf
alternatives analysis is a determination on the potential cost-effectiveness
of alternatives to the proposeu investment. wnere it is ound thatmore
cost- eveit 
-perrty is introduced to reflect the
extent to which the proposal is a less paFdactive-rse-of--federal'fiidns~
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Participation of Disadvantaqed Business Enterprises To be eligible for
Federal funding, projects must comply with Section 105(f) of the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 that calls for 10 percent participation
by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises. In developing final judgments on
projects that are similar in terms of cost-effectiveness, UMTA will also
consider the extent to which the projects may exceed this minimum threshold.
Support by Local Governments and the Community Since the most direct evidence
of local support is the local financial commitment to the project, much of
this consideration is captured in the criterion on local fiscal effort.
Beyond the financial aspect, however, UMTA considers other local actions to
improve the effectiveness of the proposed investment, including the adoption
of supportive land use and transportation policies (zoning and parking
management, for example). The level of community support, as evidenced by
endorsements by local officials, civic groups, and private citizens, is also
considered in UMTA's overall evaluation of a project, but is secondary to the
strength of financial commitments and adoption of supporting actions.
- 353 -
3. Calculation of Indices of Project Merit and Application of Threshold Tests
To aid in the'assignment of ratings to proposals for Federal funding
assistance, UMTA computes two indices that represent the cost-effectiveness of
the proposals from two perspectives. The data uised in these computations are
taken directly from the results of technical studies -- system
alternative fiireiminary engineering -- done by local
governments and agencies with UMTA's technical and financi assistance. To
be1TTTfor Federal funds, the proposals must then satisfy three threshold
tests of their cost-effectiveness.
3(a) Calculation of the Indices
Two indices are used to provide two perspectives on a proposed transit
investment. One perspective is that of the Federal government, in which the
Federal funds needed for the project are compared to its total benefits. The
other perspective is that of society in general, in which total total funds
needed -- regardless of their source -- are compared to total benefits.
The index representing the Federal perspective is computed as
AI $CAP + A $0M + A $TT - A $LOC
(1) Federal Index =RIDER
A RIDERS
where the A's represent changes in costs and benefits compared to the TSM
alternative, and
$CAP = total capital costs, annualized over the life of the project:
$0&M = annualized operating and maintenance costs'
$TT = annualized value of traveltime savings for existing riders;
$LOC = annualized value of local, State, and private capital funding:
RIDERS = annual transit ridership, measured in "linked" trips.
The index used to represent society's perspective is similar, omitting only
the term for local match, andis computed aW
A $CAP + A $0&M + A $TT
(2) Total Index =
A RIDERS
In both indices, "existing" riders are transit patrons carried by the
TSM alternative in the forecast year -- that is, those riders who would exist
without a new transit guideway. Values of time necessary to convert travel
time into its monetary equivalent have been derived from a survey of research
in the field. The research indicates that 1) the value of travel time is
dependent on both the traveler's wage rate and trip purpose, and 2) that the
values can be computed as approximately one-third the wage rate for work trips
and one-sixth the wage rate for all other trips. Given the current national
average wage rate, values of $4.00 and $2.00 per hour respectively have been
used for 1984. These values will be updated periodically as wage rates change
over time.
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While both indices produce ratios with units of "added cost per new rider,"
they both reflect benefits to existing riders and savings in operating costs
as well as te attraction of nelw riders.The indices can be int'erpreted as
ratios between the necessary capital investment and the return in transit
ridership, with credits for 0&M cost savings, traveltime savings, and local
funding used to offset some (or all) of the capital costs. Clearly, bette
projects will be indicated by lower values for both indices. For extemely
attractive projects, total credits may exceed the capital cost and the
resulting indices will be negative.
The indices can also be shown graphically. Figure 1 shows three alternatives
within a given city, represented by their respective cost and ridership
increments. Ihe graph also effectively represents the TSM alternative since
the TSM option is the basis for computing the increments and therefore lies at
the origin. The figure could represent the computation of either index since
they differ only in the use of local funding as one of the credits against
capital costs. In Figure 1, it is clear that Alternative A is the most
cost-effective, since it attracts the same number of riders at a lower cost
than Alternative C and attracts more riders for the same cost as Alternative
B. It is fairly easy to see that better alternatives are found higher and to
the left of the graph where relatively more riders are gained at relatively
lower costs. Thus, the slope of a line connecting an alternative with the
origin is an indicator of the alternatives's cost-effectiveness and, in fact,
the slope is the inverse of the index defined above.
City X City Y
25 25 FRONTIER
20 o ,0 20 G
Added A C
Riders 15 0 15 0
(MM's 10 TS / 10
per H
year) 5 o 5 o
B D TSM
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
Added Capital Costs Less Credits Added Capital Costs Less Credits
($MM's per year) ($MM's per year)
Figure 1 Figure 2
Figure 2 illustrates the use of the graphical representation to identify the
"best" alternatives from a given city. The figure connects the four
alternatives (D, E, F, and G) that lie highest and furthest to the left. The
resulting boundary, or "frontier," indicates the best that can be done with
increasing levels of investment in the corridor. Alternatives H and I lie
below and to the right of this frontier, indicating that they are inferior to
the options found along the frontier. The shape of the frontier also
demonstrates the declining productivity of the higher increments of investment
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in the hypothetical corridor. Each successive increment (from D to E, from E
to F, etc.) results in a line segment with a flatter slope that reflects the
lower returns- per dollar of the additional investment.
The indices in equations (1) and (2) above depend only upon the differences in
costs, travel impacts, and financing between the proposed investment and the
TSM alternative. In addition, UMTA considers the results of alternatives
analysis -- that-is, whether offiermajornvestment alternatives available
l1 ~5lly are more cost-effective than the locally preferred option.
City X City Y
25--------------- - P 25
20 20 o
Added I
Riders 15 15
(MM's 10 0
per TSM A I V
year) 5 5
0 1 0 TSMI
0 410 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
Added Capital Costs Less Credits Added Capital Costs Less Credits
($MM's per year) ($MM's per year)
Figure 3 Fiqujre 4
This situation is best illustrated qraphically. In Fiqure 3, a locally
preferred alternative (P) from City X is plotted with respect to its added
costs and added ridership compared to the ISM alternative. For this example,
the credits include local match and the index represented is for the Federal
perspective. The added cost per added rider for this alternative is
$42MM525MM = $1.60. No other alternatives in City X produce added riders
qujite so efficiently since Alternative A yields new riders at a rate of
$3OMMfIOMM = $3.00 each. This result is also represented graphically since
Alternative A lies below and to the riqht of the cost-effectiveness frontier
drawn between the oriqin and Alternative V.
The situation in Fiqiire 4 for City Y is similar in that the locally preferred
alternative (pw) has added costs and riders identical to those of Alternative
V in City X9 but different because Alternative Air yields new riders at a rate
of $1OMM/2OMM = $0.50 each and is fouind on the frontier.
Figure 5 demonstrates the approach to including in the index recognition that
in City Y a significantly more cost-effective option is available. The
approach treats the investment,4in the preferred alternative as two segments:
the first equial to that needed for Alternative A-, and the second equial to
that needed beyond Alternative A- to reach Alternative P*. The composite
index assigned to Alternative P- is a weighted average of the indices for each
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of these two segments, where the weights are simply the increment of
investment in each segment . n this case, the weiqht tor the tirst segment is
$10 muTTion while that for the second is $30 million. The first segment is
assigned the $0.50/rider value computed above for Alternative A*. The second
segment is assigned a value reflecting the additional $30 million and 5
million riders associated with Alternative P* compared to A*: ($30MM/5MM) =
$6.00/rider.
City Y
25 -- -- -- -- --- 0 P-
20--
Added A* $6.00/ride
Riders 15
(MM's 10
per
year) 5 $0.50/ride
0
0 10 20 30 40
Added Capital Costs Less Credits
($MM's per year)
Figure 5
Thus, the (composite) Federal index for Alternative P* is
($10MM x $0.50) + ($30MM x $6.00)
(4) Federal Index = = $4.63.
$10MM + $30MM
Therefore,.Alternative V would be assigned a Federal composite index of $4.63
that reflects the existence of a-more cost-effective major investment option
in Atraive A. A composite index fott.1ns wudb cm uted
analogously.
In cases where several lower cost alternatives are found on the frontier, the
computation involves weighting over several segments. Where no lower cost
alternatives lie on the frontier, the computation simplifies to a single
segment.
- 357 -
3(b) Application of Threshold Tests
To ensure that projects being considered for Federal funding meet minimum
levels of cost-effectiveness, UMTA applies several threshold or screening
tests at three points in the project development process. The tests are
engi neeri nq,. and e) d  l - i on of fna ing e i1qi bi 1ity at the conc Tusion of
p These threshold requirements apply to all proposals
for funding assistance tnder Section 3, Section 9, or the Interstate Transfer
program.
The purpose of these thresholds is to identify as early as possible those
projects which clearly do not warrant Federal support. he threshold tests
help avoid a prolonqed and costly planning effort by local governments and
UMTA in cases where ederal iniA ort is very unlikey. t the same
time, the thresholds are sufficiently generous to ensure tnat 'potentially
meritorious projects receive full consideration for funding.
To enter alternatives analysis, a corridor must satisfy two threshold tests:
1) The corridor must today have at least 15,000 daily transit (linked
trips . This requirement ensures that at least a modest transit
miaret exists in the corridor.
2) The major investment alternatives proposed for study must be
potentially cost-effective, in the sense that they areiTkely to yield
Eost-effectiveness indices that are not excessive. The most direct
way to demonstrate this condition is with preliminary cost and rider-
ship estimates developed during system planning studies toupdate the
reqion's long ranige-transport!atin plan. The threshold value used in
thiestest isbased on a generous estimate of the operating cost,
parking cost, and travel time savings for a typical auto commuter who
shifts to a quideway transit mode of travel. This estimate is multi-
multipilied by a factor of three to recognize the presence of indirect
benefits as well as the preliminary nature of cost and ridership esti-
mates. For 1984, the threshold value is $10.00 per new transit trip.
Where Section 9 or formula-allocated Interstate Transfer funds are to be used
for alternatives analysis, UMTA will concur in the analysis even if these
threshold tests are not satisfied. In these cases, UMTA will issue a letter
of exception to warn local officials that a fixed guideway project in the
corridor would probably not qualify for UMTA capital assistance.
Regardless of the source of funds, projects must satisfy three thresholdsJq
pass from alternatives analysis into preliminary engineering, and to qualify
for consideratIon in ti hiFing system at the en f~5Trimi nary engineering:
1) The alternative must produce a gain in transit riders c red to
the TSM alternative. s res o ensures that potential Federal
investments demonstrate a basic level of performance.
2) The alternative must lie on the cost-effectiveness frontier. The
iiipactbof thls t-FrshFolid is illustrated in Figure 6. In this example,
the locally preferred alternative P is not on the frontier defined by
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the origin, A, and B. A full Federal share invested in Alternative P
would. represent an unproductive use of some of these funds since
higher benefits could be achieved with a lower investment in
Alternative A. This result is prevented by the requirement that, in
terms of the Federal index, the alternative must lie on the frontier.
Local officials have the option of moving their preferred alternative
to the frontier by increasing still further their commitment of local
or private funds to the project. The necessary increase in local
funds would reduce the Federal share of Alternative P sufficiently to
move the alternative to point P' on the frontier in Figure 6. (The
total index remains unchanged since it is independent of the sources
of funds.) This device is labeled a "buy-back" where local officials
are able to increase the attractiveness of the project for Federal
funding by reducing Federal costs. Thus, this threshold limits
City Z
30 B
20 '
Added . .
Riders
(MM's 10
oer
year)
TSM
0 10 20 30 40
buy-back
Added Costs Less Credits
($MM's per year)
Figure 6
potential Federal investment in a corridor to projects that offer the
best return for increasing levels of investment. It also has the
effect of making more Federal funds available for better projects: in
Figure 6, more Federal funds would be available for Alternative A than
Alternative P even though Alternative A is less costly.
3) The a~temative must not have an excessive composite index. This
requirement prevents entry of projects tha satisfy the first two
screens but represent Ary unproductive uses of Federal funds. The
threshold value used in this test is again based on a generous
estimate of the operating cost, parking cost, and travel time savings
for a typical auto commuter who shifts to a guideway transit mode of
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travel. This estimate is multiplied by a factor of two to recoqnje
the presence of indirect benefits as well as the more re nate
of the cos t anTdFid ij i_ esiates pdu d gltnt r
analys.0 For 1984, the threshold value is $6.00 per new transit
trip.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate two ways in which locally preferred
alternatives can survive the first two screens yet be very
unattractive investments. In Figure 7, the locally preferred
alternative is on the frontier but yields new riders at an extremely
costly rate. In Figure 8, the local preference is again on the
frontier but performs so poorly versus Alternative A that its
composite index is extremely high.
Index = $16.00/rider
5 TSM
0CV
0 10 20 30 40
Added Capital Costs Less Credits
($MM's per year)
Figure 7
= $0.25/rider
Index = $14.00/rider
T SM
Composite Index
= $12.30/rider
0 10 20 30 40
Added Capital Costs Less Credits
($MM's per year)
Figure 8
Added
Riders
(MM s
per
year)
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4. Assignment of Project Ratings
This section describes the timing and method UMTA uses to assign ratings to
each project, based on the indices described above and on the overall
performance of the project with respect to the Federal objectives in urban
mass transportation.
4(a) Timing
Ratings are assigned by UMTA in the first quarter of each fiscal ytear to ajl
projects that have competed ip-reTiminary engineering, have satisfied the
threshold tests on cot-effectiveness, and are seeking (but have not yet
obtained) a commitment from UMTA for discretionary fuding. Preliminary
ratings will also be includedf ecs WE-aeTeerged from alternativ
analysis, and have satisfied an initial application of the threshold tests,
but have not completed preliminary engineering. These projects, which are not
yet ready for funding decisions, are included to indicate the relative merits
of all projects that might be expected to compete for Federal funding within
the current authorization cycle. The ratings wl be sha d
Congress, as input to the annual appropriations process, and with local
6'fff fiTs. For each project, the ratings will be accompanied by UMTA's
TnalyTsi'sof the project's merit for Federal- assistance.
As part of alternatives analysis, indices for all alternatives are computed as
a reference for local officials choosing a preferred alternative. Once this
alternative is identified, UMTA assigns a preliminary rating to the project
and shares this rating with local officials. This rating also guides UMTA's
decision on whether to concur in advancing a project into preliminary
engneeDrjag. DecisTiohn entry into pre1iifiry engineering may occur at any
time of the year.
4(b) Development of Ratings
The approach UMTA uses to rate potential investments is similar to that used
by private financial institutions to evaluate or grade investment options and
assess risk. Private institutions typically use a set of objective criteria
to place investment options into broad groups with similar worthiness. They
then apply judgemental criteria to determine a final ranking.
Similarly, UMTA uses a t o-epgpracess to assign ratings to projects. First,
the cost-effectiveness indices described above are used to determine the
Everall investment worthiness of each can idate project. Wher projects
exhibit similar degrees of cost-e fectivees, assigned the same
rating as an indication of their similar investment worthiness. Second,
all projects receiving the same rating are ranked aqainst each other on the
b6asis oi s-peciTfied poli-cy objectives.
Hence, the UMTA rating system relies upon informed judgment to establish the
final rankings of projects that exhibit comparable levels of investment
worthiness. Rather than trying to produce an automatic, discrete ranking of
projects on the basis of a single measure, the rating system instead
recognizes the margin of error implicit in [orecasting ridership and
estima n costs, and reles upon other Tactors to establish the inal
rinis of projects with similar cost-effectiveness indces.
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Step 1: Initial Determination of Project Ratings
As a first step in assigning ratings to candidate projects, UMTA computes the
two indices of project merit, Federal and total, for each eligible project.
Data on capital costs, operatin and maintenance costs. ridership, travel
time n oa financing are those produced by local project sponsnrs and
docunented in r Final n rnmen Im act atement EISand
Preferred Alternative Renort. Where additional planning and engineering work
has been done since the EIS, or where the data in the EIS is incomplete or
outdated, UMTA and the local project sponsor will reach agreement on the
estimates of ridership. travel time and costs to s This will help to
tn....hat the project ratings the latest information available on
each project. In each case, UMTA will review the methodsanaut s sd
to develop the ridership, trave t an coseiiimates in order to ensure
that these forecasts are technically .ound and that they are compara Mie f
the forecasts develope or other proit..
The two indices of project merit are used to classify projects according to
their investment worthiness. In some cases, however, the indices do not
clearly distinguish between the projects. For example, given the uncertainty
inherent in forecasting project costs and benefits, two projects with Federal.
indices of $1.50 per new rider and $1.70 are considered indistinguishable in
terms of the indices. In such cases, projects are assigned the same rating.
Projects that perform well on both the Federal and total cost-effectiveness
indices are deemed to represent the best use of available Federal resources
and are assigned a high rating. Projects that perform poorly on both are
considered least worthy among the eliqible projects and receive a low rating.
The remaining projects are assigned a rating that reflects their moderate
attractiveness as potential investments. Depending on the number and
differences among these remaining projects, there may be more than one class
of projects in this intermediate range.
Local officials can influence the rating given to their project throu jgr
decisions on mode alignment, design, and financin . e most effective way
for localToficial to compete for Fe era uning is to select a highly
cost-effective alternative at the conclusion of alternatives analysis. Once
an alternative is chosen, local officials can improve the project's rating by
takin steps to improve it indc. - xample, local officials might
change the scope or design of the project to reduce its capital costs, enhance
its riders n ia , or ur 1M r e to existing riders.
In assigning project ratings, UMTA examines both the Federal and total
cost-effectiveness indices. Since only those -projects that perform well on
both indices are assigned the highest rating, a project that performs poorly
in~terms of total cost-effectiveness can-ot Fe upgraded to a highly rated one
solely because of a high local overmatch that produces a competitive Federal
index. At best, such a project might receive a middle rating on the basis of
its improved trade-off between the necessary Federal investment and the
project's transportation benefits.
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Step 2: Establishment of Final Ordering of Projects
Within each set of projects that receive the same rating, UMTA orders the
projects in terms of their overafl consistency with the objectives and
criteria discussed above. This is done judgmentally and results only in the
ordering of all oects with the same ratijnq, not in the assignment of a new
rating to any project. Loca mmtment, particularly the stability
and reliability of local sources of operating funds. is a pimrriteion in
the ordering. To evaluate the stabili ty andreliiability of these funding
sources, UMTA and its financial advisors will determine whether local
operating funds are derived from dedicated sources, the extent to which these
sources will cover projected operating assistance requirements, and the
longevity of the dedicated funding source. Preference will be given to
projects that exhibit the most stable and reliable funding sources. This will
help reduce the risk that a shortfall in local operating revenues will
ultimately lead to a reduction in service from the levels presumed in the
Federal decision to support the project.
Other factors that may influence a project's final ranking include an
unusually high level of community support, particularly when demonstra y
commitments to supporting and use and ransportation poli cies. n addition,
UMIA would also-co-nsider an outstanding ettort to obtainthe Participation of
disadvantaged businesses in project planning, design, construction, and
operation. Finally, preference will be given wenever oca ciasagree
to lt Ir uture use of Section 9 revenues for operating assiSice.
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5. Use of Project Ratings in UMTA Funding Decicions
The rating system has been designed to help the Federal government direct
those discretionary resources that are available for major investment projects
toward those projects that offer the greatest return on the Federal
investment. Fixed guideway projects that rate most highly under the system
are given priority for discretionary funds authorized by the Congress under
Section 3 of the Urban Mass Transportation Act and the Interstate Transfer
program 3. SimTiiFly, projects that rate poorly underthe q
system are given a low priority for funding, and are funded only after all
other eligible projects. Fixed guideway proposals that fail to satisfy the
threshold criteria noted above are considered ineligible for Federal funding,
both discretionary and formula.
There are two ways in which the ratings affect Federal funding decisions.
First, the project ratings developed by UMTA in the first quarter of each
fiscal year are shared with the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, the
off ice ofManagementand Budget, the Congress, and the bc.2. These
evaluations help guide funding decisions during that fiscal year. All
interested parties will then have the benefit of objective information on the
relative merits of projects that are in a position to receive a capital
grant. They will also be aware of the merits of other projects not yet
finished preliminary engineering that are likely to seek Federal funds during
the authorization period.
Second, project ratings are used by UMTA in deciding on whether to issue a
Letter oFTI5tentiLOI) and construction. Upon the
completion of the preliminary engineerinq phase, local officials may ask UMTA
for a Letter of Intent to provide Section 3 discretionary funds for final
design and construction. Letters of Intent are used to document UMTA's
intention to obligate Section 3 funds for a particular project, but are not a
Federal obligation or administrative commitment. The total amount of
potential Federal obligations covered by all outstanding Letters of Intent
cannot exceed the amount authorized to carry out Section 3, less an amount
necessary for other grants not covered by Letters of Intent (i.e., the bus and
rail modernization programs).
In order to optimize the use of available resources over the authorization
period, UMTA will use the rating system to determine which projects should
receive Letters of Intent. Such letters will be offered to cost-effective
projects, in order of their performance in the rating system, up to the point
where the remaining authorization for new start projects is exhausted. In
selecting projects for Letters of Intent, UMTA will consider all projects
expected to become eligible for funding during the current authorization
cycle, not just those eligible in the current year. When the competing
proposals include a highly rated project that would consume all available
resources, UMTA will seek to negotiate some reasonable compromise that would
allow other worthy projects to share in the benefits of the program.
